[Debate] Review: BDS: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights

[Ran Greenstein]

A critical review raising interesting points: in particular, whether
it is right to elevate a specific tactic that may be suitable in
certain contexts into a universal imperative that overrides all other
strategies (answer, it is wrong)

=================

Review: BDS: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for
Palestinian Rights
By Glen Pine
Tuesday, August 23, 2011
http://www.zcommunications.org/review-bds-boycott-divestment-sanctions-the-global-struggle-for-palestinian-rights-by-glen-pine

Roughly four million Palestinians live under a brutal and illegal
US-backed Israeli occupation. Approximately 1.5 million Palestinians
live inside Israel, where, although they face less dire circumstances
than those in the occupied territories, they nevertheless endure
substantial and increasingly vicious racial oppression. And according
to the UN, five million Palestinians worldwide are "registered"
refugees whom Israel denies the right of return; roughly one third of
them live in refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the occupied
Palestinian territories. Given this appalling situation, those
concerned with social justice have sought to aid the Palestinian
cause, producing many contending views of how best to proceed. Omar
Barghouti's book contributes to this discussion.

BDS: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions is a collection of essays and
interviews that denounce injustice towards the Palestinians and
promote "BDS" as "the most ambitious, empowering, and promising
Palestinian-led global movement for justice and rights" (16). Since
many excellent writings already exist that detail the dramatic
injustice in the region -- and Barghouti's book, too, is hard-hitting
and compelling in that regard -- this review focuses on Barghouti's
arguments advocating and defending BDS, particularly with respect to
organizing in the United States.

Although an overwhelming majority of Americans have probably never
heard of "BDS," it has gained a strong following among portions of
those involved in Palestine-related activism, both in the US and
internationally. The book's author has himself gained a notably
elevated status among many solidarity activists. With that in mind,
and given the pressing urgency of the circumstances facing oppressed
Palestinians, the book deserves rigorous examination. Some aspects of
the book are commendable, but I find that it suffers from several
profound confusions and flaws.

Although this review is critical, I do not intend it as a general
critique of the strategies of boycott, divestment, or sanctions. I am
personally involved, through New York University Students for Justice
in Palestine (NYU SJP), in a divestment campaign known as the
TIAA-CREF Campaign.

I focus below on five topics. First, I examine the issues that arise
from the book's conflation of movements and strategy. Second, I draw
attention to some of the problems Barghouti faces in his attempt to
show that BDS has been, and will be, "effective," and I take issue
with how the book applies an analogy between Israel and South Africa.
I then do the same for whether BDS is a "moral obligation." Fourth, I
insist on a distinction between principles and advocacy, and I argue
that BDS: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions in important ways fails to
make this distinction. Finally, I examine pitfalls in the book's
approach to what solidarity with oppressed Palestinians entails.

Conflating movements and strategies

On the one hand, "BDS" stands for "boycott, divestment, sanctions,"
which are three different broad strategies. The July 2005 "BDS Call"
appeals for the use of these three strategies against Israel until
certain conditions are met, and Barghouti often refers to "BDS
tactics." On the other hand, Barghouti refers to "BDS" most frequently
as a "movement," sometimes in dramatic terms: BDS is more than just a
"concept" or "vision," and "it is not all about strategy. It is all of
those, for sure, but also much more." It is "above everything else a
deeply rooted yet qualitatively new stage in the century-old
Palestinian resistance...." (60-61).

The book does not consider the negative implications of this
conflation of movements and strategy. As Barghouti is aware, what
constitutes effective strategy for a solidarity activist group varies
based on the particularities of the societal position in which the
group finds itself. What works for student-based groups may not work
for workplace-based activists; what works in Florida may not work in
Canada; what works for a local group may not work for a national
coalition. For this reason, strategic and tactical decisions should be
tailored to the situation of the group. Meanwhile, group strategy
needs to flow from specific objectives, which in turn arise from a
combination of principles and an assessment of what is possible for a
given group to achieve at a given historical juncture.

A "global movement" for justice in the Middle East therefore has no
reason to be anything but agnostic about strategy and tactics in the
abstract, judging them only on a group-by-group and
location-by-location basis (excluding tactics that are morally
unacceptable, like terrorism). The notion of a "BDS movement," as
compared to, say, a "justice movement," is unhelpful in this sense. On
the one hand -- unlike "justice" or "self-determination" -- "boycott,"
"divestment," and "sanctions" are not ends unto themselves; they are
not goals that movements wish to achieve. On the other hand, Barghouti
does not seek to demonstrate that boycott, divestment, or sanctions of
Israel are superior strategies for all groups irrespective of context,
or why activists should desire a separate movement for these
strategies alone.

