[DEBATE] : Kenya and the myth of 'African barbarism'

[Firoze Manji]

source??

Firoze

On 14 Jan 2008, at 11:38 am, Russell Grinker wrote:

> Thursday 10 January 2008
>
>
>
>
>
> Julie Hearn
>
> Kenya and the myth of ‘African barbarism’
>
> Observers describe the post-election violence as a virus. In truth,  
> everyday
> Kenyans have historically resisted the top-down process of ethnic
> one-upmanship.
>
>
> ‘Tribal violence’, ‘genocide’ and comparisons with Rwanda in 1994
> characterised the early international media coverage of the post- 
> election
> crisis in Kenya at the beginning of 2008. Such sensationalist  
> reporting was
> not only analytically unhelpful - it was also irresponsibly  
> dangerous. Kenya
> is not Rwanda, nor is it the metaphor for irrational, barbaric,  
> ‘primordial’
> African violence that the Western psyche seems to have an  
> insatiable need
> for. Kenya must be understood on its own terms.
> As the Kenya Human Rights Commission has bravely borne witness to  
> in its
> work, elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and the 2005 referendum vote  
> have all
> been accompanied by political violence (1). For example, in the  
> aftermath of
> the 1992 elections, Africa Watch’s report noted: ‘President Daniel  
> arap Moi
> of Kenya confidently predicted that the return of his country to a
> multiparty system would result in an outbreak of tribal violence  
> that would
> destroy the nation. His prediction has been alarmingly fulfilled.  
> One of the
> most disturbing developments in Kenya over the last two years has  
> been the
> eruption of violent clashes between different ethnic groups… So  
> far, Africa
> Watch estimates that the clashes have left at least 1,500 people  
> dead and
> 300,000 displaced.’ (2)
> Political violence is not new to Kenya and those in power have  
> always used
> ethnicity to maintain their position. The modern state of Kenya was  
> built on
> colonial force and the political manipulation of ethnic identity.  
> At the
> height of colonialism, ethnic organisations were actively  
> encouraged to
> counter a national consciousness and all national organisations,  
> except for
> religious institutions, were banned (3). Hence it was ‘natural’ to  
> portray
> the country’s bloody independence struggle as atavistic. Kenya’s  
> history is
> crammed full of examples of British colonialism’s tried and tested  
> strategy
> of divide and rule. But it is important to remember that when the  
> Kenyan
> electorate were finally free to vote at independence in 1963, they  
> elected
> the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), with its nationalist  
> vision, and
> not the ethnically-based federalism of the Kenya African Democratic  
> Union
> (KADU), the departing colonial administration’s preference.
> Post-independence politics in many African countries has been  
> characterised
> by what Africa expert Morris Szeftel describes as ‘the dependence  
> of the
> African petty bourgeoisie on access to the state and its resources.  
> In the
> context of underdevelopment, local accumulation rests heavily on  
> political
> power and the ability it provides to appropriate public resources.’ He
> continues: ‘The problem is how to find a niche somewhere between
> underdevelopment and the domination exercised over the local  
> economy by
> foreign capital… Ruling elites learn that gate-keeping functions  
> (trade
> licences, contracts, foreign exchange) bring huge rewards (far  
> greater and
> with far fewer costs than legitimate business).’ (4)
> It is not only accumulation that is dependent on access to the  
> state but
> also political support. Via the mechanism of clientalism, those in  
> public
> office can distribute development projects and more clandestine  
> resources in
> return for loyalty and votes (5).
> Both these processes have been ‘ethnicised’ (6). Kenya’s first  
> president,
> Jomo Kenyatta, set the ball rolling from independence in 1963, and  
> spent 15
> years installing Kikuyu hegemony until Daniel arap Moi replaced him  
> in 1978.
> For the next 24 years, Moi attempted to dismantle this hegemony and  
> create
> networks of economic and political power based on ethnic Kalenjis,  
> until
> Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, became president in 2002. In the 45 years of  
> Kenya’s
> independence, other large ethnic groupings have been economically and
> politically marginalised. This has been particularly true for the  
> Luo, the
> ethnic group that Raila Odinga, Kibaki’s recent election opponent,  
> comes
> from. It is important to note that although politics has been  
> deliberately
> ethnicised, from above, many Kenyans have actively opposed this  
> from below,
> right from the colonial era through to the present.
