[DEBATE] : His Excellency Comrade Robert: How Mugabe's ZANU clique rose to power | Links
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Sun Jun 22 13:26:03 BST 2008
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His Excellency Comrade Robert: How Mugabe's ZANU clique rose to power
By Stephen O’Brien
Towards the end of 1975 a movement of young radicals organised in the
Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) took charge of Zimbabwe’s liberation war.
ZIPA’s fusion of inclusive politics, transformational vision and
military aggression dealt crippling blows to the white supremacist
regime of Ian Smith. However, it’s success also paved the way for a
faction of conservative nationalists led by Robert Mugabe to wrest
control of the liberation movement for themselves.
The fact that Mugabe, a former rural school teacher, and his cronies
would become the ruling capitalist elite of Zimbabwe by crushing a
movement of young Chavista-style revolutionaries doesn’t sit well with
their anti-imperialist self-image.
The ZIPA cadre emerged from the wave of young people who, experiencing
oppression and discrimination in Rhodesia, decided to become liberation
fighters in early 1970s. Unlike many of the first generation of
fighters, they volunteered to join the respective military wings of the
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National
In 1975, key nationalist leaders -- such as Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo,
Ndabiginini Sithole, Jason Moyo, Herbert Chitepo, Abel Muzorewa, James
Chikerema and Josiah Tongogara -- had become entangled in factional
rivalry and long-running and fruitless peace talks with the Smith
regime. The young recruits who would shortly form ZIPA sought to
reinvigorate the struggle as the war stalled and as the old leaders
A group of ZANU officers based at training camps in Tanzania consulted
widely among the liberation forces. They approached President Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel, soon to be president of newly
liberated and independent Mozambique, for support to restart the war
against Smith. Both Machel and Nyerere had initially supported peace
negotiations and the resulting ceasefire with Rhodesia, but by October
1975 had lost patience with the whole process, and listened with
sympathy to the ideas of the young officers.
The ZANU officers also sought unity with ZAPU, the long-standing rival
organisation from which ZANU had split in 1963. ZAPU agreed and in
November 1975 ZIPA was formed with a combined High Command composed of
equal numbers from both ZAPU and ZANU. The alliance with ZAPU
disintegrated after a few months partly because ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo
had continued to negotiate with Smith. Nevertheless, it was an important
attempt at unity which defied the prevailing trend of division.
ZIPA’s nominal head was Rex Nhongo (later known as Solomon Mujuru he
would become head of the Zimbabwe Army under Mugabe), but strategic and
tactical leadership came to be held by his young deputy, Wilfred Mhanda.
Mhanda had been a typical recruit to ZANU and its military wing, the
Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA). He had been involved in
school protests and on leaving his studies helped form a ZANU support
group. Like many who were to become part of ZIPA, Mhanda had been
influenced by the youth radicalisation of the 1960s. In 1971, with the
special branch in pursuit, Mhanda’s group skipped the border into
Botswana and joined ZANLA. He took the war name of Dzinashe Machingura.
He was later sent for training in China and progressed through the ranks
to became a military instructor, political commissar, commander of the
Mgagao camp in Tanzania and then member of the High Command.[ii]
ZIPA theory, tactics
Theory influenced ZIPA’s tactics. Its fighters were not regarded as
cannon fodder, lines of retreat and supply were secured,
counter-offensives anticipated and strategic reserves made ready. Senior
ZIPA commanders visited the front. ZIPA’s aims went beyond winning
democracy, to the revolutionary transformation of Rhodesia’s social and
economic relations. The previous conception of the old-guard
nationalists had tended to regard armed struggle as a means to apply
pressure for external intervention to end White minority rule.
The Zimbabwe People’s Army relocated its troops from Tanzania to
Mozambique and in January 1976, 1000 guerrillas crossed into Rhodesia.
The entire eastern border of Rhodesia became a war zone as the guerillas
launched coordinated and well-planned attacks on mines, farms and
communication routes, such as the new railway line to South Africa.
ZIPA established Wampoa College to help institute its vision and ran
Marxist-inspired courses in military instruction and mass mobilisation
for its fighters. It educated its cadre against the sexual abuse of
women and sought to win the support of the Zimbabwean peasantry through
persuasion rather than coercion.
