[DEBATE] : ‘An Acceptable Presence’: The New US Basing Structure in the Philippines

[Riaz K. Tayob]

‘An Acceptable Presence’:
The New US Basing Structure in the Philippines
By Herbert Docena *


Sixteen years ago, the Philippine Senate made the historic vote to shut
down what American analysts once described as “probably the most
important
basing complex in the world” -- the US military bases in Subic and
Clark,
along with other smaller support and communications facilities in the
country.

Taken after long and emotional debates, the Senate vote shook the
Philippines’ relations with its most important ally. That one small and
weak country could say no to what by then had become the world’s only
remaining superpower reverberated across the world.

Since then, every move by the US military in the Philippines has
provoked
controversy. For the most part, however, the question has tended to be
framed in terms of whether the US is seeking to re-establish the kind of
bases it had in the past. Such framing has consequently allowed the
US and
Philippine governments to categorically deny any such plans.

But what has since emerged is not a return to the past but a new and
different kind of basing.

GLOBAL POSTURE
Since the end of the Cold War, but in a process that has accelerated
since
the Bush administration came to office, the United States has
embarked on
what American officials tout as the most radical reconfiguration since
World War II of its “global defense posture.”

This term no longer refers simply to the over 850 physical bases and
installations that the US now maintains in around 46 countries around
the
world.[1] As US Defense undersecretary for policy Douglas J Feith
explained, “We are not talking only about basing, we’re talking about
the
ability of our forces to operate when and where they are needed.”[2]

Billed as the “Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy,” the plan
seeks to comprehensively transform the US overseas military presence –
largely unchanged since the 1950s – in light of perceived new threats
and
the US’ self-avowed “grand strategy” of perpetuating its status as the
world’s only military superpower.

“The [US] military,” declared President George W Bush, “must be ready to
strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world.”[3] To do
this, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, an official document
required by
the US Congress of the Pentagon to articulate US military strategy,
states
that the US is seeking to move away from “obsolete Cold War
garrisons” to
“mobile, expeditionary operations.”[4]

REDUCED FOOTPRINT
The plan is simple: Instead of concentrating its troops and equipment in
only a few locations, the United States will decrease the number of
large
well-equipped bases and increase the number of smaller, simpler bases in
more locations.[5]

Marine Gen. James Jones, commander of US forces in Europe, described the
aim as developing a “family of bases” that could go “from cold to
warm to
hot if you need them” but without having the “small town USA”-feel,
complete with schools and families that have typically come with such
bases.[6]

Recognition of the rising opposition to the US military presence
around the
world is also driving these changes. As early as in 1988, a US
government
commission created during the Reagan administration concluded that, “We
have found it increasingly difficult, and politically costly to maintain
bases.”[7]

Apart from those in the Philippines, US bases have been closed or
terminated in recent years in Puerto Rico, Panama, and recently
Ecuador, as
a result of public mobilizations. Turkey refused to allow the US to
use its
bases for the invasion in Iraq. Even in Japan and Korea, hostility to
bases
has been growing.

Hence, the US has been trying to restructure its overseas presence in
a way
that aims to undermine this growing opposition. As US Navy Rear Admiral
Richard Hunt, the Joint Staff’s deputy director for strategy and policy
said, “We don’t want to be stepping all over our host nations…We want to
exist in a very non-intrusive way.”[8]

The aim, according to the Pentagon, is to “reduce the forward
footprint” of
the military while increasing its agility and flexible.[9]

MISSION PRESENCE
As part of this over-all reconfiguration, the Pentagon now
categorizes its
overseas structures into three: Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward
Operating Sites (FOSs), and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). (See
sidebar).

FOSs and CSLs are also called “lily pads” intended to allow the US to
hop
from MOBs to their destinations rapidly when needed but without
requiring a
lot of resources to keep them running when not needed.[10] Referring to
this kind of base, Gen. Jones said, “We could use it for six months,
turn
off the lights, and go to another base if we need to.”[11]

But, as mentioned earlier, the US definition of “global posture” goes
way
beyond physical structures. In an effort to maximize its forward
presence
while minimizing opposition, the US has also been seeking to increase
what
US Air Force-sponsored analysts call “mission presence” and “limited
access.”

“Mission presence” is what the US has in countries where there are
ongoing
military missions which “lack the breadth and capability to qualify
as true
forward presence but nonetheless contribute to the overall US posture
abroad.”

“Limited access” is the kind the United States gets through exercises,
visits, and other operations.[12]

Hence, the US’ global posture encompasses, by definition, not just those
who are “forward-based,” or those units that are stationed in foreign
countries on a long-term basis such as troops in Korea and Japan, but
also
those who are “forward-deployed,” or those who are sent overseas to
conduct
various kinds of deployments, exercises, or operations.

THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO COMPETE
If, in the Cold War, the US’ overseas presence targeted the Soviet Union
and other communist and nationalist forces in the Third World, today,
the
US’ current “global posture” is aimed at any state or non-state forces
perceived to be threatening the interests of the United States.

“Terrorists” stand in the line of fire. Regional powers hostile to the
United States, such as Iran and North Korea, have also been singled out.
But, in light of the United States’ self-declared grand strategy of
preventing the rise of rivals who could threaten its preeminent
status, one
rising power is now clearly in its sights – China.

For years, American officials have been divided between those who
believe
that China could be a “strategic partner” to be engaged and those who
believe that it is a “strategic competitor” to be confronted militarily
before it grows more powerful. Since the end of the Cold War,
indications
are that the latter view has prevailed.

As early as 1997, the Pentagon’s QDR had already identified China, along
with Russia, as possible “global peer competitors.”[13] In 1999, a
pivotal
Pentagon think-tank conducted a seminar to lay down all the likely
scenarios involving China. Its conclusion: no matter what happens,
China’s
rise will not be “peaceful” for the US.

In 2000, a US Air Force-funded study argued explicitly in favor of
preventing China’s rise. Also in the same year, Robert Kagan and William
Kristol, two influential commentators whose ideas have evidently
molded US
policy, proposed that Beijing – along with Baghdad – should be
targeted for
“regime-change.”[14] The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a
grouping whose members and proposals have since staffed and shaped
the Bush
administration and its policies, supported the same aims and made
similar
recommendations.

During the US presidential elections, George W. Bush distinguished
himself
from other candidates by singling out China as a “strategic competitor.”
Since then, various officials have successively warned that China’s
military modernization constitutes a direct threat to the United
States.[15]

The Pentagon’s 2006 official report to Congress on China stated,
“China’s
military expansion is already such as to alter regional military
balances.”[16]

If in 2001 the QDR was still vaguely worded, by 2006, when the next
QDR was
released, the assessment became more explicit: “Of the major and
emerging
powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the
United States…”[17]

MOVING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
The problem for the US is its relatively weak presence in Asia. As a
Pentagon report on China, whose conclusions have been widely echoed,
warned: “Lack of forward operating bases or cooperative allies greatly
limits the range of US military responses…”[18]

What the US does have in terms of presence is now believed to be
concentrated in the wrong place. Since the 1950s, the bulk of the US
forward-presence in Asia has been in South Korea and Japan, directed
towards the Soviet Union and North Korea. To address this, the US has
been
seeking expand southwards – to Southeast Asia.[19]

By early 2002, the US began negotiating with various governments in
Southeast Asia for use of bases in the region.[20] In 2003, then US
Pacific
Command chief Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, stated, “Power projection and
contingency response in Southeast Asia in the future will depend on this
network of US access in areas with little or no permanent American
basing
structure.”[21]

Along with the plans for East Asia and Southeast Asia, the US had also
established bases to the west of China, in Central Asia, with new
installations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.[22] While it had none before
the invasion of Afghanistan, by 2002 it had access to over a dozen
bases in
the region.[23]

With the US forward presence northeast of China (in Japan and South
Korea),
the deepening cooperation with Mongolia to China’s north, and its
deepening
alliance with India, to China’s southwest, the United States is slowly
encircling China from all sides.

It is in light of these large, sweeping changes in US strategy, its
perception of threats, and its tactics, that US military objectives
regarding the Philippines can be best understood.

IN THE DRAGON’S LAIR
Since the late 1990s, a chorus of American defense analysts, military
officials, civilian leaders, and influential commentators have
identified
the Philippines as playing a critical role in the US’ global posture
and a
succession of studies sponsored for different US military services have
singled it out for its strategic location.

The PNAC, for example, had proposed that the US Navy should establish a
home-port while the US Air Force should station a wing in the
Philippines.[24] Another study for the US Air Force (USAF) noted the
Philippines is located firmly within what US strategists have called the
“dragon’s lair” or those areas of the Western Pacific where China could
potentially seek to prevent the US from deploying.[25] Another US Air
Force-funded study to develop a “global access strategy” for the US Air
Force proposed renting an island from the Philippines for use as a
military
base.[26]

A 2006 USAF-funded study evaluating basing options for storing and
pre-positioning US’ war material included the Philippines as among
the most
desirable sites. Exploring different alternatives, a US Army-sponsored
research identified the Philippines as one of the suitable locations
for a
new unit of the Army.

