No subject

25/08/2011
By Hossam Salama

Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat =96 Abdelhakim Belhadj is the commander of the =
Libyan
rebel Tripoli Military Council; he emerged as a leader during the Libyan
rebels=92 operation to liberate the Libyan capital from Gaddafi control.
Belhadj is also a former Emir of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group =
(LIFG),
which was banned internationally as a terrorist organization following =
the
9/11 attacks.

The LIFG was founded in the 1990s by Libyan mujahedeen returning from
Afghanistan and was reportedly previously led by Abu Laith al-Libi, a =
top Al
Qaeda leader in Afghanistan who is believed to have been a training camp
leader and key link between Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Belhadj was born in 1966, and graduated from university with a degree in
civil engineering. He is also believed to have two wives; one Moroccan =
wife
and a second Sudanese wife. Belhadj immigrated to Afghanistan in 1988 to
participate in the Afghan jihad against occupying Soviet forces. He is
believed to have lived in a number of Islamic countries including =
Pakistan,
Turkey and Sudan. Belhadj was arrested in Afghanistan and Malaysia in =
2004,
and was interrogated by the CIA in Thailand before he was extradited to
Libya in the same year. He was released in Libya in 2008, and announced =
his
renunciation of violence the following year.

Belhadj is known within Islamist circles as =93Abu Abdullah Assadaq" and =
the
Libyan uprising has seen his transformation from wanted man to hero of =
the
Libyan revolution.

The LIFG is considered a key component in the revolution that brought =
down
the Gaddafi regime. Approximately 800 members of the LIFG are believed =
to
have participated in fighting alongside rebel forces, under the =
leadership
of Abdelhakim Belhadj.

Libyan Islamists, especially over the past two decades, have been the
subject to government suppression. An LIFG rebellion was crushed in =
Benghazi
in 1995 and 1,800 LIFG members were imprisoned. They were only released
after the group=92s ideology was revised in 2008. In September 2009, the =
LIFG
published a new jihadist =93code=94, a 417-page document entitled =
=93Corrective
Studies=94 which was published after more than two years of intense =
talks
between incarcerated LIFG leaders and Libyan officials, including Saif
al-Islam Gaddafi.

The Gaddafi regime released ten leaders of the LIFG (alongside 214
affiliates of other Islamist trends) on 23 March 2010. Belhadj was =
amongst
those released, and he has been described as the Emir of the LIFG. In
addition to this, other senior LIFG members were released, including =
LIFG
theorist Abu Mundhir al Saadi, and LIFG military commander Khalid =
al-Sharif.

In March 2011, members of the LIFG reportedly announced that they had =
placed
themselves under the leadership of the Libyan rebel National =
Transitional
Council, and that the group had changed its name from the LIFG to the =
Libyan
Islamic Movement.

On Mon, Aug 29, 2011 at 11:31 AM, Neville Adams <nada01 at claranet.co.uk>
wrote:
> I am puzzled by your use of the term =91felicity=92.=A0 I am happy =
with my=20
> arguments.=A0 Do you mean veracity?=A0 Yes, there needs to be a move =
to=20
> the generation of principles vis-=E0-vis intervention in other states, =

> preferably ones that stem from a democratised international legal=20
> order, where, in short hand, democratised refers to bottom up law=20
> formation.=A0=A0 In the interim we try to squeeze as much out of the=20
> normative potential of what exists in relation to international law=20
> and the states supposedly bound by them, to further progressive =
ends.=A0=A0=20
> And in that interim, when shit happens and others prefer to=20
> pontificate about the lack of ideal circumstances, it is better to run =