Historian David Moore’s study of ZIPA notes: ``The students made their
political education directly relevant to the struggle, so that Marxism
could better direct the war of liberation.’’[iii] ZIPA’s political
approach lead to it becoming known as the Vashandi, a word which means
worker in the Shona language, but which, according to Mhanda, took on a
broader meaning as the revolutionary front of workers, students and
Smith’s regime reeled under the offensive. Repression was intensified,
``psychopathic’’ counter-insurgency units such as the Selous Scouts were
deployed, so called ``protected villages’’ intensified control over the
population and raids were launched against refugee camps in neighbouring
countries. Rhodesia was forced to borrow 26 helicopters from apartheid
South Africa, and in order to deploy 60% more troops, increased the
military call-up for whites. In his memoirs, Ken Flower, head of the
Central Intelligence Organisation under Smith (and later under Mugabe),
recalls that by July 1976 ``Rhodesia was beginning to lose the war.[iv]
Concerned about the growing influence of the young Marxists in Zimbabwe,
Henry Kissinger, the United States’ Secretary of State, sought to resume
the dormant negotiations by organising a round of talks in Geneva in
The legal basis for the talks centred around Rhodesia’s technical status
as a British colony. Rhodesia had made a Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) in 1965, partly to quell the nascent nationalist
movement and to forestall any British demand that ``legal’’ independence
include guarantees for equal rights for the black majority.
Kissinger’s proposals centered around a supposed timetable for a
transition to black majority rule (these days they say ``road map’’)
with the intention that the talks would provide an opportunity to
sideline or eliminate the radicals.
ZIPA was opposed to negotiations. On numerous occasions, especially
after Portuguese colonialism collapsed in 1974 and Frelimo started to
take control of Mozambique, Smith had used talks to exploit divisions
and ideological confusion in the nationalists’ ranks.
ZIPA leaders were also wary of the old leadership. When Samora Machel
pressed them to nominate the political leader with whom they most
closely identified, in a decision which was to have fateful
consequences, they nominated Robert Mugabe. In his struggle to depose
the ZANU president Ndanbiginini Sithole, Mugabe was careful to identify
with the guerillas, unlike Sithole who unsuccessfully attempted to place
them under his control. This influenced the ZIPA leaders and they
thought that, although they did not support Mugabe, they could work with
Disunity had long plagued the nationalist movement. When ZANU had split
from ZAPU in 1963 the acrimony turned violent in the townships at a
certain point and Smith’s police stood by while it took its course.
Since then, guerilla revolts against what were perceived to be
incompetent leaders, such as ZAPU’s March 11 Movement (1971) and ZANU’s
Nhari Rebellion (1974-1975), had been brutally suppressed.
It was during the fallout from the Nhari rebellion that Herbert Chitepo,
the ZANU chair, was assassinated in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia. In
response, Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian president, who had hosted the
liberation forces in Zambia, banned Zimbabwean nationalist organisations
and detained hundred of their leaders and supporters, including Josiah
Tongogara, the ZANU military commander.
However, so that they could attend the Geneva talks, these leaders were
subsequently released along with Mugabe, who had also been in detention.
Mugabe had fled from Rhodesia to Mozambique in April 1975 after his
release from ten years in Smith’s jails to participate in an earlier
round of talks. Mozambique, along with other pro-liberation states, had
initially regarded Mugabe with suspicion because of his opposition to
Sithole and had placed him in open detention.
Other nationalist delegates to Geneva included Nkomo and Bishop Abel
Muzorewa of the Rhodesian based United African National Congress. The
ZIPA commanders treated the whole Geneva negotiations with suspicion and
issued a statement which declared: ``None of the Zimbabwe delegations
there represents ZIPA’’.[v]
Mhanda, who was in effect the central ZIPA figure, explains that ZIPA
members regarded many of the old leaders as being out of touch. They
thought that leaders such as Mugabe and Nkomo, having been in jail for
many years, did not fully understand changes brought about by the youth
radicalisation and the Vietnam War. Where the older generation was
motivated by a desire to force negotiations that would usher in ``one
man one vote’’, the ZIPA comrades were ``fighting for the total
transformation of the Zimbabwean society’’.[vi]
Some of the young radicals had experienced and even sought out Marxist
ideas during their training. Mhanda describes the delight he and a group
of comrades felt when they discovered Marxist classics in the library at
their training camp in Tanzania.[vii] Making the most of the opportunity
they ran study classes on Marxist-Leninist philosophy, polemics and
historical materialism. In contrast, while a few of the old guard had
encountered communists, and even Trotskyists in South Africa,[viii] many
of them had little direct experience with Marxism. The socialist
tradition in Rhodesia was fleeting. During its brief existence, the
Rhodesian Communist Party had been a tiny white enclave.