As a concrete example, consider the May 2010 flotilla action. The
violent Israeli response sparked outrage and protests that led to the
slight easing of the economic blockade of Gaza. The flotilla was not a
boycott, divestment, or sanction, but it was easily among the most
effective international solidarity actions in recent years. Reasonable
activists pursuing boycott, divestment, or sanction strategies might
not see any reason to view the flotilla action as separate from their
movement, and vice versa.

The flotilla action was not BDS, but the book gives BDS credit for
harnessing the flotilla's aftermath, writing that because of years of
"the BDS campaign's awareness-raising about Israel's ... oppression
and the [BDS] movement's call for creative practical action to
contribute to justice and peace, moral indignation at Israel's latest
bloodbath was bound to be channeled into pressure measures that are
more effective than the same old demands that have been ignored again
and again by Israel and its hegemonic partners" (207). Although
Barghouti offers examples of divestment, boycott, and sanctions
activity that occurred after the flotilla incident, he provides no
compelling evidence or argument for how the international response,
led by the Turkish population, would have been significantly less
potent without the presence of "the BDS campaign" per se.

The flip side of this issue is that, despite its references to
"context sensitivity," Barghouti's book does not adjudicate among BDS
tactics on a group-by-group basis or any basis, so any tactic under
the BDS umbrella appears moral and effective for any organization that
has used it (33). For example, devoting activist resources to the
cultural boycott of Israel appears equally efficacious and moral
whether it happens in the US or Belgium. Or for example, for all
groups, campaigning for boycott of Haifa University appears just as
efficacious and moral as campaigning for divestment from Northrop
Grumman. But since strategy and tactics must be contextual, the book
has an uncritical feel on this front -- a topic to which I return
below.

Is BDS "effective"?

Barghouti argues that activists should support BDS primarily because
it is "effective" and "a moral obligation," but both of these claims
are in some ways questionable.

To demonstrate BDS's past effectiveness requires a carefully crafted
historical analysis that shows precisely how "the BDS movement" has
made inroads towards its three main goals: ending the occupation; full
equality for Palestinians inside Israel; and full right of return for
Palestinian refugees. Barghouti states that the "most consequential
achievement of the first five years of the BDS movement was indeed to
expose the 'essential nature' of Israel's regime over the Palestinian
people as one that combines military occupation, colonization, ethnic
cleansing, and apartheid" (11). But he makes no serious attempt to
prove that "the BDS movement" per se accomplished this feat. Nor, for
that matter, does he explain exactly to whom Israel has been exposed,
aside from "many in the West." Nor does he demonstrate how this
accomplishment, even if true and BDS can rightfully take credit for
it, has brought Palestinians meaningfully closer to justice.

Barghouti claims that BDS has "dragged Israel" and its allies "into a
confrontation on a battlefield where the moral superiority of the
Palestinian quest for self-determination, justice, freedom, and
equality neutralizes and outweighs Israel's military power and
financial prowess" (62). But given that both the occupation and
Israel's internally racist regime have only worsened since the 2005
"BDS Call," including since the publication of Barghouti's book, one
needs to take such rhetorical flourishes over BDS's achievements
towards helping Palestinians with a grain of salt.

Israel's economy chugs along, and US political and military aid
arrives in ever-larger quantities. Some of the small victories to
which Barghouti points -- such as embarrassing Veolia and helping to
thwart its potential contracts over its racist Jerusalem Light Rail --
are meaningful and not to be discounted. But the "BDS movement's"
overall effectiveness at aiding the oppressed has not yet been
demonstrated, and Barghouti offers insufficient evidence in support of
his bold claims.

At the book's worst, it partially resorts to proof by assertion --
repeating throughout the book that BDS is "effective" -- as well as
proof by appeal to authority, with elaboration at length on the
various groups and prominent figures that support the BDS Call, most
frequently Desmond Tutu.

More important is the book's lack of distinction among the different
tactics within BDS in terms of their potential effectiveness. For
example, whereas Barghouti demonstrates how the divestment campaign
against Veolia achieved modest but appreciable results, the book does
not convincingly show why international activists concerned with
making good use of their time should pursue the academic and cultural
boycott of Israel. Barghouti repeatedly offers a moral defense of the
academic and cultural boycott, but even if activists accept this
defense, it in no way follows that they will find that boycott
tactically expedient and efficacious towards materially improving the
lives of the oppressed.

Barghouti frequently asserts the effectiveness and potential of
anti-Israel boycott using an analogy to apartheid South Africa. In a
section discussing how to obtain "justice and full respect for human
rights," Barghouti writes that boycotts "work in reality and in
principle, as was shown in the South African anti-apartheid struggle.
There is absolutely no reason why they cannot work in our case too."
(173). However, the book does not elaborate on how much "work,"
relative to other phenomena, the boycott actually did towards ending
South African apartheid; nor does it consider whether some of the
boycott tactics used against South Africa may have been more effective
than others.