> with that normative potential knowing full well that =A0the unfinished =

> business of the enlightenment means that western states stare back at=20
> us Janus faced reflecting the reality that their ostensible,=20
> =91universal=92 values of freedom, equality and such like can be=20
> undergirded by repressive particularisms.=A0 =A0There is a chance then =
that
intervention in support of the Libyan people might turn into an
imperialistic relationship.
> =A0However, having asked for help - =A0and we should not be so=20
> patronising, or hubristic, as to believe that they did not know the=20
> risks - it is, in the first instance, up to the Libyan people to=20
> ensure that that does not happen.=A0=A0 Our role =96 those living in =
the=20
> west=A0 who supported the intervention =96 is to try to ensure that=20
> requested intervention does not trip over into dependency revisited.
>
>
>
> Peter=92s point was, as I understand it, about =A0trying to comprehend =
the=20
> world still through the prism of a Palaeolithic =A0Marxism.=A0=A0 My =
point=20
> is that intervention in support of those with emancipative aims who=20
> request it has occurred before.=A0 The absence of a fully worked out =
set=20
> of guiding principles, international laws and inter-state governance=20
> arrangements should not be a barrier to responding positively to that, =

> which I think it is for you.=A0=A0 So to your last point about whether =
or=20
> not other means had been exhausted.=A0 =A0=A0People who live under a =
regime=20
> in which violence of differing sorts is insinuated into almost every =
=A0
> aspect of society, particularly their relationship to the state, do=20
> not, when they rise up against this, initiate the violence.=A0 You =
can=92t=20
> seriously be suggesting that they should have first had some form of=20
> =91indaba=92 about the best way forward?=A0=A0 That very act itself =
would have=20
> been interpreted as an act of violence against the state by the =
Gaddafi
regime, and dealt with violently.
>
>
>
> You are not the only one concerned about the lack of an adequate=20
> framework within which to assess the claims for help. =A0I=92m simply =
not=20
> hamstrung by that absence.
>
>
>
> Neville
>
>
>
> From: debate-list-bounces at fahamu.org=20
> [mailto:debate-list-bounces at fahamu.org]
> On Behalf Of Riaz K Tayob
> Sent: 28 August 2011 17:20
> To: Debate is a listserve that attempts to promote information and=20
> analyses of interest to the independent left in South and Southern=20
> Africa
>
> Subject: Re: [Debate] (Fwd) Is Qaddafi's overthrow a blow or a boon?=20
> (Pham
> Binh)
>
>
>
> I do not know why you see this as condemnatory hubris when I am quite=20
> willing to change the label of container, while you continue to avoid=20
> my points on content regarding felicity to the arguments made in=20
> support of the intervention/solidarity (insert appropriate term here)
actions.
>
> It is precisely because I am willing to engage on these issues, and I=20
> am not unresponsive to the idealism that drives the will to intervene, =

> that I question the felicity of the arguments made. Which I find quite =

> wanting. As Peter put it in his crit of Yoshie, there is a need to=20
> move to generalisation of issues and principles so that some=20
> obligation to compliance can be made. Arguments like Achcar's or=20
> Devan's are not convincing.
>
> On your question, oppressed peoples deserve our support. But no=20
> uncritically. And the bar is set much higher when we make common cause =

> with imperialism. It simply will not do to say that something positive =

> is being done so we must support it, because of the old hard-learned=20
> addage - beware foreigners bearing gifts (and we should look a gift =
horse
in the mouth).
> That the brutalities we see in far too many third world countries has=20
> neither a principled basis nor even a useful procedure (the SC is=20
> about threats to international peace) to address it is worrying. And=20
> it is possible to have the development of laws on this through state=20
> practice if not through treaty. But the interventionists or=20
> neo-humanitarians steer clear of this.
>
> Your comparison, in your question to me, is context speficic in the=20
> cold war or during the hey days of self determination and=20
> decolonisation (or the process to complete independence). This is=20
> where PeterW points to Yoshie make imminent sense, as things have=20
> changed and moved on. And this is the fork in the road where we can=20
> (and do differ). Unlike the neohumanitarians
> (sic) and Chomsky (in interventions) the choice over a brutal dictator =

> and imperialism should lead to support for the latter is not as =
obvious.
>
> The problem with responding to oppressed people calling for help with=20
> a military response is one of substance and procedure. Is violence the =

> correct means? Have other means been exhausted? Who decides? And how =
do
they decide?
> We do lack the laws and the means for this but in the context where=20
> the same people who write state practice in pre-emptive war and=20
> Devan's any means necessary are not the sort of folk to be entrusted =
with
such unilaterally!
> Which brings us to the point of what are the principles that guide the =