Britain was anxious that the ZIPA commanders attend Geneva, and thus be
away from their troops. Recent research in British archives has revealed
that Britain offered an interest-free loan of £15 million to Machel’s
government to ensure that the ```young men’ controlling Mugabe attended
Heavily dependent on the support of Machel for access to the supply
lines and infiltration routes through Mozambique, the ZIPA leadership
had little choice but to attend.
In Geneva, ZIPA unsuccessfully tried to unite the various nationalist
delegations. They sought to create a united front against Smith and
demand that the racists unconditionally surrender power. However, the
various nationalist delegations were incapable of uniting and rejected
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Mugabe, for his part, allied with the recently released military chief
Tongogara, and Solomon Mujuru. The nominal head of ZIPA, Mujuru had
never really shared the strategic vision of his deputy political
commissar Mhanda. He also blocked with ZAPU’s Joshua Nkomo and his
deputy Jason Moyo to create the Patriotic Front. This helped strengthen
Mugabe against the right (Abel Muzorewa and Ndanbiginini Sithole) and
against the left, the increasingly politically independent ZIPA.
Historian David Moore has suggested that Mugabe was not really committed
to the talks at Geneva as he first needed to deal with ZIPA and gain
control the army before he entered serious negotiations. The talks
adjourned indefinitely just before Christmas 1976.[x]
After the collapse of the talks, the ZIPA leaders were sidelined into
undertaking solidarity duties in Europe. Mugabe, Tongogara and Mujuru
rushed back to Mozambique. In January 1977, with Machel's support they
started to impose their control. The radio and print media were taken
over, Wampoa closed and ZIPA officers placed under arrest. When Mhanda
and the rest of the ZIPA delegation returned from Geneva they were faced
with a changed reality. Mhanda and other leaders who refused to be
co-opted joined their comrades in prison.
Prosecution of the war took second place while Mugabe continued to
impose control. Pawns, a novel about the war by Charles Samupindi,
describes the new atmosphere:
The Vashandi, the young kids as …[Tongogara] …calls them, are now all
safely behind bars in Frelimo prisons in Beira. But, he says, some of
them are still among us. Some may be with us here at the parade. He
wants to know who they are. Things are never the same again.[xi]
Until at least August 1977, there were mass denunciations, torture and
beatings. Three-hundred junior Vashandi were executed.[xii]
When Machel enquired what had happened to the prosecution of the war,
Mugabe was evasive and avoided Machel’s suggestion that the jailed
leaders be allowed to fight.
With its most experienced commanders out of action, ZANLA failed to
learn from previous lessons and Smith launched another devastating
attack on the camps in Mozambique. On November 23, 1977, the ZANU base
at Chimoio in Mozambique was razed leaving more than 1200 casualties.
After the suppression of the radicals, the old leaders maintained, and
even stepped up, the left discourse popularised by ZIPA.
Mugabe `lays the line’
In August 1977, Mugabe felt strong enough to call a special ZANU
congress and have himself appointed party president. In his congress
speech, later published as ``Comrade Mugabe Lays the Line’’, Mugabe made
it clear that henceforth the ``given leadership’’ was in control.[xiii]
The trappings of a personality cult started to emerge. One of his
biographers writes that in his Maputo office, Mugabe’s ``subalterns
…would click their heels or stamp a foot to attention when they went to
see him’’.[xiv] Party documents were now embellished with the slogan
``Forward with Comrade President Robert Mugabe’’.[xv]
Undisciplined habits among ZANU apparatchiks, which had been a factor in
the Nhari rebellion, re-emerged. Machel had to complain to Mugabe about
the ``heavy drinking and the womanising that some senior ZANU men
indulged in at the capital’s nightspots, like the Polana Hotel’’.[xvi]
Discipline weakened as the preoccupation with ``dissidents’’ meant that
there was inadequate ideological and military training. Sexual abuse
became common and even pro-ZANU historians mention the ``rampant
raping’’ carried out by senior commanders.[xvii] During 1977 to 1979
some observers even expressed concerns that the deterioration of the
guerillas’ behaviour in certain areas could cause a ``collapse of rural
Astute leadership was especially needed when the political situation
became confused. Smith took advantage of the disunity of the
nationalists. He cut a deal with the conservative wing of the
nationalists, represented by Ndabiginini Sithole, James Chikerema and
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, to establish the puppet state of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe
under nominal black majority rule.
