[Debate] Did Wikileaks just reveal the US blueprint for Libya?

[Riaz K Tayob]

Did Wikileaks just reveal the US blueprint for Libya?

  Ali Abunimah on Fri, 08/26/2011 - 23:23

The US administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
were set on developing deep “military to military” ties with the Libyan 
regime of Muammar Gaddafi, classified US diplomatic cables released by 
Wikileaks on 24 August reveal.

The United States was keen to integrate Libya as much as possible into 
“AFRICOM,” the American military command for Africa which seeks to 
establish bases and station military forces permanently on the continent.

“We never would have guessed ten years ago that we would be sitting in 
Tripoli, being welcomed by a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi,” Senator Joseph 
Lieberman (Ind.-CT) said during an August 2009 meeting, which also 
included Senators John McCain and Susan Collins.

The records confirm that McCain, the Republican presidential candidate 
in 2008, strongly supported US arms sales to Libya and personally 
pledged to Muammar Gaddafi (also spelled “al-Qadhafi”) and his son 
Muatassim that he would push to get such transfers approved by Congress. 
McCain also revealed that the United States was training officers in 
Gaddafi’s army.

While the Americans pursued the relationship vigorously, they met with a 
cautious and sometimes “mercurial” response from the Libyans. In 
particular, the mistrustful Libyans wanted security guarantees that the 
Americans appeared reluctant to give.

“We can get [equipment] from Russia or China,” Muatassim told the 
visiting senators, “but we want to get it from you as a symbol of faith 
from the United States.”

In hindsight, given the US support for the NATO war against the Gaddafi 
regime, it is not difficult to understand why the Libyans wanted these 
guarantees.

Nevertheless, Gaddafi received high praise for his “counterterrorism” 
credentials from US officials.

The documents also reveal that the United States was keen to court 
Gaddafi’s sons, flying them to the United States for high level visits.

And, notably, none of the cables regarding high level meetings quoted in 
this post made any mention of American concerns about “human rights” in 
Libya. The issue never appeared on the bilateral agenda.

Does the removal of the Gaddafi regime now clear the way for the United 
States to pursue the plans for integrating Libya into AFRICOM under what 
the Americans must hope will be a pliable regime?

“Increased defense cooperation”

In January 2008, US Assistant Secretary of State David Welch met with 
Libyan Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgam. The classified memo 
recording the meeting notes:

Welch underscored the importance of increased defense cooperation as a 
signal of normalcy in the bilateral military relationship, particularly 
when considering Libya’s relatively recent rescission from the state 
sponsors of terrorism in June 2006. A/S Welch added that the Libyan 
government should invite AFRICOM Commander General Ward to Libya to 
discuss AFRICOM in greater detail.

The Libyans responded positively but somewhat warily:

Shalgam voiced the Libyan government’s interest in discussing AFRICOM 
and welcomed General Ward’s visit. However, he cautioned, the old guard 
within the MOD [Ministry of Defense] does not favor closer ties with the 
USG [US government] (reftel). In particular, General Abubaker Younes, 
the second in command, is firmly against cooperation and will refuse to 
meet any American official as he views U.S. coalition forces in Iraq as 
an occupation force. Nonetheless, Shalgam explained that it is important 
for Ward to visit and dispel misinformation and mistrust of AFRICOM 
among the Libyan leadership. He reasserted Libya’s continued, strong 
objection to U.S. military forces in Africa.

Shalgam also raised the issue of six C-130 military transport planes 
that Libya had purchased from the United States in the early 1970s, but 
which were never delivered due to US sanctions that were imposed later on.

Courting Gaddafi and his sons

After President Barack Obama took office in January 2009, it appears 
General William Ward, the commander of AFRICOM did get his invitation to 
visit Libya the following March. Before his visit, Ward received a 
classified briefing document from the US Embassy in Tripoli setting out 
US priorities and goals in Libya as well as providing insights into the 
regime.

The American document notes that after Libya settled various claims to 
do with terrorism cases including the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie bombing, it:

allowed us to move forward on the Mil-Mil MOU [Military to Military 
Memorandum of Understanding], which was signed in Washington in January. 
It also increased the number of high-level visits between the two 
countries including Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi’s two-week trip to the US 
in November and his brother Muatassim al-Qadhafi’s trip to Washington 
planned for April.

The memo again notes the mistrust on the Libyan side:

Despite the high-level interest in deepening the relationship, several 
old-guard regime figures remain skeptical about the re-engagement 
project and some facets of our interaction remain at the mercy of the 
often mercurial inner circle.

This was a reference to Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, whom the 
Americans note, often appeared cooler than his sons.

Seducing Libya on AFRICOM

Ward’s brief, according to the classified cable, was to help overcome 
Libyan suspicion of US military expansion into Africa. The document 
advises the general:

Since the former Secretary of State’s visit to Tripoli in September, 
regime officials have slowly come to terms with AFRICOM as we have 
explained more of your mission. A clear explanation of AFRICOM’s mandate 
and expected activities on the continent, as well as a two-way 
discussion on areas of military-to-military cooperation will be welcomed 
by your interlocutors.

