[Debate] Mali Heading Closer to Civil War

[Riaz K Tayob]

Mali Heading Closer to Civil War
By William Lloyd-George
Malian rebels do not have the support of most ethnic groups in the north 
of the country. / Credit:William Lloyd-George/IPS
Malian rebels do not have the support of most ethnic groups in the north 
of the country.

Credit:William Lloyd-George/IPS <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=107617>


*NIAMEY, Apr 30, 2012 (IPS) - Since January, various groups of Tuareg 
rebels in Mali have come together in an attempt to administer a new 
northern state called Azawad.*

While this was announced on Apr. 6, the rebel grouping's control of the 
region remains questionable, and the roots behind the conflict, complex.

After the colonial French departed in 1960, the region was carved up and 
the Tuareg 
<http://www.ips.org/africa/2012/04/tuareg-fighters-declare-mali-ceasefire/> 
nomadic communities were placed into several different countries.

According to Professor Jeremy Keenan, the French felt close to the 
Tuareg and not the southern ethnicities in Mali, due to their 
matriarchal society, similar class structures, monogamous nature and a 
romantic notion that the French had of the Taureg people.

"The French patronised them, it made certain Tuareg clans feel 
superior," says Keenan.

When Mali gained independence, Tuareg communities in the north suddenly 
found themselves under the rule of the southern tribes, whom some Tuareg 
clans believed to be inferior.

"Their world was turned upside down and they didn't like it," explains 
Keenan. "They felt as though they had done pretty badly out of the 
colonial shift."

Unhappy with the new setup, a handful of Tuareg led a small rebellion in 
1963. This started when Alladi Ag Alla, a Tuareg rebel, attacked two 
policemen as they travelled on camel across a remote desert.

The Malian army responded, crushing the rebellion within a year. Soon 
afterwards, severe drought hit the region from 1969 to 1974 and from 
1982 to 1984, and forced thousands of Tuareg to flee to neighbouring 
countries in search of work and food.

But in 1990, hundreds of Tuaregs returned under the leadership of Iyad 
Ag Ghali, now the leader of the Islamist faction, Ansar Dine, which is 
currently calling for Sharia law to be implemented in Mali.

After an initial attack on a small police camp, conflict raged until 
1992 when the rebels entered into talks with the Malian government.

The resultant National Pact, which was signed in 1992, fractured the 
movement. While some Tuareg leaders were keen to negotiate with the 
government, others took a hard-line approach. Those who disapproved of 
their comrades' desire to compromise fled to neighbouring countries. And 
most of the rebel leaders who remained were given special positions in 
the state military.

Despite peace agreements, rebels said that the Malian government did not 
fulfil their promises and anger simmered away. This was until 2006 when 
a new rebellion broke out after insurgents attacked Malian army 
installations, only to stop again after ceasefire talks brokered by 
Algeria.

The result of the talks, the Algiers Accords, promised the Tuareg rebels 
greater autonomy, economic development, and the protection of Tuareg 
culture. But the agreement broke down again.

However, one Tuareg rebel leader, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, refused to 
negotiate. When the Algiers Accords were being worked out, he was still 
attacking the Malian army. But in 2009, he was finally pushed out of 
Mali and found refuge in Libya.

There he teamed up with several former revolutionary commanders who had 
left Mali after the 1990 rebellion. They included Mohammed Ag Najim, the 
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad's (MNLA) current chief of 
staff. Once again plans began, to launch another rebellion, one that 
would be stronger than ever before.

As anti-Muammar Gaddafi protests began in Libya's capital, Tripoli, Ag 
Bahanga made plans to travel back to Mali with a handful of leaders to 
restart their rebellion.

The group returned to Mali in October 2011, and was followed by hundreds 
of Tuareg mercenaries, who were once hired by both Gaddafi and the 
Libyan National Transitional Council, and who were armed with stolen 
Libyan weapons. This was the beginning of the latest conflict.

According to MNLA spokesman Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, few of his people 
were loyal to Gaddafi, and they never forgot the atrocities committed 
against the Tuareg people in Mali.

"We would attack a police force and they would respond by attacking any 
Tuareg they could find," explains Acharatoumane.

The most notable perpetrators of war crimes were members of Ganda Koy, a 
Songhai militia funded by the Malian army, which allegedly committed 
several massacres against unarmed Tuareg civilians.

While some MNLA commanders do have grounds for complaint against the 
Malian government, and genuine dreams for the creation of a Tuareg 
state, observers are sceptical of how much public support they have in 
the region. They are also not convinced that the concept of Tuareg 
nationalism is embraced by all.

According to West Africa expert Tommy Miles, the MNLA do not have the 
support of most ethnic groups in the north, who see the rhetoric of the 
movement as another way for noble Tuaregs to dominate their communities.

Milesargues rather than being a national liberation struggle, "northern 
Mali now looks like the locus of an armed political struggle between 
rival local Tuareg leaders, which has cascaded into a general collapse 
of the social order."

Miles explains this by pointing to the dominance of the Ifghoas clan 
members in the rebellions. Few other Tuareg clans are interested in the 
desire for an independent state.

According to Keenan, in order to understand the true reasons motivating 
the Islamist groups operating in the north, one has to look at their 
links with the Algerian regime and the drug trade.

"These are the two elephants in the room," explains Keenan. "Algeria's 
secret service, the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité 
(DRS), has operatives in all these groups in the region."

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in 
West Africa, through proxy drug smugglers, make vast amounts of money 
out of the drug trade. Like many other groups in the region, they have a 
major vested interest to be in the north of Mali, where they can control 
the transportation of cocaine.

"In addition to several other agendas, the DRS wants to keep instability 
in the region in order to secure the drug trade," Keenan says, adding 
that the DRS is also trying to keep the Islamist groups off Algerian 
soil and in the north of Mali where they can use operatives to control 
the situation.

Several anti-MNLA groups are emerging and there is a growth in the 
number of foreign Islamist groups operating in the region. As the 
conflict becomes increasingly complex and fractured, the MNLA's history 
of grievances becomes more distant. As clans, factions and Islamist 
groups take up guns for their own interests, the region edges closer to 
all-out civil war.

(END)
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