Known as the ``internal settlement’’, the pact prolonged white
domination by two more bloody years. During this time both Sithole and
Muzorewa set up their own armies and fought ZANU and ZAPU, while white
Rhodesians and mercenaries, especially in the Selous Scouts, massacred
at will while masquerading as guerillas.
However, the weight of popular discontent, international presssure and
ZANU and ZAPU’s military pressure eventually forced Smith, on behalf of
the tiny white minority, to return to the negotiating table.
In December 1979, at the Lancaster House talks in Britain, Smith finally
surrendered. In the elections held for the black seats the following
February, ZANU won 57 seats, ZAPU 20 and Muzorewa’s United African
National Council, three. While the end of white political domination was
achieved, the radical transformation as conceived by ZIPA certainly wasn’t.
Origins of ZANU elitism
While ZANU formally adopted ``Marxism-Leninism-Mao TseTung thought’’ at
its 1977 Chimoio Congress, this left talk ``was ultimately a disguise
for classically authoritarian nationalism’’.[xix]
This orientation can be traced back to the intellectual formation of
many members of the 1950s and 1960s generation of nationalists. At this
time the vast mass of the people was restricted to the rural areas and
had little access to education. A significant number of the first
nationalists were educated at church and colonial schools which had been
designed to create a tiny educated layer who would ``lead’’ the black
masses on behalf of the white minority. They later found work in
intellectual occupations such as teachers (Mugabe), preachers (Sithole
and Muzorewa), journalists, clerks, social workers and trade union
Many of them adopted the view that their role, and that of the black
middle class, ``was to aid the government in its `civilizing’ programmes
of development and industrialisation’’.[xx] This was reflected in the
fact that trade union officials and the educated elite played an
ambivalent role in such popular struggles as the general strike in 1948,
the bus boycotts of 1956 and the mass protests which thwarted the
undemocratic Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals of 1971.
Mugabe himself had been involved in the liberal multi-class and
multi-race organisation, the Capricorn Society.[xxi] He only joined a
nationalist party in 1960 when he was 36 years old, after having worked
and studied abroad. Mugabe maintained his liberal contacts and could
call on them to support his wife while in exile in Britain and petition
the British government to grant her residency.
Despite its numerical strength, at least half a million by 1948, the
organised working class did not play a central role in the later stages
of the liberation struggle.[xxii] As a result, there was no significant
social counterweight to the educated intellectuals who came to dominate
the leadership of the struggle.
Disunity and rivalry was common among the middle-class nationalists. By
the time the young ZIPA radicals arrived on the scene the divisions in
the nationalist ranks were deep. Divisions existed between those who had
been in jail, those who had fled into neighbouring countries to direct
the guerilla war, such as Chitepo and Moyo, younger party members who
had studied abroad and the generally more conservative Rhodesia-based
nationalists, such as Muzorewa, who had remained ``legal’’ and largely
out of jail.
Differences were reflected in questions of tactics, such as when and how
to apply military pressure and to what extent outside powers be allowed
to broker talks. Opposition to white rule was one of the few things that
they had in common, and even that was negotiable for some.
ZANU in power
Lacking a complete military victory, and subject to pressure from their
war-weary allies, in particular Mozambique and Zambia, the nationalists
made significant and arguably generous concessions during the Lancaster
House negotiations. Responsibility was accepted for paying the foreign
debt the Smith regime had accumulated buying arms and mercenaries in
contravention of UN sanctions. Even today Zimbabwe continues to accept
and pay debts for which it has no moral obligation.
After independence, rather than being dismantled and transformed, the
white state was merely taken over as it was. The first government
included former supporters of Smith who were willing to help apply many
of the same economic policies.
One of their first acts was to demobilise the ZANU committees and
support groups, which had helped the party organise the rural
population. The new government suppressed a spontaneous strike wave
unleashed by an increasingly confident working class.
Mugabe broke the Patriotic Front, his nominal alliance with Nkomo,
shortly before the 1980 election and both ZANU and ZAPU went to the vote
separately. The split with ZAPU was to have dire consequences.