Although proposals made by military analysts do not necessarily
translate
into action, it is clear that a consensus has been building that “[A]
ccess
to Philippine facilities is much more important than most judged 12
years
ago.”[27]

THE APPEARANCE OF BASES
One obstacle however remains:  domestic opposition to US military
presence
in thePhilippines. As yet another  US Air Force-funded study
acknowledges,
“On the matter of US access to military facilities in the
Philippines, the
general view of Philippine security experts is that for domestic
political
reasons it would be difficult to give the appearance that the United
States
is reestablishing its bases in the Philippines.”[28]

Hence, the aim has been to avoid giving this appearance.  As Admiral
Dennis
Blair, former commander of the US Pacific Command, explained, “[W]e are
adapting our plans and cooperation of the past to the future. Those
plans
do not include any request by the United States for bases in the
Philippines of the kind that we have had in the past.” [italics
added] [29]

“Our basic interest,” explained former US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, “is to have the ability to go into a country and have a
relationship and have understandings about our ability to land or
overfly
and to do things that are of mutual benefit to each of us. But we don't
have any particular plans for permanent bases if that's the kind of
thing
you mean…”[30]

Thus, instead of “the kind of bases we had in the past”, the US is
trying
something new.

TRAINING FOR ACCESS
First, the US has stepped up deploying troops, ships, and equipment
to the
country ostensibly for training exercises, humanitarian and engineering
projects, and other missions.

Though the Visiting Forces Agreement was approved in 1998, it was
only in
2001 that the number and the size of troops involved in training
exercises
jumped significantly. Last year alone, up to 37 exercises were
scheduled;
up from around 24 in the preceding years.[31] As many as 5,000 US troops
are involved, depending on the exercise. As a result of these continuing
deployments, former US Ambassador to the Philippines Francis Ricciardone
has described the US presence in the country as “semi-continuous.”[32]

Apart from training allied troops, the holding of joint exercises allows
the US to gain temporary – but repeated and regular – access to the
territories of countries in which the exercises are held. As former US
PACOM head Admiral Thomas Fargo noted in March 2003,  “The habitual
relationships built through exercises and training…is our biggest
guarantor
of access in time of need.”[33]

He said: “Access over time can develop into habitual use of certain
facilities by deployed US forces with the eventual goal of being
guaranteed
use in a crisis, or permission to preposition logistics stocks and other
critical material in strategic forward locations.”[34]

As US troops come and go in rotation for frequent and regular exercises,
their presence – when taken together – makes up a formidable
forward-presence that brings them closer to areas of possible action
without need for huge infrastructure to support them and without
inciting a
lot of public attention and opposition.

As analyst Eric Peltz has told the US House Armed Services Committee:
“Other methods of positioning, such as training rotations, can provide a
temporary ‘forward position’ or sustain a long-term position without
permanent forward unit basing.”[35]

And as US troops depart, they leave behind the infrastructure that
they had
built and used ostensibly for the exercises and which could still be
of use
to the US military in the future for missions different from those for
which they were initially built.

In General Santos City, for example, the US constructed a deepwater port
and one of the most modern domestic airports in the country,
connected to
each other by one of the country’s best roads. In Fort Magsaysay in
Nueva
Ecija, where US troops routinely go for exercises, the airport has been
renovated and its runway strengthened to carry the weight of C-130
planes.[36] In Basilan and Sulu, venues of Balikatan exercises, the US,
through USAID, has also built roads and ports that can berth huge ships.

This is consistent with a USAF-funded study which recommended having
more
deployments to have more infrastructure. By increasing deployments,
notes
the study, the US can get into arrangements that “include measures to
tailor local infrastructure to USAF operations by extending runways,
improving air traffic control facilities, repairing parking aprons
and the
like.”[37]

Along with troops, an increasing number of ships have also been entering
the country with growing frequency ostensibly for exercises and
humanitarian missions. “[T]he Navy counts those ships as providing
overseas
presence full time, even when they are training or simply tied up at the
pier,” said the US Congressional Budget Office.[38]

As has been discussed earlier, the US sees these regular and frequent
“temporary” deployments as part of its global “posture.” As the US
National
Defense Strategy states, “Our posture also includes the many military
activities in which we engage around the world. This means not only our
physical presence in key regions, but also our training, exercises, and
operations.”[39]

BASE SERVICES WITHOUT PERMANENT BASING
Second, the US has obliged the Philippines to provide it with a broad
range
of locally-provided services that would enable it to launch and sustain
operations from the Philippines when necessary.

In September 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted the US free
access to its ports and offered it overflight rights.[40] In November
2002,
the US and Philippine governments signed the Mutual Logistics Support
Agreement (MLSA) which has been described by researchers with the US
Congressional Research Service as “allowing the United States to use the
Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the
region.”[41]

The MLSA obliges the Philippine government to exert “best efforts” to
provide the US logistics supplies, support and services during
exercises,
training, operations, and other US military deployments. The agreement
defines these to include food, water, petroleum, oils, clothing,
ammunition, spare parts and components, billeting, transportation,
communication, medical services, operation support, training services,
repair and maintenance, storage services, and port services.
“Construction
and use of temporary structures” is also covered.[42]

In other words, the MLSA gives the US access to the full range of
services
that the US military would require to operate in and from the country.
Through the MLSA, the US has secured for itself the services that it
would
normally be able to provide itself inside a large permanent base but
without constructing and retaining large permanent bases – and without
incurring the costs and the political problems that such bases pose.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATIONS
Third, the US has established in the Philippines a new category of
military
installations it calls “Cooperative Security Locations” (CSLs).

In August 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission, the official commission
tasked to review US basing, categorically identified the Philippines
as one
of the countries where CSLs are being developed by the United States
in the
region.[43] As mentioned earlier, CSLs is a new category of bases that
refers to facilities owned by host-governments but are to be made
available
for use by the US military as needed.

The Philippine government has not disclosed the locations and other
details
about these CSLs. But the description by Robert Kaplan, a prominent
American journalist and best-selling author who has visited such
facilities
around the world, is quoted here in full because of the dearth of
information about them and because parts of it could be describing the
Philippines –

“A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host
country's civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and
mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with
which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal
arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens… The United
States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby
helping the
host country to better project its own air and naval power in the
region.
At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host country's
military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer humanitarian
help to
the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects garner positive
publicity
for our military in the local media…The result is a positive diplomatic
context for getting the host country's approval for use of the base when
and if we need it.”[44]

The terms of the MLSA and the establishment of CSLs reflect the US’
increasing emphasis on just-in-time logistics support and pre-
positioning
of equipment to ensure that US forces – dispersed as they are to be
around
the world, often far away from main bases where they store equipment and
use all kinds of services – are always ready and on the go.
Therefore, it
is not so much the size of the base that matters but whether it can
provide
the US military with what it needs, when it’s needed.

As the Council on Foreign Relations points out: “While host nation
support
often carries the connotation of basing, its role of staging and
access is
perhaps more critical. Support for port visits, ship repairs, overflight
rights, training areas, and opportunities, and areas to marshal, stage,
repair, and resupply are no less important for both daily US presence in
the region and for rapid and flexible crisis response.”[45]

FORWARD OPERATING BASE
Fourth, the US has succeeded in indefinitely stationing a US military
unit
in the country.

Since 2002, a unit now called the Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines (JSOTFP) has been deployed to the southern
Philippines.
While initially presented as being part of on-again off-again temporary
training exercises, it has since been revealed that this unit has
maintained its presence in the country continuously for the last six
years.

With the Philippine government not giving a definite exit date, and
with US
officials stating that this unit will stay on as long as they are
allowed
by the government, it is presumed that it will continue to be based
in the
Philippines for the long-haul.

The unit is headquartered in the Philippine military’s Camp Navarro in
Zamboanga City [46] but its “area of operations,” according to a US
military publication, spans 8,000 square miles, covering the entire
island
of Mindanao and its surrounding islands and seas.[47]

According to a comprehensive compilation of various media reports, the
number of troops belonging to the unit has ranged between 100 and 450
but
it is not clear what the actual total is for a specific period.[48] It
varies “depending on the season and the mission,” said US Lt. Col. Mark
Zimmer, JSOTF-P public affairs officer.[49]

When it was publicly revealed last month that the US Department of
Defense,
via a US military construction unit, had granted a contract to a company
providing “base operations support” for the JSOTF-P[50], the US embassy
admitted that US was setting up allegedly “temporary” structures for
“medical, logistical, administrative services” and facilities for
“for them
to eat, sleep and work.”[51] The Philippine’s own Visiting Forces
Commission also confirmed that the US maintains “living quarters” and
stocks supplies inside Philippine military camps.[52]

FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA
Referring to their bases in Mindanao as “forward operating base-11” and
“advanced operating base-921,”[53] the JSOTF-P corresponds to what a
US Air
Force-sponsored study described as the ongoing “redefinition of what
forward presence means.”[54]

In terms of profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar to the Combined
Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-Horn of Africa) which was
established in Djibouti in eastern Africa in 2003, also composed
mostly of
Special Forces, and which has been described as a sample of the US
austere
basing template and the “model for future US military operations.”[55]

Indeed, more deployments similar to that of the JSOTF-P and CJTF-Horn of
Africa are planned in other locations around the world in the future.
[56]
In 2004, former PACOM commander Thomas Fargo talked about expanding
Special
Operations Forces in the Pacific.[57] Apparently referring to the
JSOTF-P,
former defense secretary Rumsfeld had also announced that the Pentagon
would establish more “nodes for special operations forces.”