In fact, although none would argue that the South Africa boycotts were
unimportant, other factors dwarfed their significance in helping to
end the apartheid regime, most notably black worker-led internal
resistance. This sustained worker militancy was possible because in a
crucial respect, South Africa is not like Israel: white South Africans
relied on black labor, while Israel does not rely on Palestinian labor
from the occupied territories. In short, the book does not offer
compelling evidence to suggest that, through an analogy to South
African apartheid, one can demonstrate the potential effectiveness of
boycotting Israel.

Is BDS a "moral obligation"?

The "comprehensive boycott of Israel and its complicit institutions,"
Barghouti writes, is "not only a moral obligation but also an urgent
political necessity" (35). Roughly a third of the book's chapters are
explicitly devoted to defending and advocating the boycott of Israeli
academic and cultural institutions, primarily on moral grounds.

But as Barghouti deftly exposes the moral bankruptcy of Israeli
institutions and the hypocrisy of certain critics, he misses an
important moral consideration: the moral obligations of activist
groups vary based on factors like their political, economic, or
geographic positioning. Moral obligations do not exist in the
abstract, they exist for -- and vary among -- concrete groups and
individuals. Also, the morality of a given strategy is, to an extent,
contextual; it depends in part on what else a group is capable of
doing with the time and resources devoted to implementing that
strategy.

Most notably, consider the case of activists based in the US, which
Barghouti properly describes as the "main sponsor, supporter, and
protector of Israel, diplomatically, economically, militarily, and
otherwise" (80). Without this US backing, the occupation would likely
end, and at least some symbolic number of refugees might be allowed
back into Israel -- an unquestionably dramatic improvement for the
lives of millions of people, as Palestinians themselves agree.

Tactically speaking, US-based solidarity activists are uniquely
positioned to target culpable institutions in the US, the primary
enabler of Israel's aggression. Belgian activist groups, for example,
are for obvious reasons ill-suited to change US policy as compared to
US-based groups.

This tactical point relates to a moral consideration. US-based
activists may feel a strong moral obligation to help the Palestinian
cause, especially given that many US institutions -- such as the US
government or US-based corporations profiting from the occupation --
are profoundly implicated in the oppression of Palestinians. However,
this moral obligation to help facilitate Palestinian
self-determination does not translate into a "moral obligation" to use
the strategy of campaigning for the "comprehensive boycott of Israel
and its complicit institutions." Given their unique opportunities,
some US-based activists may instead justifiably choose to devote their
highly limited resources towards targeting US institutions instead.

In short, activists living inside of Israel's "main sponsor" have both
unique tactical opportunities and special moral obligations and
responsibilities. Activists living in, say, Iran, which has notably
worse relations with Israel, have different opportunities and
obligations.

Similar logic applies, for example, to those who participated in the
flotilla action mentioned above, or to Rachel Corrie, the 23-year-old
American crushed to death by an Israeli bulldozer when she
courageously stood in the way of its destruction of Palestinian homes.
These activists undoubtedly felt a sense of moral obligation to aid
the struggle for Palestinian self-determination. And by participating
in life-threatening -- and in some cases life-ending -- nonviolent
direct actions, they more than fulfilled this obligation. They seized
their distinct, context-specific opportunities to aid the cause. One
cannot fairly suggest, then, that they also had a particular "moral
obligation" to devote their energies towards the strategies of
boycott, divestment, or sanctions of Israel.

Confusion between principles and advocacy

As suggested above, one can accept Barghouti's arguments regarding the
culpability of Israeli academic and cultural institutions but still
question the tactical efficacy of campaigning for a boycott of them.
With boycott organizers constantly plagued with protestations
concerning academic and artistic freedom, Barghouti underplays the
importance of whether, in the US context, anyone outside of a small
cadre of purists is anywhere near ready to accept such an approach. In
this sense, Barghouti avoids the issue of the extent to which
organizing academic and cultural boycotts of Israel in the US may be
an irresponsible strategy that serves mainly to marginalize US-based
solidarity activists.

The issue above relates to the crucial distinction -- well articulated
in writings of Noam Chomsky and others -- between principles and
advocacy. Supporting the academic and cultural boycott in principle
does not justify advocating for it without accounting for political
circumstances.

The book fails to make this distinction in another important context
as well. Although "the BDS movement ... steers away from the
one-state-versus-two-states debate, focusing instead on universal
rights and international law," Barghouti personally contends that "a
two-state solution was never moral, and it's no longer practically
attainable either"; he is also "completely against" a binational state
(51-52, 180, 177). He instead "is calling for a secular, democratic
state" (178).