> Such a political system, at key flashpoints such as elections,  
> produces both
> cynically organised violence and the righteous indignation of an  
> aggrieved
> citizenry. First, there is the immediate widespread fury of voters  
> that the
> exercise of their democratic right was not taken seriously, but  
> instead was
> merely a plaything in the hands of those in power. Why vote? Why  
> believe in
> democracy? Second, there is anger at an even deeper level. For  
> some, these
> elections represented a potential break with the corrupted  
> political system,
> a rejection of ethnically entrenched politics and the possibility of a
> completely different way of doing politics. It is a slim hope, but  
> a hope
> that many felt. Third, there is the despair that the same  
> communities are
> losing out yet again: 50 years of independence, 50 years of  
> exclusion. These
> are some of the motivations that lied behind the peaceful protests  
> and the
> depth of anger and desolation is represented by those interviewed  
> who said
> that they were willing to die.
>
> The cynically organised violence comes in two forms, the formal and  
> the
> informal. Police were firing live shots into the crowds of protesters,
> including those who were unarmed. The informal violence, including  
> road
> blocks and their ethnically targeted intimidation, is carried out by
> vigilante groups, some with connections to local and national  
> politicians,
> in government and in opposition. Observers have warned about the  
> rise of
> vigilantism as a form of political violence, and now we see  
> tragically why
> (7).
> As the popular East African proverb notes, when two elephants fight  
> it is
> the grass that suffers. Kibaki has used the full force of the state  
> in the
> shape of live ammunition, water cannon and tear gas while Odinga  
> has relied
> for his show of strength on supporters to come out on to the  
> streets as
> cannon fodder. Both are seasoned politicians; indeed, Odinga was  
> Kibaki’s
> kingmaker. Referring to the above proverb, Peter Kimani grimly  
> notes: ‘But
> if all the grass is destroyed, the sage should have added, there  
> will be no
> grass left for the elephants to feed on.’ (8)
> It is the everyday heroic and pragmatic humanism of ordinary Kenyans,
> wananchi, which has acted as a countervailing force throughout Kenya’s
> history to the powder keg of politically manipulated ethnicity. As  
> Ngugi wa
> Thiong’o reminds us, there are only two tribes in Kenya: the haves  
> and the
> have-nots (9).  Kenya and Kenyan lives are in a precarious position,
> balanced between the politics of what Colin Leys, drawing on Rosa  
> Luxemburg,
> calls ‘capitalism-produced barbarism’ and the nation’s reservoir of  
> humanity
> (10).
> It is critical that we understand and accurately interpret the  
> causes of
> Kenya’s political violence, provide comfort to its victims and  
> support those
> inside and outside the country struggling to change the politics of
> underdevelopment. Challenging the racist discourse of ‘African  
> violence’
> behind the sensationalist international reporting is part of that  
> process.
>
> Julie Hearn is a lecturer in politics and development at the  
> University of
> Lancaster.
>
> (1) Kenya Human Rights Commission
> (2) Human Rights Watch/Africa Watch (1993) Divide and Rule: State- 
> Sponsored
> Ethnic Violence in Kenya, p1
> (3) Furedi, F. (1994) Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World
> Nationalism, I.B. Tauris
> (4) Szeftel, M. (2000) ‘Between Governance & Underdevelopment:  
> Accumulation
> & Africa’s “Catastrophic Corruption”, Review of African Political  
> Economy
> 84, pp. 287 & 302
> (5) Szeftel, M. (2000) ‘Clientalism, Corruption & Catastrophe’,  
> Review of
> African Political Economy 85
> (6) This map on the BBC website provides the following breakdown:  
> Gikuyu (20
> per cent), Luo (14 per cent), Luhya (13 per cent), Kalenjin (11 per  
> cent),
> Kamba (11 per cent) with the remainder divided among Kenya’s smaller
> communities
> (7) Warigi, G. (2007) ‘Kenya: Vigilantes on the Rise’, BBC World
> Service.com, 11 October 2007, Kenya: Vigilantes On The Rise;  
> Kagwanja, P.
> (2003) ‘Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? the Mungiki, Ethnic  
> Violence and
> the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya, 1987-2002’, African  
> Affairs 102
>
> (8) Kimani, P. (2008) A Past of Power More Than Tribe in Kenya’s  
> Turmoil,
> Open Democracy, 2 January 2008
> (9) Wa Thiong’o, N. (2007) The Choices Before Us: Reflections on  
> Mwai Kibaki
> & the 2007 Kenya General Election, 17 December 2007
> (10) Leys, C. (1994) ‘Confronting the African Tragedy’, New Left  
> Review 204,
> p. 34.
>
>
>
>
>
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