“In place of traditional overseas bases with extensive infrastructure,”
Rumsfeld said, “we intend to use smaller forward operating bases with
prepositioned equipment and rotational presence of personnel… We will
maintain a smaller forward-presence force in the Pacific while also
stationing agile, expeditionary forces capable of rapid responses at our
power projection bases.”[58]

The JSOFT-P’s characteristics fit this description. Modest and
austere, the
JSOTF-P has none of the extensive infrastructure and facilities of the
former US bases in Subic and Clark. But with the availability of local
logistics and other services assured, the free entry of ships and planes
and the pre-positioning of equipment allowed, and with the new roads,
ports, and other infrastructure the US has been building in the area,
the
US Special Forces will be ready and able at a moment’s notice to
launch and
sustain its operations in the region.

As evidenced by the fact that most Filipinos are not even aware of their
presence and their actions, “the JSOTF had succeeded,” notes Kaplan,
“as a
political mechanism for getting an American base-of-sorts up and
running…”[59] C.H. Briscoe, command historian of the US Army Special
Operations Command, under which the units of the JSOTF-P belong,
concurs:
“After more than 10 years, PACOM has reestablished an acceptable
presence
in the Philippines…”[60]

Strategically positioned between two routes at the entrance of a major
sea-lane, the Makassar Strait, at the southwestern rim of the South
China
Sea and closer to Malaysia and Indonesia than most of the rest of the
Philippines, the JSOTF-P, according to Briscoe, is “now better able to
monitor the pulse of the region.”[61]

Having secured this presence, the US has become closer to the country
with
“the greatest potential to compete militarily” with it. By getting
the US
“semi-permanently” based south of Luzon for the first time since
World War
II, Kaplan notes that “the larger-than-necessary base complex” in
Zamboanga
has delivered more than tactical benefits.[62] In the minds of the US
Army
strategists, Kaplan notes: “Combating Islamic terrorism in this region
[Southeast Asia] carried a secondary benefit for the United States: it
positioned the US for the future containment of nearby China.”[63]

QUALITATIVELY TRANSFORMED
All of the steps discussed above have paved the way for the gradual and
incremental re-entry of the US military to the Philippines. At no time,
since 1991, has US military presence been more entrenched. At the same
time, this presence is no longer the same; it has been qualitatively
transformed.

No longer are US troops permanently stationed and confined inside large
bases in two locations in the country. Drawn instead from rotational
forces, the troops have been deploying in various locations all over the
country for exercises and other missions. Instead of being massed in the
thousands inside huge fortifications flying the US flag, they are in the
hundreds, dispersed and housed inside camps that technically belong
to the
Philippine military.

In the past, US troops could, despite the occasional deployment,
expect to
stay for long periods of time, stationed in the same base for years.
Now,
they are to be always ready and on the move, prepared to take part in
shorter but more frequent deployments overseas.

Before, they stored their equipment, weapons, and supplies in huge
storerooms and warehouses inside their base complex at all times,
ready to
lift and carry them wherever they went; now, they are scattering and
storing their equipment and supplies in various locations, guarded and
maintained by host-nation governments or private companies, and ready
to be
picked up on the way to the fighting.

All these changes in the Philippines are driven by the overlapping
goals of
building up support for and countering domestic opposition to US
presence
while improving the agility and efficiency of the US military.

TRIAL BALLOONS
But this too could change: for while large bases have their
disadvantages,
they also provide the guaranteed access, capacities, and other
advantages
that smaller more austere bases cannot. Also, while the kind of
basing that
the US is developing now can be useful for certain scenarios, they
may not
be appropriate and sufficient for others. In case of a long drawn-out
standoff, for instance, it would take more than 500 Special Forces
stationed in relatively simple bases to sustain US military operations.

Hence, given the right moment and given the need, if plans are not in
fact
afoot, the US may still want to re-establish larger bases in the
Philippines. Given US strategy and the Philippines’ location, the
possibility cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the frequent reports that
the US
is trying to re-establish bases in the country have been
characterized by
an analyst with the Brookings Institute as “trial balloons” to test the
atmosphere.[64]

For the moment, however, it cannot be said that just because the US does
not have large bases of the kind it used to have, the US has not been
securing its military objectives in the country. Through the back-
door and
largely out of sight, the US has gradually but incrementally
reintegrated
the Philippines firmly within its “global posture.”

All these may have effectively reversed that historic decision, taken 16
years ago, to end nearly a century of US military presence in the
country.#

*Herbert Docena (herbert at focusweb.org) is a researcher with Focus on the
Global (www.focusweb.org) South, a policy research institute. This
article
was published in three parts by the Philippine Daily Inquirer from
October
15 to 17:

Part 1:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?
article_id
=94438
Part
2:http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?
article_
id=94687
Part 3:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?
article_id
=94921

Sidebar:
CATEGORIES OF US OVERSEAS MILITARY STRUCTURES

Main Operating Bases (MOB) are those relatively larger installations and
facilities located in the territory of reliable allies, with vast
infrastructure and family support facilities that will serve as the
hub of
operations in support of smaller, more austere bases; examples are the
Ramstein Air Base in Germany, the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and Camp
Humphreys in Korea
- Forward Operating Sites (FOS) are smaller, more spare bases that
could be
expanded and then scaled down as needed; they will store pre-positioned
equipment but will only normally host a small number of troops on a
rotational, as opposed to permanent, basis; while smaller, they must
still
be able to quickly support a range of operations with back-up from MOBs
- Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) are facilities owned by host
governments that would only be used by the US in case of actual
operations;
though they could be visited and inspected by the US, they would most
likely be ran and maintained by host-nation personnel or even private
contractors; useful for pre-positioning logistics support or as
venues for
joint operations with host militaries, they may also be expanded to
become
FOSs if necessary
	
Source: US Department of Defense, “Strengthening US Global Defense
Posture,” September 2004