But if a "two-state solution" is not moral, and a binational state is
unacceptable, Barghouti's "call" for a unitary secular democratic
state is also problematic. The two-state and binational state options
are not morally ideal, but neither is a unitary secular democratic
state that entrenches colonial boundaries and leaves capitalist
property relations intact. Why, then, should we "call for" a secular
democratic state on the grounds of moral principle -- as Barghouti
does -- and not instead "call for" dismantling all colonial boundaries
and establishing libertarian socialism throughout the Middle East and
beyond, with full worker control of production?

While I support my more robust "call" in principle and could
articulate why I feel it is more moral than Barghouti's call, most
people would react with utter incredulity if I insisted on advocating
such a thing and rejected any lesser settlement as immoral. One can
recognize the superiority of a two-state settlement, not "solution,"
compared to the existing horrors -- almost everyone in the world does,
including most Palestinians -- while still supporting in principle a
binational state, a unitary secular democratic state, or a global
libertarian socialist syndication. The immediate tactical issue for
international solidarity activists is what sort of advocacy will be
most effective at easing the suffering of the most oppressed without
losing sight of principles and broader goals.

Confusion over what it means to be in solidarity with Palestinians.

Assuming the "BDS Call" represents a unified Palestinian voice -- a
topic to which I return below -- the question arises of what it means
for international activists to be in solidarity with oppressed
Palestinians.

Barghouti argues that

"a call signed by more than 170 Palestinian political parties, unions,
nongovernmental organizations, and networks, representing the entire
spectrum of Palestinian civil society -- under occupation, in Israel,
and in the Diaspora -- cannot be 'counterproductive' unless
Palestinians are not rational or intelligent enough to know or
articulate what is in their best interest. This argument smacks of
patronization and betrays a colonial attitude that we thought --
hoped! -- was extinct in the liberal West." (144, emphasis added).
Indeed, for solidarity activists to oppose the principle of
self-determination for Palestinians would be "patronizing" and
"colonial," and meaningful support for self-determination entails the
assumption that Palestinians are best-suited to make decisions about
their own form of governance and economy.

However, oppressed Palestinians are not best qualified, morally or
tactically, to decide how international solidarity activists should go
about fighting in their own countries for Palestinian
self-determination. Again, for obvious reasons, US-based solidarity
activists, not Palestinian civil society groups, should know best how
they themselves can pressure their own institutions to withdraw
support from the occupation and other injustices.

Similarly, if US-based activists (including Palestinians who live in
the US) deem generalized boycott of Israel to be a counterproductive
tactic despite the BDS call, the decision is not necessarily
"patronizing" or "colonial" minded; it might instead be a tactical
choice made to facilitate Palestinian self-determination. Whether
operating locally or as a cross-national coalition, international
solidarity groups must support Palestinian self-determination and
should work towards this goal by creative means appropriate to their
own situations.

Incidentally, even if one accepts Barghouti's conception of what
international solidarity entails, the book does not demonstrate the
extent to which the "Palestinian civil society" groups behind the "BDS
Call" actually represent the Palestinian people at large, given, for
example, that the leaders of these groups are not elected by the
population as a whole.

This issue is more pronounced with regard to the BDS National
Committee (BNC), BDS's Palestinian-run leadership and coordinating
body. The BNC "guide[s]" the "principles and overall strategy" of
"solidarity groups advocating BDS tactics" (227). According to
Barghouti, "the BNC is a broad coalition of the leading Palestinian
political parties, unions, coalitions, and networks representing the
three integral parts of the people of Palestine": refugees,
Palestinians in the occupied territories, and Palestinian citizens of
Israel (61). But he does not attempt to show whether the BNC, which
currently has nineteen member groups, is a representative body, with
democratic and transparent accountability to all of "Palestinian civil
society." In other words, the book does not convincingly show whether
the BNC can legitimately speak on behalf of "Palestinian civil
society," let alone the "people of Palestine" at large.

A justice movement

Like the others in NYU SJP, I feel that the TIAA-CREF divestment
campaign is a great way to leverage our position as NYU students to
help end the occupation and increase the degree of justice in the
region. By assessing their social-structural positioning and waging
campaigns accordingly, groups like NYU SJP -- in my personal view, as
part of a justice movement, not a BDS movement -- may modestly but
meaningfully contribute to the facilitation of Palestinian
self-determination.

Barghouti's book is compelling and useful in many ways, for example,
in its exposure of Israeli injustices, the moral bankruptcy of those
who support oppression, and the fraudulent US-sponsored "peace
process." But it is unconvincing on the key issues described above,
suggesting the need for a more nuanced consideration of how we can
best advance the Palestinian cause.

Glen Pine is a PhD student in the Sociology Department at New York
University and an organizer with NYU Students for Justice in
Palestine.



-- 
Ran Greenstein
Johannesburg, South Africa