Reiterating AFRICOM’s support and humanitarian roles while allaying 
their fears about American troops or bases on the continent is another 
message they will be keen to receive. While Libya is a strong partner on 
counterterrorism, the Libyans remain wary of initiatives that put 
foreign military or intelligence assets too close to their borders. They 
are unlikely to join the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, due 
as much to unwillingness to appear subservient to US interests as 
genuine distrust of U.S. intentions from certain old-guard regime 
elements. Negotiations on the Mil-Mil MOU [Military to Military 
Memorandum of Understanding] stalled on Libyan insistence that the 
language include security assurances on par with our NATO obligations. 
AFRICOM’s capacity-building component and support for peacekeeping 
forces may appease some, but we expect your military interlocutors will 
use your visit as an opportunity to tie their cooperation to security 
assurances.

Gaddafi is a “Top partner”

The Ward memo states:

Libya is a top partner in combating transnational terrorism. The regime 
is genuinely concerned about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel 
and Sahara and worries that instability and weak governments to their 
south could lead to a “belt of terrorism” stretching from Mauritania to 
SOMALIA. Al-Qadhafi prides himself on his recent initiatives with Tuareg 
tribes to persuade them to lay down arms and spurn cooperation with 
al-Qaeda elements in the border region; this is an issue worth exploring 
with him, while being mindful that he will oppose U.S. military activity 
in what he views as his backyard.

US arms sales to Libya

Throughout bilateral discussions, the Ward briefing memo notes, “Libyan 
officials have been keen to purchase US military equipment - both lethal 
and non-lethal.” It adds:

Libyan officials presented “wish lists” in the context of signing the 
Mil-Mil MOU. Muatassim [Gaddafi] accompanied his father on a 
high-profile trip to Moscow in October to discuss potential deals, but 
his father’s trips to Belarus and Ukraine were seen as an attempt to 
bring the price-point down for weapons deals. Their wish-lists comprise 
both lethal and non-lethal materiel and we have told the GOL that sales 
will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, particularly since not all 
senior USG leaders who would have a say on the subject have been 
appointed by the new administration.

The Americans were clearly open to selling weapons to Gaddafi, but were 
noncommital, as Ward was advised:

In effect, the Libyans have made military sales a key litmus of US trust 
and future intentions. In response, you might say that the U.S. looks 
forward to developing the bilateral security relationship and this 
process will take time; the C130s are a commercial matter best pursued 
with Lockheed-Martin.

The memo to General Ward concludes:

We are confident that your visit to Tripoli will open new doors for 
continued cooperation. Military cooperation is a key metric to determine 
the extent to which the Libyan government wishes to engage with the US. 
We hope your visit will assuage the fears of the more conservative 
elements of the regime while paving the way for AFRICOM’s continued success.

Senator McCain pushes for weapons sales

During his August 2009 visit to Tripoli, according to the classified 
record of the meeting, Senator John McCain was frank about his support 
for Libya’s weapons requests in a meeting with Muammar and Muatassim 
Gaddafi:

Senator MCCAIN assured Muatassim that the United States wanted to 
provide Libya with the equipment it needs for its security. He stated 
that he understood LIBYA’s requests regarding the rehabilitation of its 
eight C-130s (ref D) and pledged to see what he could do to move things 
forward in Congress. He encouraged Muatassim to keep in mind the 
long-term perspective of bilateral security engagement and to remember 
that small obstacles will emerge from time to time that can be overcome. 
He described the bilateral military relationship as strong and pointed 
to Libyan officer training at U.S. Command, Staff, and War colleges as 
some of the best programs for Libyan military participation.

A blueprint for post-Gaddafi Libya?

Nothing in the leaked documents reviewed here suggests that the 
NATO-backed removal of the Gaddafi regime was premeditated. On the 
contrary, the documents show that the United States was more 
enthusiastic about working with Gaddafi than perhaps Gaddafi was with 
the Americans – though clearly both stood to gain.

The Americans sought to expand their military presence in Africa and 
Gaddafi wanted to secure his regime against external threats.

At no point were human rights concerns ever an obstacle to American 
engagement for either the George W. Bush or Obama administrations.

The documents support the view that the decision to go to war against 
Gaddafi – in the name of “protecting civilians” was more opportunistic – 
riding on the back of the “Arab Spring.”

It is likely that after the toppling of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
presidents by popular uprisings in January and February respectively, 
top American and NATO decisionmakers believed that once protests started 
against it, the Gaddafi regime would be too unstable and unreliable to 
deal with.

Yet, the regime also fought back against the uprising in Libya with a 
ferocity that exceeded even the violence of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
regimes. It appears likely that American and allied leaders calculated 
that with a little push from their bombs, the balance could quickly be 
tipped in favor of the rebellion.

This mindset is clear from the claim in February – a month before the 
NATO intervention began – by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, that 
Gaddafi had already fled to Venezuela.

It was also clear from statements by US military and political leaders, 
once the bombing began, that the US military role would only last for days.

As it turned out, the war has so far lasted five months, and is not 
over. The full-extent of atrocities by NATO-backed rebels and Gaddafi 
loyalists are only now starting to come to light.

But just as the Americans were happy to work with Gaddafi, they will be 
as keen to work with his successors, who now owe their positions to 
foreign intervention.

The Americans must hope that the National Transitional Council (NTC) 
which the US has recognized as the new government will be less mercurial 
and even more open to “military to military,” and other kinds of ties.