NOTES:
[1] US Department of Defense Report to Congress, “Strengthening US
Global
Defense Posture,” September 2004.
[2] US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, Prepared
Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, June 23, 2004, US
Department of Defense website:
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=133 [Accessed
September 10, 2007].
[3] quoted in G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” Foreign
Affairs September/Octoberober 2002, Vol 81. No 5.
[4 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington
D.C., February 6, 2006, pp. v-vi,
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf [Accessed
September 10, 2007].
[5] US Department of Defense Report to Congress, “Strengthening US
Global
Defense Posture,” September 2004.
[6] Center for Defense Information, “Worldwide Reorientation of US
Military
Basing,” September 19, 2003,
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?
documentID=1717&from_pag
e=../program/document.cfm [Accessed September 10, 2007].
[7] Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, January 1988), p. 22,
quoted in Christine Wing, “The United States in the Pacific,” in Joseph
Gerson and Bruce Richards, eds., The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the
Network of Foreign US Military Bases (Boston, MA: South End Press,
1991),
p. 144.
[8] Jim Garamone, “Global Posture Part and Parcel of Transformation,”
American Forces Press Service, October 14, 2004
[9] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001,
Washington
DC, p. 53.
[10] John D. Klaus, “US Military Overseas Basing: Background and
Oversight
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress,
November 17, 2004.
[11] quoted in David Isenberg, “The US Global Posture Review: Reshaping
America’s Global Military Footprint,” Basic Notes: Occasional Papers on
International Security Policy, British American Security Information
Council, November 19, 2004, p. 3.
[12] David Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick-
Paley, A
Global Access Strategy for the US Air Force, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2002, pp. 17-18.
[13] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 1997,
Washington
DC.
[14] Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Present Danger,” The
National
Interest, Number 59 Spring 2000.
[15] George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, “The
Worldwide
Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a  Complex World,” February 11,
2003,
www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html
[Accessed September 10, 2007]; Conn Hallinan, “Cornering the Dragon,”
Counterpunch, February 23, 2005,
http://www.counterpunch.org/hallinan02232005.html [Accessed September
10,
2007]; Mark Mazzetti, “Chinese Arms Threaten Asia, Rumsfeld Says,” Los
Angeles Times, June 4, 2005)
[16] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2006: Annual Report to Congress, Washington D.C.,
http://stinet.dtic.mil/dticrev/PDFs/ADA449718.pdf [Accessed September 9,
2007]
[17] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001,
Washington
D.C., February 6, 2006, p. 29,
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf [Accessed
September 10, 2007]
[18] Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final
Report,
“Asia 2025” Organized by the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net
Assessment, 25 July to 4 August 1999, Newport Rhode Island,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/967.pdf [Accessed June 12,
2007],
p. 76.
[19] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L.
Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J.
Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force
Posture, Sta Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001; Under Secretary of
Defense
(Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, “Asia 2025” Organized by the
Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25 July to 4
August
1999, Newport Rhode Island,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/967.pdf [Accessed June 12,
2007];
Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America’s Defenses:
Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, September 2000.
[20] Michael Richardson, “US Wants More Use of South Asian Bases,”
International Herald Tribune, February 8, 2002.
[21] Admiral Thomas Fargo, transcript of hearing of US House of
Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on
Asia
and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.
[22] Robert D. Kaplan, “How we would fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly,
June 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan [Accessed
June 14,
2005].
[23] Rosemary Foot, “US Foreign- and Domestic-policy Realignments after
September 11,” Adelphi Papers, Volume 44, Issue 363, February 2004.
[24] Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America’s
Defenses:
Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, September 2000,
Washington DC, p. 35.
[25] Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chaise, Derek Eaton, Kevin L.
Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and
their Implications for the United States, Sta Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation
Project Air Force, 2007, p. 112.
[26] David Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick-
Paley, A
Global Access Strategy for the US Air Force, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2002, p. xxii.
[27] Michael McDevitt, “US Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region:
Southeast
Asia,” in US Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region conference proceedings,
May 5, 2003.
[28] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L.
Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J.
Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force
Posture, Sta Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 182.
[29] Transcript, Press Conference with Admiral Dennis Blair,
Commander in
Chief, US Pacific Command, Manila, July 13, 2001.
[30] Transcript, Press Conference with US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, April 25, 2002
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t04262002_t0425er.html
[Accessed September 10, 2007].
[31] Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Q and A with US Ambassador Francis
Ricciardone:
‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying,’” MindaNews, February 28, 2005; Jojo
Due,
“Biggest RP-US military exercise starts next week,” Philippine Business
Daily Mirror, February 17, 2006.
[32] Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Q and A with US Ambassador Francis
Ricciardone:
‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying,’” MindaNews, February 28, 2005.
[33] Admiral Thomas Fargo, transcript of hearing of US House of
Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on
Asia
and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.
[34] Admiral Thomas Fargo, Transcript of Hearing of US House of
Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on
Asia
and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.
[35] Eric Peltz, “Toward an Expeditionary Army: New Options for
Combatant
Commanders,” Testimony Presented to the House Armed Services
Committee on
March 24, 2004, p. 3.
[36] Karl Wilson, “US force in Asia to become smaller but deadlier,”
Daily
Times, August 22, 2004.
[37] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L.
Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J.
Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force
Posture, Sta Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 63.
[38] Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, “Options
for the Navy’s Future Fleet,” May 2006
[39] US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2005,
Washington
D.C., pp. 18-19.
[40] Rufi Vigilar, “Philippines opens its ports to U.S. military,” CNN,
September 18, 2001.
[41] Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch, “The Republic of the Philippines:
Background and US Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, January 10, 2006,
http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33233_20060110.pdf [Accessed August 25,
2007]; Sheldon W. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the US Pacific
Command,” National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, Volume 14,
Number 2,
August 2003.
[42] Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Between the Department of
Defense
of the United States of America and the Department of National
Defense of
the Republic of the Philippines, November 21, 2002.
[43] Overseas Basing Commission, Report to the President and Congress,
August 15, 2005, p. H11, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf
[Accessed August 25, 2007].
[44] Robert D. Kaplan, “How we would fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly,
June 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan [Accessed
June 14,
2005].
[45] Council on Foreign Relations, The United States and Southeast
Asia: A
Policy Agenda for the New Administration, July 2001, pp. 47-48.
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SEAsiaTF.pdf
[Accessed
September 10, 2007].
[46] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American
Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond,  New York:
Vintage Books 2006, p.147.
[47] T.D. Flack, “Special Operations Force Aiding an Important Ally,”
Stars
and Stripes, March 11, 2007; Col. Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a
Successful
COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach,” Military
Review, November to December 2006.
[48] At start of the deployment in January 2002, there were supposed
to be
160 to 250 who were joining. (Steve Vogel, “Americans Arrive in
Philippines
U.S. Special Forces To Aid Filipino Army In Threatened Areas,”
Washington
Post, January 16, 2002; Fe B. Zamora, “All US troops will leave on
July 31,
says Wurster,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 2002; Pat Roque, “US
Special Forces in Philippines,” Associated Press, February 18, 2002;
Bill
Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Philippine confusion,” Washington Times,
February 8, 2002). In November 2002, the Army Magazine reported that
there
were 260 members of the task force were in the southern Philippines.
(Army
Magazine, “News Call,” November 1, 2002). In February 2003, 350 Special
Forces were reportedly scheduled to be sent to Sulu but this was
postponed.
(Eric Schmitt, “US combat force of 1700 is headed to the
Philippines”,  New
York Times, February 21, 2003; Bradley Graham, “US Bolsters Philippine
Force,” Washington Post, February 21, 2003) In Octoberober 2003, 300
Special Forces were reported to be in Basilan (US spy aircraft
deployed in
Philippines,” Octoberober 13, 2003 The News International (Pakistan). By
February 2006, 250 more troops were reported to be joining those who
were
already in Sulu but it was not clear how many were still there at
that time
(“RP-US to conduct war games amid ‘rape’ controversy, Philipine Daily
Inquirer, January 10, 2006; “No time frame of US troops’ stay in Sulu,
Mindanews, January 17, 2006). Shortly after, US military spokesperson
Capt
Burrel Parmer announced that 400 US troops will be Sulu for various
projects. (Ding Cervantes, “5,500 US military personnel coming for
Balikatan 2006,” Philippine Star, February 17, 2006). In September 2006,
114 US troops were reported to have arrived in Zamboanga City as part of
the “normal rotation” of soldiers under JSOTF-P, according to the US
embassy. (Julie Alipala, “100 GIs held at Zambo immigration,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, September 28, 2006). In February 2007, US today reported
450 and Reuters put the number at 100 (Paul Wiseman, “In Philippines, US
Making Progress in War on Terror,” USA Today, Februay 13, 2007;
“Philippines increases security for US forces,” Reuters, February 26,
2007).
[49] “Civilians want probe on US military’s alleged supervision in Sulu
war,” MindaNews, November 24, 2005.
[50] In August 2007, Focus on the Global South publicized the
granting by
the US Deparment of Defense, through the US Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC), of a six-month $14.4-million contract to a certain
“Global Contingency Services LLC” of Irving, Texas for “operations
support”
for the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).
According to its own website, the NAVFAC is the unit within the US
military
that is in charge of providing the US Navy with “operating, support, and
training bases.” It “manages the planning, design, and construction and
provides public works support for US Naval shore installations around
the
world.” Among their business lines are “bases development” and
“contingency
engineering.” According to the announcement by the Pentagon, the
contract
awarded to Global Contingency Services LLC includes “all labor,
supervision, management, tools, materials, equipment, facilities,
transportation, incidental engineering, and other items necessary to
provide facilities support services.” Global Contingency Services LLC
is a
partnership between DynCorp International, Parsons Global Services,
and PWC
Logistics. The $14.4 million contract is actually part of a bigger
$450-million five-year contract for Global Contingency Services to
“provide
a full range of world-wide contingency and disaster-response services,
including humanitarian assistance and interim or transitional
base-operating support services.” According to DynCorp’s website,
this will
include “facility operations and maintenance; air operations; port
operations; health care; supply and warehousing; galley; housing
support;
emergency services; security, fire, and rescue; vehicle equipment; and
incidental construction.” Contingency Response Services LLC describes
its
work as encompassing “operating forces support,” “community support,”
and
“base support.” According to the Defense Industry Daily publication, the
contract also includes “morale, welfare, and recreation support.” The
specific contract for work for the JSOTF-P is expected to be
completed in
January 2008 but other contracts may follow as part of the $450
million-package. (“Contracts, June 6, 2007,” US Department of Defense,
www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3532 ; Press
Release, “DynCorp International and JV Partners Win $450 million NAVFAC
Contract,” DynCorp International, November 2, 2006,
www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=197; “Contingency Response Services,”
DynCorp International, www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=204; Defense
Industry Daily, “$14.4M to help US SOCOM in the Philippines,” June 8,
2007,
www.defenseindustrydaily.com/?s=philippines; Ethan Butterfield, “DynCorp
lands $450M Navy Contingency Services Deal,” Washington Technology,
November 3, 2006; www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/29650-1.htm
[Accessed August 20, 2007]
[51] “US denies building bases in Mindanao,” GMANews.TV, August 27,
2007.
[52] Veronica Uy, “VFACom Chief Denies US bases in Mindanao,”
Inquirer.net,
August 24, 2007.
[53] Maj. Kevin T. Henderson, US Army, “Army Special Operations
Forces and
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Integration:
Something a Joint Task Force Commander should Consider,” monograph,
United
States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced
Military
Studies, May 19, 2004; Cherilyn Walley, “Impact of the semi-permissive
environment on force protection in Philippine engagements,” Special
Warfare, September 2004; T.D. Flack, “When Visiting Jolo, Show a Little
Courtesy, Please,” Stars and Stripes, March 12, 2007.
[54] Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom, David A. Ochmanek, David A. Shlapak,
Alan J. Vick, A New Division of Labor: Meeting America’s Security
Challenges Beyond Iraq, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007, p.15.
[55] Stanley A. Weiss, “After Iraq, a New US Military Model,”
International
Herald Tribune, December 27, 2006.
[56] Greg Jaffe, “Rumsfeld details big military  shift in new document,”
Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2005.
[57] US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Testimony to Senate
Armed
Service Committee, Washington DC, September 23, 2004; Admiral Thomas B.
Fargo, “Regarding the Defense Global Forces Posture Review,” Testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 23, 2004.
[58] US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the
President and the Congress 2005, p. 36.
[59] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American
Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond,  New York:
Vintage Books 2006, p.150.
[60] C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations
During
Balikatan 02-1,” Special Warfare, September 2004.
[61] C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations
During
Balikatan 02-1,” Special Warfare, September 2004.
[62] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American
Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond,  New York:
Vintage Books 2006, p.178.
[63] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American
Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond,  New York:
Vintage Books 2006, p.134.
[64] Catharin Dalpino, “Separatism and Terrorism in the Philippines:
Distinctions and Options for US Policy,” Testimony to Subcommitee on
East‘An Acceptable Presence’: The New US Basing Structure in the 
Philippines By Herbert Docena *


Sixteen years ago, the Philippine Senate made the historic vote to shut 
down what American analysts once described as “probably the most 
important basing complex in the world” -- the US military bases in Subic 
and Clark, along with other smaller support and communications 
facilities in the country.