Ex-ZAPU members were increasingly purged from senior positions in the
army and from government ministries. The army, having been retrained by
British military officers, ``embraced the ideas, training, organisation
and forms of force of the Rhodesian settler army’’.[xxiii] It had
absolute loyalty to Mugabe above all and regardless of any
constitutional and democratic considerations.
A separate brigade, the Fifth, composed exclusively of Shona speakers
and ZANU veterans, was established and trained by North Korea. The Fifth
Brigade was to unleash a brutal war of terror on Ndebele people, who
were assumed to be ZAPU supporters and therefore dissidents. In what
became known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1985, at least 5000 people
died in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions of Zimbabwe. At Nkomo’s
funeral in 1999, Mugabe himself was to refer to the experience as a
``moment of madness’’.
A paternalistic and authoritarian state kept the popular classes in
their place. Significant spending on education and health in the early
years of the government was matched by corporatist trade union
structures. The cities were also kept under control and thousands of
urban dwellers and squatters were regularly evicted from black
townships. In the rural areas land reform was forever promised but not
delivered, while rural wages were kept low to subsidise cheap food, and
therefore lower wages, for the cities. As one commentator observed
``poverty was structural; all the post-independence state did was
By 1987, with the popular classes under control, ZAPU severely weakened,
the old-time allies conveniently dead or purged (Tongogara had died in
an accident on the eve of independence)[xxv] and with the armed forces
and police under his control, Mugabe changed the constitution and
appointed himself executive president.
With an increasing orientation to international capital, the country
slipped further into corruption and debt. Nonetheless, ZANU continued to
pretend that it sought ``to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe on
the guidance of Marxist-Leninist principles’’.[xxvi]
People started to realise that the fruits of the liberation struggle had
been appropriated. In Echoing Silences, by Alexander Kanengoni, a war
veteran suffering post-traumatic stress disorder has a dream in which
Chitepo and Jason Moyo are discussing how the struggle has lost its way
and wondering ``how the politics, wealth and the economy of the entire
country was slowly becoming synonymous with the names of less than a
The Vashandi, according to Moore, had ``hoped that full electoral
freedom would enable them to mount a radical challenge to Mugabe's empty
nationalism’’.[xxviii] However, the patterns and tools of political
repression, established with the suppression of ZIPA, were too well
entrenched to make this a possibility.
The detained ZIPA members were only released from detention in
Mozambique, and allowed to return to Zimbabwe, after independence. When
former ZIPAs publicly advocated unity with ZAPU, they were promptly
arrested again, and only freed on the intervention of Nkomo.
Mhanda was warned that his presence in Zimbabwe was dangerous and he was
obliged to spend several years studying in Europe. The ZIPA movement was
effectively dispersed. In 2000, along with other ex-combatants, Mhanda
helped form the Zimbabwe Liberators’ Platform to organise and fight for
the rights of the country’s genuine war veterans.
Mugabe had proven to be apt in suppressing the threat from the left and
employing the language of people such as Mhanda's ``to practice the
worst of Third World socialism – and then the worst of Third World
neo-liberalism’’[xxix] essentially to allow his cronies to enrich
themselves with the ``privileges and subsidies that white exploiters had
However, even before the end of the first decade of independence, it was
clear that Mugabe’s version of patriarchal nationalism had exhausted any
progressive content and the first steps towards a political break
between the people and the ZANU elite were developing.
Once again it was young people, university students who had grown up
under independence, supported by a new general secretary of the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions, Morgan Tsvangirai, who began to challenge the
dominant system of inequality and repression and open up a new phase in
Zimbabwe’s still unresolved struggle for national libereation.
[Stephen O'Brien is a member of the Democratic Socialist Perspective, a
Marxist tendency within the Socialist Alliance of Australia. He writes
on Zimbawean politics for Green Left Weekly.]
[i] Up until the early 1970s nationalists had to forcibly conscript
Zimbabwean youth to fight against Smith. See Chung, F. (2006) Re-living
the second Chirumenga. Memories from Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.
Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute in cooperation with Weaver Press,
[ii] Mhanda, W. (2007) Interview with Wilfred Mhanda by Stephen O’Brien
August 2007. Harare
[iii] Moore, D. (1990) The Contradictory construction of hegemony in
Zimbabwe: Politics, ideology and class in the formation of a new African
State. PhD dissertation York University, Toronto. p. 335.
