[DEBATE] : Kenya and the myth of 'African barbarism'

[Russell Grinker]

Thursday 10 January 2008





Julie Hearn 

Kenya and the myth of ‘African barbarism’

Observers describe the post-election violence as a virus. In truth, everyday
Kenyans have historically resisted the top-down process of ethnic
one-upmanship.


‘Tribal violence’, ‘genocide’ and comparisons with Rwanda in 1994
characterised the early international media coverage of the post-election
crisis in Kenya at the beginning of 2008. Such sensationalist reporting was
not only analytically unhelpful - it was also irresponsibly dangerous. Kenya
is not Rwanda, nor is it the metaphor for irrational, barbaric, ‘primordial’
African violence that the Western psyche seems to have an insatiable need
for. Kenya must be understood on its own terms. 
As the Kenya Human Rights Commission has bravely borne witness to in its
work, elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and the 2005 referendum vote have all
been accompanied by political violence (1). For example, in the aftermath of
the 1992 elections, Africa Watch’s report noted: ‘President Daniel arap Moi
of Kenya confidently predicted that the return of his country to a
multiparty system would result in an outbreak of tribal violence that would
destroy the nation. His prediction has been alarmingly fulfilled. One of the
most disturbing developments in Kenya over the last two years has been the
eruption of violent clashes between different ethnic groups
 So far, Africa
Watch estimates that the clashes have left at least 1,500 people dead and
300,000 displaced.’ (2) 
Political violence is not new to Kenya and those in power have always used
ethnicity to maintain their position. The modern state of Kenya was built on
colonial force and the political manipulation of ethnic identity. At the
height of colonialism, ethnic organisations were actively encouraged to
counter a national consciousness and all national organisations, except for
religious institutions, were banned (3). Hence it was ‘natural’ to portray
the country’s bloody independence struggle as atavistic. Kenya’s history is
crammed full of examples of British colonialism’s tried and tested strategy
of divide and rule. But it is important to remember that when the Kenyan
electorate were finally free to vote at independence in 1963, they elected
the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), with its nationalist vision, and
not the ethnically-based federalism of the Kenya African Democratic Union
(KADU), the departing colonial administration’s preference. 
Post-independence politics in many African countries has been characterised
by what Africa expert Morris Szeftel describes as ‘the dependence of the
African petty bourgeoisie on access to the state and its resources. In the
context of underdevelopment, local accumulation rests heavily on political
power and the ability it provides to appropriate public resources.’ He
continues: ‘The problem is how to find a niche somewhere between
underdevelopment and the domination exercised over the local economy by
foreign capital
 Ruling elites learn that gate-keeping functions (trade
licences, contracts, foreign exchange) bring huge rewards (far greater and
with far fewer costs than legitimate business).’ (4) 
It is not only accumulation that is dependent on access to the state but
also political support. Via the mechanism of clientalism, those in public
office can distribute development projects and more clandestine resources in
return for loyalty and votes (5). 
Both these processes have been ‘ethnicised’ (6). Kenya’s first president,
Jomo Kenyatta, set the ball rolling from independence in 1963, and spent 15
years installing Kikuyu hegemony until Daniel arap Moi replaced him in 1978.
For the next 24 years, Moi attempted to dismantle this hegemony and create
networks of economic and political power based on ethnic Kalenjis, until
Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, became president in 2002. In the 45 years of Kenya’s
independence, other large ethnic groupings have been economically and
politically marginalised. This has been particularly true for the Luo, the
ethnic group that Raila Odinga, Kibaki’s recent election opponent, comes
from. It is important to note that although politics has been deliberately
ethnicised, from above, many Kenyans have actively opposed this from below,
right from the colonial era through to the present. 
Such a political system, at key flashpoints such as elections, produces both
cynically organised violence and the righteous indignation of an aggrieved
citizenry. First, there is the immediate widespread fury of voters that the
exercise of their democratic right was not taken seriously, but instead was
merely a plaything in the hands of those in power. Why vote? Why believe in
democracy? Second, there is anger at an even deeper level. For some, these
elections represented a potential break with the corrupted political system,
a rejection of ethnically entrenched politics and the possibility of a
completely different way of doing politics. It is a slim hope, but a hope
that many felt. Third, there is the despair that the same communities are
losing out yet again: 50 years of independence, 50 years of exclusion. These
are some of the motivations that lied behind the peaceful protests and the
depth of anger and desolation is represented by those interviewed who said
that they were willing to die. 