Taken after long and emotional debates, the Senate vote shook the 
Philippines’ relations with its most important ally. That one small and 
weak country could say no to what by then had become the world’s only 
remaining superpower reverberated across the world.

Since then, every move by the US military in the Philippines has 
provoked controversy. For the most part, however, the question has 
tended to be framed in terms of whether the US is seeking to 
re-establish the kind of bases it had in the past. Such framing has 
consequently allowed the US and Philippine governments to categorically 
deny any such plans.

But what has since emerged is not a return to the past but a new and 
different kind of basing.

GLOBAL POSTURE Since the end of the Cold War, but in a process that has 
accelerated since the Bush administration came to office, the United 
States has embarked on what American officials tout as the most radical 
reconfiguration since World War II of its “global defense posture.”

This term no longer refers simply to the over 850 physical bases and 
installations that the US now maintains in around 46 countries around 
the world.[1] As US Defense undersecretary for policy Douglas J Feith 
explained, “We are not talking only about basing, we’re talking about 
the ability of our forces to operate when and where they are needed.”[2]

Billed as the “Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy,” the plan 
seeks to comprehensively transform the US overseas military presence – 
largely unchanged since the 1950s – in light of perceived new threats 
and the US’ self-avowed “grand strategy” of perpetuating its status as 
the world’s only military superpower.

“The [US] military,” declared President George W Bush, “must be ready to 
strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world.”[3] To do 
this, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, an official document required 
by the US Congress of the Pentagon to articulate US military strategy, 
states that the US is seeking to move away from “obsolete Cold War 
garrisons” to “mobile, expeditionary operations.”[4]

REDUCED FOOTPRINT The plan is simple: Instead of concentrating its 
troops and equipment in only a few locations, the United States will 
decrease the number of large well-equipped bases and increase the number 
of smaller, simpler bases in more locations.[5]

Marine Gen. James Jones, commander of US forces in Europe, described the 
aim as developing a “family of bases” that could go “from cold to warm 
to hot if you need them” but without having the “small town USA”-feel, 
complete with schools and families that have typically come with such 
bases.[6]

Recognition of the rising opposition to the US military presence around 
the world is also driving these changes. As early as in 1988, a US 
government commission created during the Reagan administration concluded 
that, “We have found it increasingly difficult, and politically costly 
to maintain bases.”[7]

Apart from those in the Philippines, US bases have been closed or 
terminated in recent years in Puerto Rico, Panama, and recently Ecuador, 
as a result of public mobilizations. Turkey refused to allow the US to 
use its bases for the invasion in Iraq. Even in Japan and Korea, 
hostility to bases has been growing.

Hence, the US has been trying to restructure its overseas presence in a 
way that aims to undermine this growing opposition. As US Navy Rear 
Admiral Richard Hunt, the Joint Staff’s deputy director for strategy and 
policy said, “We don’t want to be stepping all over our host nations…We 
want to exist in a very non-intrusive way.”[8]

The aim, according to the Pentagon, is to “reduce the forward footprint” 
of the military while increasing its agility and flexible.[9]

MISSION PRESENCE As part of this over-all reconfiguration, the Pentagon 
now categorizes its overseas structures into three: Main Operating Bases 
(MOBs), Forward Operating Sites (FOSs), and Cooperative Security 
Locations (CSLs). (See sidebar).

FOSs and CSLs are also called “lily pads” intended to allow the US to 
hop from MOBs to their destinations rapidly when needed but without 
requiring a lot of resources to keep them running when not needed.[10] 
Referring to this kind of base, Gen. Jones said, “We could use it for 
six months, turn off the lights, and go to another base if we need to.”[11]

But, as mentioned earlier, the US definition of “global posture” goes 
way beyond physical structures. In an effort to maximize its forward 
presence while minimizing opposition, the US has also been seeking to 
increase what US Air Force-sponsored analysts call “mission presence” 
and “limited access.”

“Mission presence” is what the US has in countries where there are 
ongoing military missions which “lack the breadth and capability to 
qualify as true forward presence but nonetheless contribute to the 
overall US posture abroad.”

“Limited access” is the kind the United States gets through exercises, 
visits, and other operations.[12]

Hence, the US’ global posture encompasses, by definition, not just those 
who are “forward-based,” or those units that are stationed in foreign 
countries on a long-term basis such as troops in Korea and Japan, but 
also those who are “forward-deployed,” or those who are sent overseas to 
conduct various kinds of deployments, exercises, or operations.

THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO COMPETE If, in the Cold War, the US’ overseas 
presence targeted the Soviet Union and other communist and nationalist 
forces in the Third World, today, the US’ current “global posture” is 
aimed at any state or non-state forces perceived to be threatening the 
interests of the United States.

“Terrorists” stand in the line of fire. Regional powers hostile to the 
United States, such as Iran and North Korea, have also been singled out. 
But, in light of the United States’ self-declared grand strategy of 
preventing the rise of rivals who could threaten its preeminent status, 
one rising power is now clearly in its sights – China.

For years, American officials have been divided between those who 
believe that China could be a “strategic partner” to be engaged and 
those who believe that it is a “strategic competitor” to be confronted 
militarily before it grows more powerful. Since the end of the Cold War, 
indications are that the latter view has prevailed.

As early as 1997, the Pentagon’s QDR had already identified China, along 
with Russia, as possible “global peer competitors.”[13] In 1999, a 
pivotal Pentagon think-tank conducted a seminar to lay down all the 
likely scenarios involving China. Its conclusion: no matter what 
happens, China’s rise will not be “peaceful” for the US.

In 2000, a US Air Force-funded study argued explicitly in favor of 
preventing China’s rise. Also in the same year, Robert Kagan and William 
Kristol, two influential commentators whose ideas have evidently molded 
US policy, proposed that Beijing – along with Baghdad – should be 
targeted for “regime-change.”[14] The Project for the New American 
Century (PNAC), a grouping whose members and proposals have since 
staffed and shaped the Bush administration and its policies, supported 
the same aims and made similar recommendations.

During the US presidential elections, George W. Bush distinguished 
himself from other candidates by singling out China as a “strategic 
competitor.” Since then, various officials have successively warned that 
China’s military modernization constitutes a direct threat to the United 
States.[15]

The Pentagon’s 2006 official report to Congress on China stated, 
“China’s military expansion is already such as to alter regional 
military balances.”[16]

If in 2001 the QDR was still vaguely worded, by 2006, when the next QDR 
was released, the assessment became more explicit: “Of the major and 
emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily 
with the United States…”[17]

MOVING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA The problem for the US is its relatively weak 
presence in Asia. As a Pentagon report on China, whose conclusions have 
been widely echoed, warned: “Lack of forward operating bases or 
cooperative allies greatly limits the range of US military responses…”[18]

What the US does have in terms of presence is now believed to be 
concentrated in the wrong place. Since the 1950s, the bulk of the US 
forward-presence in Asia has been in South Korea and Japan, directed 
towards the Soviet Union and North Korea. To address this, the US has 
been seeking expand southwards – to Southeast Asia.[19]

By early 2002, the US began negotiating with various governments in 
Southeast Asia for use of bases in the region.[20] In 2003, then US 
Pacific Command chief Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, stated, “Power projection 
and contingency response in Southeast Asia in the future will depend on 
this network of US access in areas with little or no permanent American 
basing structure.”[21]

Along with the plans for East Asia and Southeast Asia, the US had also 
established bases to the west of China, in Central Asia, with new 
installations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.[22] While it had none before 
the invasion of Afghanistan, by 2002 it had access to over a dozen bases 
in the region.[23]

With the US forward presence northeast of China (in Japan and South 
Korea), the deepening cooperation with Mongolia to China’s north, and 
its deepening alliance with India, to China’s southwest, the United 
States is slowly encircling China from all sides.

It is in light of these large, sweeping changes in US strategy, its 
perception of threats, and its tactics, that US military objectives 
regarding the Philippines can be best understood.

IN THE DRAGON’S LAIR Since the late 1990s, a chorus of American defense 
analysts, military officials, civilian leaders, and influential 
commentators have identified the Philippines as playing a critical role 
in the US’ global posture and a succession of studies sponsored for 
different US military services have singled it out for its strategic 
location.

The PNAC, for example, had proposed that the US Navy should establish a 
home-port while the US Air Force should station a wing in the 
Philippines.[24] Another study for the US Air Force (USAF) noted the 
Philippines is located firmly within what US strategists have called the 
“dragon’s lair” or those areas of the Western Pacific where China could 
potentially seek to prevent the US from deploying.[25] Another US Air 
Force-funded study to develop a “global access strategy” for the US Air 
Force proposed renting an island from the Philippines for use as a 
military base.[26]

A 2006 USAF-funded study evaluating basing options for storing and 
pre-positioning US’ war material included the Philippines as among the 
most desirable sites. Exploring different alternatives, a US 
Army-sponsored research identified the Philippines as one of the 
suitable locations for a new unit of the Army.