> move to justify Libyan intervention aside from uniqueness?
>
> The lack of felicity to the arguments presented sets a dangerous=20
> precedent for parochial interpretation when in any event whatever=20
> principles are derived would be subject to paradiastole.
>
>
>
> On 2011/08/28 07:04 PM, Neville Adams wrote:
>
> There you go again, Riaz,=A0 exercising a condemnatory hubris through=20
> reductive labelling =96 =91interventionists, =91neo-humanitarians=92, =
and so=20
> forth.=A0=A0 Having read your responses so far to the Libyan issue, I =
am=20
> only too aware of =91the complexity of the paranoid politics that=20
> foreign interference breeds in local politics.=92=A0=A0 I seem to =
recall a=20
> vigorous call for foreign intervention of differing sorts =96 =
disinvestment,
boycotts etc .
> =96 against apartheid South Africa.=A0 Was there not military =
intervention=20
> by proxy on the part of the USSR and its satellites through the arming =

> and training of the ANC?=A0 =A0In the case of Zimbabwe, I remember the =
UK=20
> being caricatured =96 quite rightly - as a toothless old lion for not=20
> using brute force to end the UDI.=A0 =A0In the history of liberation=20
> struggles, it would appear then that some of those struggling against=20
> oppressive regimes actively sought supporting =A0intervention by =
others.=A0=A0=20
> So, given the scenario of the oppressed rising up and calling for=20
> help, under what circumstances would such a type of intervention be
unacceptable?
>
>
>
> Neville
>
>
>
> From: debate-list-bounces at fahamu.org=20
> [mailto:debate-list-bounces at fahamu.org]
> On Behalf Of Riaz K Tayob
> Sent: 28 August 2011 09:44
> To: pbond at mail.ngo.za; Debate is a listserve that attempts to promote=20
> information and analyses of interest to the independent left in South=20
> and Southern Africa
> Subject: Re: [Debate] (Fwd) Is Qaddafi's overthrow a blow or a boon?=20
> (Pham
> Binh)
>
>
>
> Sure this makes sense, but has not been much in evidence IMHO on this
list.
>
> Problem is that some of the Libya interventionists on this list have=20
> not being willing to embrace the complexity of the paranoid politics=20
> that foreign interference breeds in local politics... and this relates =

> to all sorts of interference, from World Bank loans and neo-liberalism =

> through to betting on one or other candidate.
>
> To me it seems that this would mean eschewing the simplicity of=20
> anti-statism in third countries with a more sophisticated, but no less =

> critical, position (many third world elites do aspire to be part of=20
> the globalised elite). And this is not to be reductionistic in=20
> critique - which goes to the heart of my characterisation of=20
> interventionists and the shortcomings in arguments in support of the
intervention.
>
> If one adds Binh's point to the equation one can see how foreign=20
> forces undermined progressive movements from Egypt to Libya. This was=20
> the case even in countries where it is reasonably foreseeable that the =

> sceptre of foreign involvement would haunt and undermine the=20
> progressive movements. In some places there is the implicit view that=20
> international solidarity is the monopoly of the West, which is not
acceptable.
>
> If the quote you like from Binh is viewed as valid, it should not be=20
> limited to peoples revolutions only. One would then also have to look=20
> at issues like the Meghrahi case, which as an indictment of the=20
> Collective North of an order of magnitude that is not even permitted=20
> public gaze, not even by neohumanitarian interventionists. But then=20
> the challenge is how does one integrate this level of sophisticated=20
> brutality by the Collective North into the assessments which are=20
> further complicated by Q's idiotic and brutal actions?
>
> On 2011/08/28 11:16 AM, Patrick Bond wrote:
>
> (This makes sense to me: "We in the West need to do what we can to=20
> keep the hands of our rulers off of other people=92s revolutions, =
which=20
> means taking a stand against imperialist intervention even when it is=20
> disguised as aid to a beleaguered rebellion.")
>
> August 27, 2011
>
> Qaddafi=92s Overthrow: a =93Blow to the Arab=A0Spring=94?
>
>
>
> By Pham Binh
>
>
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--
Yoshie Furuhashi
<http://mrzine.org/>
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