[iv] Flower, K. (1987) Serving secretly. An intelligence chief on
record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964-1981. London: John Murray. p. 131.
Flower also admits that the Selous Scouts attracted ``psychopathic
killers’’, p. 124.
[v] Moore, D. (1990) p. 359
[vi] Moore, D. (1990) p. 309
[vii] Julius Nyerere, the then leader of Tanzania, had close ties to
China and pursued a Tanzanian version of socialism.
[viii] For example See Nyagumbo, M. (1980) With the people. Salisbury:
The Graham Company. p. 78-86 and Bhebe, N. (2004) Simon Vengai Muzenda
and the struggle for and liberation of Zimbabwe. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo
Press, p. 49-68
[ix] Moore, D. (2008) ``Todays' imperialists were those who nurtured
Mugabe’’, Sunday Independent, 20 January.
[x] Moore (1990) p. 361 suggests that Mugabe deliberately stalled as
Geneva as he needed to deal with ZIPA and gain control the army before
he entered serious negotiations with Smith.
[xi] Samupindi, C. (1992) Pawns. Harare: Baobab Books, p. 97.
[xii] The figure of 300 executions is cited by Astrow, A. (1983)
Zimbabwe, a revolution that lost its way? London; Totowa, N.J.: Zed
Press, p. 107. For more information on the suppression of ZIPA see Moore
(1990) p. 367 and Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000) For Better or Worse: Women
and Zanla in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle. Harare : Weaver Press, p. 102.
[xiii] Moore, D. (1990) p. 400
[xiv] Smith, D., Simpson, C., & Davies, I. (1981) Mugabe. Salisbury:
Pioneer Head, p. 99
[xv] Nhongo-Simbanegavi, J. (2000) p. 202
[xvi] Smith, D., Simpson, C., & Davies, I. (1981) p. 106
[xvii] See Bhebe, N. (2004) p. 224, Chung, (2006) p. 125-128. For
women’s testimonies see Musengezi, C. (Ed.) (2000) Women of resilience.
The voices of women ex-combatants. Harare: Zimbabwe Women Writers and
Nhongo-Simbanegavi, (2000) and Tekere, E. (2007) A lifetime of struggle.
Harare: SAPES Trust, p. 94.
[xviii] Kriger, N. J. (2002) Zimbabwe’s guerilla war peasant voices.
Harare : Baobab Books. p. 128.
[xix] Bond, P. (1998) Uneven Zimbabwe A study of finance, development
and underdevelopment (PDF version) Trenton: Africa World Press, p. 339.
[xx] Moore, D. (1990) p. 124
[xxi] Smith, D., Simpson, C., & Davies, I. (1981) p. 18
[xxii] Low wages, import substitution industries and sanctions busting
during UDI helped further develop railways, mines, light manufacturing
and agricultural processing and contribute to the growth of the working
[xxiii] Campbell, H. (2003) Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The exhaustion of the
patriarchal model of liberation. Trenton, NJ. Asmara, Eritrea: Africa
World Press. p. 273
[xxiv] Tandon, Y. (2001) Trade unions and labour in the agricultural
sector in Zimbabwe. In B. Raftopolous & L. Sachikonye (Eds.) Striking
back: The labour movement and the post-colonial state in Zimbabwe
1980-2000 (pp. 221-249) Harare: Weaver Press, p. 229.
[xxv] Maurice Nyagumbo, Enos Nkala and Edgar Tekere, who had supported
Mugabe in deposing Sithole, all fell out with Mugabe. Tekere (2007) p.
84, a key Mugabe henchman, was to later admit that ZIPA was ``absolutely
correct’’. In 1978 a group of ZANU ``radicals’’, lead by Henry
Hamadziripi and Rugare Gumbo, appearing to have had second thoughts
about ZIPA, unsuccessfully tried to challenge the ZANU leadership. After
being sentenced to death by ZANU they were detained by Mozambique.
[xxvi] The ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU Agreement. Appendix 1. Cited in
Sibanda, E. M. (2005) The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961-1987. A
political history of insurgency in Southern Rhodesia. Trenton: Africa
[xxvii] Kanengoni, A. (2001) Echoing silences. Harare: Boabab Books. p. 87
[xxviii] Moore, D. (2001) How Mugabe came to power. London Review of
Books, 5 April, p. 23.
[xxix] Moore, D. (2001) p. 23.
[xxx] Campbell, H. (2003) p. 272.
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