Although proposals made by military analysts do not necessarily 
translate into action, it is clear that a consensus has been building 
that “[A] ccess to Philippine facilities is much more important than 
most judged 12 years ago.”[27]

THE APPEARANCE OF BASES One obstacle however remains:  domestic 
opposition to US military presence in thePhilippines. As yet another  US 
Air Force-funded study acknowledges, “On the matter of US access to 
military facilities in the Philippines, the general view of Philippine 
security experts is that for domestic political reasons it would be 
difficult to give the appearance that the United States is 
reestablishing its bases in the Philippines.”[28]

Hence, the aim has been to avoid giving this appearance.  As Admiral 
Dennis Blair, former commander of the US Pacific Command, explained, 
“[W]e are adapting our plans and cooperation of the past to the future. 
Those plans do not include any request by the United States for bases in 
the Philippines of the kind that we have had in the past.” [italics 
added] [29]

“Our basic interest,” explained former US Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, “is to have the ability to go into a country and have a 
relationship and have understandings about our ability to land or 
overfly and to do things that are of mutual benefit to each of us. But 
we don't have any particular plans for permanent bases if that's the 
kind of thing you mean…”[30]

Thus, instead of “the kind of bases we had in the past”, the US is 
trying something new.

TRAINING FOR ACCESS First, the US has stepped up deploying troops, 
ships, and equipment to the country ostensibly for training exercises, 
humanitarian and engineering projects, and other missions.

Though the Visiting Forces Agreement was approved in 1998, it was only in
2001 that the number and the size of troops involved in training 
exercises jumped significantly. Last year alone, up to 37 exercises were 
scheduled; up from around 24 in the preceding years.[31] As many as 
5,000 US troops are involved, depending on the exercise. As a result of 
these continuing deployments, former US Ambassador to the Philippines 
Francis Ricciardone has described the US presence in the country as 
“semi-continuous.”[32]

Apart from training allied troops, the holding of joint exercises allows 
the US to gain temporary – but repeated and regular – access to the 
territories of countries in which the exercises are held. As former US 
PACOM head Admiral Thomas Fargo noted in March 2003,  “The habitual 
relationships built through exercises and training…is our biggest 
guarantor of access in time of need.”[33]

He said: “Access over time can develop into habitual use of certain 
facilities by deployed US forces with the eventual goal of being 
guaranteed use in a crisis, or permission to preposition logistics 
stocks and other critical material in strategic forward locations.”[34]

As US troops come and go in rotation for frequent and regular exercises, 
their presence – when taken together – makes up a formidable 
forward-presence that brings them closer to areas of possible action 
without need for huge infrastructure to support them and without 
inciting a lot of public attention and opposition.

As analyst Eric Peltz has told the US House Armed Services Committee: 
“Other methods of positioning, such as training rotations, can provide a 
temporary ‘forward position’ or sustain a long-term position without 
permanent forward unit basing.”[35]

And as US troops depart, they leave behind the infrastructure that they 
had built and used ostensibly for the exercises and which could still be 
of use to the US military in the future for missions different from 
those for which they were initially built.

In General Santos City, for example, the US constructed a deepwater port 
and one of the most modern domestic airports in the country, connected 
to each other by one of the country’s best roads. In Fort Magsaysay in 
Nueva Ecija, where US troops routinely go for exercises, the airport has 
been renovated and its runway strengthened to carry the weight of C-130 
planes.[36] In Basilan and Sulu, venues of Balikatan exercises, the US, 
through USAID, has also built roads and ports that can berth huge ships.

This is consistent with a USAF-funded study which recommended having 
more deployments to have more infrastructure. By increasing deployments, 
notes the study, the US can get into arrangements that “include measures 
to tailor local infrastructure to USAF operations by extending runways, 
improving air traffic control facilities, repairing parking aprons and 
the like.”[37]

Along with troops, an increasing number of ships have also been entering 
the country with growing frequency ostensibly for exercises and 
humanitarian missions. “[T]he Navy counts those ships as providing 
overseas presence full time, even when they are training or simply tied 
up at the pier,” said the US Congressional Budget Office.[38]

As has been discussed earlier, the US sees these regular and frequent 
“temporary” deployments as part of its global “posture.” As the US 
National Defense Strategy states, “Our posture also includes the many 
military activities in which we engage around the world. This means not 
only our physical presence in key regions, but also our training, 
exercises, and operations.”[39]

BASE SERVICES WITHOUT PERMANENT BASING Second, the US has obliged the 
Philippines to provide it with a broad range of locally-provided 
services that would enable it to launch and sustain operations from the 
Philippines when necessary.

In September 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted the US free 
access to its ports and offered it overflight rights.[40] In November
2002, the US and Philippine governments signed the Mutual Logistics 
Support Agreement (MLSA) which has been described by researchers with 
the US Congressional Research Service as “allowing the United States to 
use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout 
the region.”[41]

The MLSA obliges the Philippine government to exert “best efforts” to 
provide the US logistics supplies, support and services during 
exercises, training, operations, and other US military deployments. The 
agreement defines these to include food, water, petroleum, oils, 
clothing, ammunition, spare parts and components, billeting, 
transportation, communication, medical services, operation support, 
training services, repair and maintenance, storage services, and port 
services. “Construction and use of temporary structures” is also 
covered.[42]

In other words, the MLSA gives the US access to the full range of 
services that the US military would require to operate in and from the 
country. Through the MLSA, the US has secured for itself the services 
that it would normally be able to provide itself inside a large 
permanent base but without constructing and retaining large permanent 
bases – and without incurring the costs and the political problems that 
such bases pose.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATIONS Third, the US has established in the 
Philippines a new category of military installations it calls 
“Cooperative Security Locations” (CSLs).

In August 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission, the official commission 
tasked to review US basing, categorically identified the Philippines as 
one of the countries where CSLs are being developed by the United States 
in the region.[43] As mentioned earlier, CSLs is a new category of bases 
that refers to facilities owned by host-governments but are to be made 
available for use by the US military as needed.

The Philippine government has not disclosed the locations and other 
details about these CSLs. But the description by Robert Kaplan, a 
prominent American journalist and best-selling author who has visited 
such facilities around the world, is quoted here in full because of the 
dearth of information about them and because parts of it could be 
describing the Philippines –

“A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host 
country's civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and 
mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with 
which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal 
arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens… The United 
States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping 
the host country to better project its own air and naval power in the 
region. At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host 
country's military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer 
humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects 
garner positive publicity for our military in the local media…The result 
is a positive diplomatic context for getting the host country's approval 
for use of the base when and if we need it.”[44]

The terms of the MLSA and the establishment of CSLs reflect the US’ 
increasing emphasis on just-in-time logistics support and pre- 
positioning of equipment to ensure that US forces – dispersed as they 
are to be around the world, often far away from main bases where they 
store equipment and use all kinds of services – are always ready and on 
the go. Therefore, it is not so much the size of the base that matters 
but whether it can provide the US military with what it needs, when it’s 
needed.

As the Council on Foreign Relations points out: “While host nation 
support often carries the connotation of basing, its role of staging and 
access is perhaps more critical. Support for port visits, ship repairs, 
overflight rights, training areas, and opportunities, and areas to 
marshal, stage, repair, and resupply are no less important for both 
daily US presence in the region and for rapid and flexible crisis 
response.”[45]

FORWARD OPERATING BASE Fourth, the US has succeeded in indefinitely 
stationing a US military unit in the country.

Since 2002, a unit now called the Joint Special Operations Task 
Force-Philippines (JSOTFP) has been deployed to the southern 
Philippines. While initially presented as being part of on-again 
off-again temporary training exercises, it has since been revealed that 
this unit has maintained its presence in the country continuously for 
the last six years.

With the Philippine government not giving a definite exit date, and with 
US officials stating that this unit will stay on as long as they are 
allowed by the government, it is presumed that it will continue to be 
based in the Philippines for the long-haul.

The unit is headquartered in the Philippine military’s Camp Navarro in 
Zamboanga City [46] but its “area of operations,” according to a US 
military publication, spans 8,000 square miles, covering the entire 
island of Mindanao and its surrounding islands and seas.[47]

According to a comprehensive compilation of various media reports, the 
number of troops belonging to the unit has ranged between 100 and 450 
but it is not clear what the actual total is for a specific period.[48] 
It varies “depending on the season and the mission,” said US Lt. Col. 
Mark Zimmer, JSOTF-P public affairs officer.[49]

When it was publicly revealed last month that the US Department of 
Defense, via a US military construction unit, had granted a contract to 
a company providing “base operations support” for the JSOTF-P[50], the 
US embassy admitted that US was setting up allegedly “temporary” 
structures for “medical, logistical, administrative services” and 
facilities for “for them to eat, sleep and work.”[51] The Philippine’s 
own Visiting Forces Commission also confirmed that the US maintains 
“living quarters” and stocks supplies inside Philippine military camps.[52]

FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA Referring to their bases in Mindanao as 
“forward operating base-11” and “advanced operating base-921,”[53] the 
JSOTF-P corresponds to what a US Air Force-sponsored study described as 
the ongoing “redefinition of what forward presence means.”[54]

In terms of profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar to the Combined 
Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-Horn of Africa) which was 
established in Djibouti in eastern Africa in 2003, also composed mostly 
of Special Forces, and which has been described as a sample of the US 
austere basing template and the “model for future US military 
operations.”[55]

Indeed, more deployments similar to that of the JSOTF-P and CJTF-Horn of 
Africa are planned in other locations around the world in the future. 
[56] In 2004, former PACOM commander Thomas Fargo talked about expanding 
Special Operations Forces in the Pacific.[57] Apparently referring to 
the JSOTF-P, former defense secretary Rumsfeld had also announced that 
the Pentagon would establish more “nodes for special operations forces.”