The cynically organised violence comes in two forms, the formal and the
informal. Police were firing live shots into the crowds of protesters,
including those who were unarmed. The informal violence, including road
blocks and their ethnically targeted intimidation, is carried out by
vigilante groups, some with connections to local and national politicians,
in government and in opposition. Observers have warned about the rise of
vigilantism as a form of political violence, and now we see tragically why
(7). 
As the popular East African proverb notes, when two elephants fight it is
the grass that suffers. Kibaki has used the full force of the state in the
shape of live ammunition, water cannon and tear gas while Odinga has relied
for his show of strength on supporters to come out on to the streets as
cannon fodder. Both are seasoned politicians; indeed, Odinga was Kibaki’s
kingmaker. Referring to the above proverb, Peter Kimani grimly notes: ‘But
if all the grass is destroyed, the sage should have added, there will be no
grass left for the elephants to feed on.’ (8) 
It is the everyday heroic and pragmatic humanism of ordinary Kenyans,
wananchi, which has acted as a countervailing force throughout Kenya’s
history to the powder keg of politically manipulated ethnicity. As Ngugi wa
Thiong’o reminds us, there are only two tribes in Kenya: the haves and the
have-nots (9).  Kenya and Kenyan lives are in a precarious position,
balanced between the politics of what Colin Leys, drawing on Rosa Luxemburg,
calls ‘capitalism-produced barbarism’ and the nation’s reservoir of humanity
(10). 
It is critical that we understand and accurately interpret the causes of
Kenya’s political violence, provide comfort to its victims and support those
inside and outside the country struggling to change the politics of
underdevelopment. Challenging the racist discourse of ‘African violence’
behind the sensationalist international reporting is part of that process. 

Julie Hearn is a lecturer in politics and development at the University of
Lancaster. 

(1) Kenya Human Rights Commission 
(2) Human Rights Watch/Africa Watch (1993) Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored
Ethnic Violence in Kenya, p1 
(3) Furedi, F. (1994) Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World
Nationalism, I.B. Tauris 
(4) Szeftel, M. (2000) ‘Between Governance & Underdevelopment: Accumulation
& Africa’s “Catastrophic Corruption”, Review of African Political Economy
84, pp. 287 & 302 
(5) Szeftel, M. (2000) ‘Clientalism, Corruption & Catastrophe’, Review of
African Political Economy 85 
(6) This map on the BBC website provides the following breakdown: Gikuyu (20
per cent), Luo (14 per cent), Luhya (13 per cent), Kalenjin (11 per cent),
Kamba (11 per cent) with the remainder divided among Kenya’s smaller
communities 
(7) Warigi, G. (2007) ‘Kenya: Vigilantes on the Rise’, BBC World
Service.com, 11 October 2007, Kenya: Vigilantes On The Rise; Kagwanja, P.
(2003) ‘Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? the Mungiki, Ethnic Violence and
the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya, 1987-2002’, African Affairs 102

(8) Kimani, P. (2008) A Past of Power More Than Tribe in Kenya’s Turmoil,
Open Democracy, 2 January 2008 
(9) Wa Thiong’o, N. (2007) The Choices Before Us: Reflections on Mwai Kibaki
& the 2007 Kenya General Election, 17 December 2007 
(10) Leys, C. (1994) ‘Confronting the African Tragedy’, New Left Review 204,
p. 34.