“In place of traditional overseas bases with extensive infrastructure,” 
Rumsfeld said, “we intend to use smaller forward operating bases with 
prepositioned equipment and rotational presence of personnel… We will 
maintain a smaller forward-presence force in the Pacific while also 
stationing agile, expeditionary forces capable of rapid responses at our 
power projection bases.”[58]

The JSOFT-P’s characteristics fit this description. Modest and austere, 
the JSOTF-P has none of the extensive infrastructure and facilities of 
the former US bases in Subic and Clark. But with the availability of 
local logistics and other services assured, the free entry of ships and 
planes and the pre-positioning of equipment allowed, and with the new 
roads, ports, and other infrastructure the US has been building in the 
area, the US Special Forces will be ready and able at a moment’s notice 
to launch and sustain its operations in the region.

As evidenced by the fact that most Filipinos are not even aware of their 
presence and their actions, “the JSOTF had succeeded,” notes Kaplan, “as 
a political mechanism for getting an American base-of-sorts up and 
running…”[59] C.H. Briscoe, command historian of the US Army Special 
Operations Command, under which the units of the JSOTF-P belong, 
concurs: “After more than 10 years, PACOM has reestablished an 
acceptable presence in the Philippines…”[60]

Strategically positioned between two routes at the entrance of a major 
sea-lane, the Makassar Strait, at the southwestern rim of the South 
China Sea and closer to Malaysia and Indonesia than most of the rest of 
the Philippines, the JSOTF-P, according to Briscoe, is “now better able 
to monitor the pulse of the region.”[61]

Having secured this presence, the US has become closer to the country 
with “the greatest potential to compete militarily” with it. By getting 
the US “semi-permanently” based south of Luzon for the first time since 
World War II, Kaplan notes that “the larger-than-necessary base complex” 
in Zamboanga has delivered more than tactical benefits.[62] In the minds 
of the US Army strategists, Kaplan notes: “Combating Islamic terrorism 
in this region [Southeast Asia] carried a secondary benefit for the 
United States: it positioned the US for the future containment of nearby 
China.”[63]

QUALITATIVELY TRANSFORMED All of the steps discussed above have paved 
the way for the gradual and incremental re-entry of the US military to 
the Philippines. At no time, since 1991, has US military presence been 
more entrenched. At the same time, this presence is no longer the same; 
it has been qualitatively transformed.

No longer are US troops permanently stationed and confined inside large 
bases in two locations in the country. Drawn instead from rotational 
forces, the troops have been deploying in various locations all over the 
country for exercises and other missions. Instead of being massed in the 
thousands inside huge fortifications flying the US flag, they are in the 
hundreds, dispersed and housed inside camps that technically belong to 
the Philippine military.

In the past, US troops could, despite the occasional deployment, expect 
to stay for long periods of time, stationed in the same base for years. 
Now, they are to be always ready and on the move, prepared to take part 
in shorter but more frequent deployments overseas.

Before, they stored their equipment, weapons, and supplies in huge 
storerooms and warehouses inside their base complex at all times, ready 
to lift and carry them wherever they went; now, they are scattering and 
storing their equipment and supplies in various locations, guarded and 
maintained by host-nation governments or private companies, and ready to 
be picked up on the way to the fighting.

All these changes in the Philippines are driven by the overlapping goals 
of building up support for and countering domestic opposition to US 
presence while improving the agility and efficiency of the US military.

TRIAL BALLOONS But this too could change: for while large bases have 
their disadvantages, they also provide the guaranteed access, 
capacities, and other advantages that smaller more austere bases cannot. 
Also, while the kind of basing that the US is developing now can be 
useful for certain scenarios, they may not be appropriate and sufficient 
for others. In case of a long drawn-out standoff, for instance, it would 
take more than 500 Special Forces stationed in relatively simple bases 
to sustain US military operations.

Hence, given the right moment and given the need, if plans are not in 
fact afoot, the US may still want to re-establish larger bases in the 
Philippines. Given US strategy and the Philippines’ location, the 
possibility cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the frequent reports that the 
US is trying to re-establish bases in the country have been 
characterized by an analyst with the Brookings Institute as “trial 
balloons” to test the atmosphere.[64]

For the moment, however, it cannot be said that just because the US does 
not have large bases of the kind it used to have, the US has not been 
securing its military objectives in the country. Through the back- door 
and largely out of sight, the US has gradually but incrementally 
reintegrated the Philippines firmly within its “global posture.”

All these may have effectively reversed that historic decision, taken 16 
years ago, to end nearly a century of US military presence in the country.#

*Herbert Docena (herbert at focusweb.org) is a researcher with Focus on the 
Global (www.focusweb.org) South, a policy research institute. This 
article was published in three parts by the Philippine Daily Inquirer 
from October
15 to 17:

Part 1: 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php? 
article_id
=94438 Part
2:http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php? 
article_ id=94687 Part 3: 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php? 
article_id
=94921

Sidebar: CATEGORIES OF US OVERSEAS MILITARY STRUCTURES

Main Operating Bases (MOB) are those relatively larger installations and 
facilities located in the territory of reliable allies, with vast 
infrastructure and family support facilities that will serve as the hub 
of operations in support of smaller, more austere bases; examples are 
the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and 
Camp Humphreys in Korea - Forward Operating Sites (FOS) are smaller, 
more spare bases that could be expanded and then scaled down as needed; 
they will store pre-positioned equipment but will only normally host a 
small number of troops on a rotational, as opposed to permanent, basis; 
while smaller, they must still be able to quickly support a range of 
operations with back-up from MOBs - Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) 
are facilities owned by host governments that would only be used by the 
US in case of actual operations; though they could be visited and 
inspected by the US, they would most likely be ran and maintained by 
host-nation personnel or even private contractors; useful for 
pre-positioning logistics support or as venues for joint operations with 
host militaries, they may also be expanded to become FOSs if necessary

Source: US Department of Defense, “Strengthening US Global Defense 
Posture,” September 2004

NOTES: [1] US Department of Defense Report to Congress, “Strengthening 
US Global Defense Posture,” September 2004. [2] US Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, Prepared Statement before the House 
Armed Services Committee, June 23, 2004, US Department of Defense 
website: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=133 
[Accessed September 10, 2007]. [3] quoted in G. John Ikenberry, 
“America’s Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs September/Octoberober 
2002, Vol 81. No 5. [4 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 
Review 2001, Washington D.C., February 6, 2006, pp. v-vi, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf [Accessed 
September 10, 2007]. [5] US Department of Defense Report to Congress, 
“Strengthening US Global Defense Posture,” September 2004. [6] Center 
for Defense Information, “Worldwide Reorientation of US Military 
Basing,” September 19, 2003, 
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm? 
documentID=1717&from_pag e=../program/document.cfm [Accessed September 
10, 2007]. [7] Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate 
Deterrence
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, January 1988), p. 22, 
quoted in Christine Wing, “The United States in the Pacific,” in Joseph 
Gerson and Bruce Richards, eds., The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the 
Network of Foreign US Military Bases (Boston, MA: South End Press,
1991), p. 144. [8] Jim Garamone, “Global Posture Part and Parcel of 
Transformation,” American Forces Press Service, October 14, 2004 [9] US 
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington DC, 
p. 53. [10] John D. Klaus, “US Military Overseas Basing: Background and 
Oversight Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report 
for Congress, November 17, 2004. [11] quoted in David Isenberg, “The US 
Global Posture Review: Reshaping America’s Global Military Footprint,” 
Basic Notes: Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, British 
American Security Information Council, November 19, 2004, p. 3. [12] 
David Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick- Paley, A 
Global Access Strategy for the US Air Force, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2002, pp. 17-18. [13] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial 
Defense Review 1997, Washington DC. [14] Robert Kagan and William 
Kristol, “The Present Danger,” The National Interest, Number 59 Spring 
2000. [15] George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, “The 
Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a  Complex World,” 
February 11,
2003, 
www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html 
[Accessed September 10, 2007]; Conn Hallinan, “Cornering the Dragon,” 
Counterpunch, February 23, 2005, 
http://www.counterpunch.org/hallinan02232005.html [Accessed September
10,
2007]; Mark Mazzetti, “Chinese Arms Threaten Asia, Rumsfeld Says,” Los 
Angeles Times, June 4, 2005) [16] Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006: Annual Report to 
Congress, Washington D.C., 
http://stinet.dtic.mil/dticrev/PDFs/ADA449718.pdf [Accessed September 9,
2007] [17] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, 
Washington D.C., February 6, 2006, p. 29, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf [Accessed 
September 10, 2007] [18] Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 
Summer Study Final Report, “Asia 2025” Organized by the Advisor to the 
Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25 July to 4 August 1999, 
Newport Rhode Island, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/967.pdf 
[Accessed June 12,
2007], p. 76. [19] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. 
Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. 
Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US 
Strategy and Force Posture, Sta Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001; Under 
Secretary of Defense
(Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, “Asia 2025” Organized by the 
Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25 July to 4 August
1999, Newport Rhode Island, 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/967.pdf [Accessed June 12,
2007]; Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America’s 
Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, September 
2000. [20] Michael Richardson, “US Wants More Use of South Asian Bases,” 
International Herald Tribune, February 8, 2002. [21] Admiral Thomas 
Fargo, transcript of hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on 
International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 
2003. [22] Robert D. Kaplan, “How we would fight China,” The Atlantic 
Monthly, June 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan 
[Accessed June 14,
2005]. [23] Rosemary Foot, “US Foreign- and Domestic-policy Realignments 
after September 11,” Adelphi Papers, Volume 44, Issue 363, February 
2004. [24] Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America’s 
Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, September 
2000, Washington DC, p. 35. [25] Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. 
Chaise, Derek Eaton, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: 
Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and their Implications for the United 
States, Sta Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Project Air Force, 2007, p. 
112. [26] David Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick- 
Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the US Air Force, Sta. Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2002, p. xxii. [27] Michael McDevitt, “US Strategy in 
the Asia Pacific Region: Southeast Asia,” in US Strategy in the 
Asia-Pacific Region conference proceedings, May 5, 2003. [28] Zalmay 
Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, 
Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The 
United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Sta 
Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 182. [29] Transcript, Press 
Conference with Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, US Pacific 
Command, Manila, July 13, 2001. [30] Transcript, Press Conference with 
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, April 25, 2002 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t04262002_t0425er.html 
[Accessed September 10, 2007]. [31] Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Q and A with 
US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone: ‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying,’” 
MindaNews, February 28, 2005; Jojo Due, “Biggest RP-US military exercise 
starts next week,” Philippine Business Daily Mirror, February 17, 2006. 
[32] Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Q and A with US Ambassador Francis 
Ricciardone: ‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying,’” MindaNews, February 28, 
2005. [33] Admiral Thomas Fargo, transcript of hearing of US House of 
Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003. [34] Admiral Thomas Fargo, 
Transcript of Hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on 
International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 
2003. [35] Eric Peltz, “Toward an Expeditionary Army: New Options for 
Combatant Commanders,” Testimony Presented to the House Armed Services 
Committee on March 24, 2004, p. 3. [36] Karl Wilson, “US force in Asia 
to become smaller but deadlier,” Daily Times, August 22, 2004. [37] 
Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. 
Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. 
Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force 
Posture, Sta Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 63. [38] Congress of 
the United States Congressional Budget Office, “Options for the Navy’s 
Future Fleet,” May 2006 [39] US Department of Defense, National Defense 
Strategy 2005, Washington D.C., pp. 18-19. [40] Rufi Vigilar, 
“Philippines opens its ports to U.S. military,” CNN, September 18, 2001. 
[41] Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch, “The Republic of the Philippines: 
Background and US Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress, January 10, 2006, 
http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33233_20060110.pdf [Accessed August 25,
2007]; Sheldon W. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the US Pacific 
Command,” National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, Volume 14, Number 
2, August 2003. [42] Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Between the 
Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Department 
of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines, November 21, 
2002. [43] Overseas Basing Commission, Report to the President and 
Congress, August 15, 2005, p. H11, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf [Accessed August 25, 2007]. 
[44] Robert D. Kaplan, “How we would fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly, 
June 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan [Accessed June 14,
2005]. [45] Council on Foreign Relations, The United States and 
Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration, July 2001, 
pp. 47-48. 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SEAsiaTF.pdf 
[Accessed September 10, 2007]. [46] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On 
the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines 
to Iraq and Beyond,  New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.147. [47] T.D. 
Flack, “Special Operations Force Aiding an Important Ally,” Stars and 
Stripes, March 11, 2007; Col. Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful 
COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach,” Military 
Review, November to December 2006. [48] At start of the deployment in 
January 2002, there were supposed to be
160 to 250 who were joining. (Steve Vogel, “Americans Arrive in 
Philippines U.S. Special Forces To Aid Filipino Army In Threatened 
Areas,” Washington Post, January 16, 2002; Fe B. Zamora, “All US troops 
will leave on July 31, says Wurster,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 
2002; Pat Roque, “US Special Forces in Philippines,” Associated Press, 
February 18, 2002; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Philippine 
confusion,” Washington Times, February 8, 2002). In November 2002, the 
Army Magazine reported that there were 260 members of the task force 
were in the southern Philippines.
(Army Magazine, “News Call,” November 1, 2002). In February 2003, 350 
Special Forces were reportedly scheduled to be sent to Sulu but this was 
postponed.
(Eric Schmitt, “US combat force of 1700 is headed to the Philippines”, 
New York Times, February 21, 2003; Bradley Graham, “US Bolsters 
Philippine Force,” Washington Post, February 21, 2003) In Octoberober 
2003, 300 Special Forces were reported to be in Basilan (US spy aircraft 
deployed in Philippines,” Octoberober 13, 2003 The News International 
(Pakistan). By February 2006, 250 more troops were reported to be 
joining those who were already in Sulu but it was not clear how many 
were still there at that time
(“RP-US to conduct war games amid ‘rape’ controversy, Philipine Daily 
Inquirer, January 10, 2006; “No time frame of US troops’ stay in Sulu, 
Mindanews, January 17, 2006). Shortly after, US military spokesperson 
Capt Burrel Parmer announced that 400 US troops will be Sulu for various 
projects. (Ding Cervantes, “5,500 US military personnel coming for 
Balikatan 2006,” Philippine Star, February 17, 2006). In September 2006,
114 US troops were reported to have arrived in Zamboanga City as part of 
the “normal rotation” of soldiers under JSOTF-P, according to the US 
embassy. (Julie Alipala, “100 GIs held at Zambo immigration,” Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, September 28, 2006). In February 2007, US today reported
450 and Reuters put the number at 100 (Paul Wiseman, “In Philippines, US 
Making Progress in War on Terror,” USA Today, Februay 13, 2007; 
“Philippines increases security for US forces,” Reuters, February 26,
2007). [49] “Civilians want probe on US military’s alleged supervision 
in Sulu war,” MindaNews, November 24, 2005. [50] In August 2007, Focus 
on the Global South publicized the granting by the US Deparment of 
Defense, through the US Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), 
of a six-month $14.4-million contract to a certain “Global Contingency 
Services LLC” of Irving, Texas for “operations support” for the Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). According to its 
own website, the NAVFAC is the unit within the US military that is in 
charge of providing the US Navy with “operating, support, and training 
bases.” It “manages the planning, design, and construction and provides 
public works support for US Naval shore installations around the world.” 
Among their business lines are “bases development” and “contingency 
engineering.” According to the announcement by the Pentagon, the 
contract awarded to Global Contingency Services LLC includes “all labor, 
supervision, management, tools, materials, equipment, facilities, 
transportation, incidental engineering, and other items necessary to 
provide facilities support services.” Global Contingency Services LLC is 
a partnership between DynCorp International, Parsons Global Services, 
and PWC Logistics. The $14.4 million contract is actually part of a 
bigger $450-million five-year contract for Global Contingency Services 
to “provide a full range of world-wide contingency and disaster-response 
services, including humanitarian assistance and interim or transitional 
base-operating support services.” According to DynCorp’s website, this 
will include “facility operations and maintenance; air operations; port 
operations; health care; supply and warehousing; galley; housing 
support; emergency services; security, fire, and rescue; vehicle 
equipment; and incidental construction.” Contingency Response Services 
LLC describes its work as encompassing “operating forces support,” 
“community support,” and “base support.” According to the Defense 
Industry Daily publication, the contract also includes “morale, welfare, 
and recreation support.” The specific contract for work for the JSOTF-P 
is expected to be completed in January 2008 but other contracts may 
follow as part of the $450 million-package. (“Contracts, June 6, 2007,” 
US Department of Defense, 
www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3532 ; Press 
Release, “DynCorp International and JV Partners Win $450 million NAVFAC 
Contract,” DynCorp International, November 2, 2006, 
www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=197; “Contingency Response Services,” 
DynCorp International, www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=204; Defense 
Industry Daily, “$14.4M to help US SOCOM in the Philippines,” June 8,
2007, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/?s=philippines; Ethan Butterfield, 
“DynCorp lands $450M Navy Contingency Services Deal,” Washington 
Technology, November 3, 2006; 
www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/29650-1.htm [Accessed August 20, 
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2007. [52] Veronica Uy, “VFACom Chief Denies US bases in Mindanao,” 
Inquirer.net, August 24, 2007. [53] Maj. Kevin T. Henderson, US Army, 
“Army Special Operations Forces and Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 
Operations Capable) Integration: Something a Joint Task Force Commander 
should Consider,” monograph, United States Army Command and General 
Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, May 19, 2004; 
Cherilyn Walley, “Impact of the semi-permissive environment on force 
protection in Philippine engagements,” Special Warfare, September 2004; 
T.D. Flack, “When Visiting Jolo, Show a Little Courtesy, Please,” Stars 
and Stripes, March 12, 2007. [54] Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom, David 
A. Ochmanek, David A. Shlapak, Alan J. Vick, A New Division of Labor: 
Meeting America’s Security Challenges Beyond Iraq, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2007, p.15. [55] Stanley A. Weiss, “After Iraq, a New US 
Military Model,” International Herald Tribune, December 27, 2006. [56] 
Greg Jaffe, “Rumsfeld details big military  shift in new document,” Wall 
Street Journal, March 11, 2005. [57] US Secretary of Defense Donald H. 
Rumsfeld, Testimony to Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington DC, 
September 23, 2004; Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, “Regarding the Defense 
Global Forces Posture Review,” Testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, September 23, 2004. [58] US Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2005, 
p. 36. [59] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the 
American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, 
New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.150. [60] C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and 
Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1,” Special 
Warfare, September 2004. [61] C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and 
Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1,” Special 
Warfare, September 2004. [62] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the 
Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to 
Iraq and Beyond,  New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.178. [63] Robert 
Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from 
Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond,  New York: Vintage Books 
2006, p.134. [64] Catharin Dalpino, “Separatism and Terrorism in the 
Philippines: Distinctions and Options for US Policy,” Testimony to 
Subcommitee on East Asia and the Pacific, House International Relations 
Committee, June 10,
2003.

Asia and the Pacific, House International Relations Committee, June 10,
2003.