[DEBATE] : NIGERIA - Femi Aborisade on strikes

[Patrick Bond]

NATIONWIDE STRIKES IN NIGERIA
A critical analysis
Femi Aborisade

The recent national strike in Nigeria ended after only four days. Femi 
Aborisade argues that despite the sudden surrender of the unions, 
working class people have shown that they are a force to reckon in the 
process of policy formulation and implementation.


The four-day general strike in Nigeria has once again demonstrated the 
potentials of the working class to influence the course of history. 
President Umaru Yar’Adua admitted this much when he said the strike 
‘wreaked havoc on economy and our people’ (24 June 2007). Government 
offices, private companies, petrol stations, ports, airports, schools 
and hospitals closed down. Commercial vehicles were off the road and 
major highways became football pitches for youths. Oil exports in all 
terminals except one were prevented. In short, the strike ‘paralysed’ 
Nigeria.

While President Umaru mourned the paralysing effects of the strike on 
crude oil exports, ordinary people saw in the strike an opportunity to 
express a striving to free themselves from the shackles of poverty. Over 
70 per cent of Nigerians, about 98,000,000 people of a population of 
140,000,000, live in extreme poverty, with less than a dollar a day. In 
the midst of pervasive poverty, former President Obasanjo, in the 
twilight of his tenure, took the following actions: The prices of 
petrol, kerosene and diesel per litre were increased by ten Naira 
(^10.00); petrol (PMS) was raised from ^65 to ^75, kerosene (DPK) from 
^54 to ^64 and diesel (AGO) from ^54 to ^64. This amounted to an 
increase of over 15 per cent in the price of petrol/litre, and about 19 
per cent increase in the prices of diesel and kerosene. VAT rate was 
raised by 100 per cent, from 5-10 per cent. In addition, six companies, 
including the Port Harcourt Refining Company Ltd (PHRC) and Kaduna 
Refining and Petrolchemical Company Limited were sold to foreign and 
local private companies without resolving labour concerns. Public sector 
employees were also agitating for payment of 15 per cent increase in 
basic pay, which the former President had granted but never implemented.

The poor perceived government actions as punitive measures to compound 
their agony. The payroll tax, called PAYE (Pay-As-You-Earn) has recently 
been changed to 10 per cent of gross pay instead of the previous policy 
of taxing only basic pay, after making allowances for dependants, 
children and the aged, etc. There are also the following taxes: National 
Housing Fund (NHF), 2.5 per cent of salary; Pension deductions, 7.5 per 
cent; National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), 5 per cent. These add up 
to 25 per cent of the employee’s pay. Workers earning poverty pay would 
be hard hit by the increase in VAT because they spend the bulk of their 
earnings on consumption items. Increases in the prices of petroleum 
products automatically cause increases in the prices of all other goods 
and services.

The process of increasing the prices of petroleum products was illegal. 
The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPRA) was established 
by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPRA) Act No. 8 of 
2003. Section 2 of the Act provides for the membership of the PPRA 
Governing Board, which includes representatives of organized labour. 
Section 7 empowers the Board to determine the pricing policy of 
petroleum products. Paragraph 1 of the 1st Schedule to the Act 
prescribes that the Board shall take decisions by majority support. The 
Board never met. It was the Secretariat of the PPRA that unilaterally 
increased the prices of petroleum products. The increases were therefore 
illegal.

Besides, there was no economic rationale for the price increases. 
Nigeria currently produces an average of about 2.6 mbd (of crude oil) 
and exports about 2.3mbd. (Udo, 2007: C7). The 2007 budget was prepared 
on the basis of a benchmark value price of US$30 per barrel. With the 
price in the international market hovering between US$65 and US$70 per 
barrel, this translates to between US$35 and US$40 per barrel going into 
the excess crude oil account.

The privatisation of public enterprises, including the sale of 
refineries, violates the current Constitution of Nigeria, which provides 
that wealth shall not be concentrated in a few hands and that the State, 
not the private sector, shall manage the major sectors of the economy. 
[Section 16 (4)].

The strike was therefore declared to achieve the following: reversal of 
the N10 increases in the prices of petrol, diesel and kerosene; removal 
of 100 per cent increase in VAT, from 5-10 per cent; payment of 15 per 
cent increase in basic pay for public sector workers, and review of the 
sale of refineries and power generating plants.

The labour movement gave a 14-day ultimatum, which government treated 
with levity. In fact, spokespersons of the regime threatened that even 
if labour embarked on strikes and mass protests for ten years nothing 
would change (The Guardian, 19 June 2007: 2). The Government declared 
the strike illegal following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in an 
earlier case where the court held that the Nigeria Labour Congress had 
no right to call out workers on strike against general economic and 
political decisions of the Federal Government because such have nothing 
to do with breach of individual contracts of employment with various 
employers as envisaged in the Trade Disputes Act.

While the Nigerian labour law restricts the right to strike and the 
judiciary goes ahead to declare strike action against general economic 
and political policies illegal, Nigeria is a member of the International 
Labour Organization, which recognises the right to strike as a 
fundamental right. The Abolition of Forced Labour Convention No. 105 of 
1957 prohibits the use of forced or compulsory labour ‘as a punishment 
for having participated in strikes’ (Article 1 sub-paragraph [d]). Also, 
the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation No. 92 of 1951 
states in paragraph 7 that no provision of the Recommendation ‘may be 
interpreted as limiting, in any way whatsoever, the right to strike’. As 
a member of the international community, it is incumbent on any country 
that seeks to acquire the status of a civilised state to give effect to 
resolutions emanating from an organisation to which it belongs.

In spite of all the pre-strike arrogance of government officials and 
spokespersons, less than 24 hours to the strike, in a desperate effort 
to avert the strike, government offered the following concessions: 
increase in VAT rate from 5-10 per cent was revoked; 15 per cent salary 
increase to be effected for federal employees with effect from 1 January 
2007; the N10 per litre increase on the prices of kerosene and diesel 
was reversed and reduction of the N10 per litre increase in the pump 
head price of petrol to N5 per litre.

Labour accepted all the concessions but one, insisting on reversal of 
the price of petrol/litre to the old rate of N65. The strike then 
continued until it was called off suddenly with effect from the midnight 
of 23 June 2007, without winning the demand. Labour capitulated on the 
basis of a letter by President Umaru Yar’Adua promising not to increase 
the price of petrol for the next one year. In effect, petrol will 
continue to sell at N70 per litre. The other concessions contained in 
President Yar’Adua’s letter included an undertaking to set up expert 
committees, which would include representatives of labour to examine the 
issues of petroleum pricing mechanism as well as sale of refineries and 
power generating plants. Government also undertook not to take any 
disciplinary action against any worker participating in the strike.

Daily Sun (25 June 2007: 6) explains that the role of traditional 
rulers, particularly the Sultan of Sokoto, was decisive in the sudden 
capitulation by the top labour leadership. However, there was a division 
even within the top leadership. As Sunday Punch (24 June 2007:13) 
reported, a section of the TUC leadership had threatened to call a Press 
Conference ‘to express a few reservations on the agreement labour 
reached with government’. Working class youths were angry about the 
sudden back down by labour leadership: ‘why embark on strike by 
rejecting the N70/litre price of petrol which government had offered in 
the bid to prevent the strike taking off, only to turn round to accept 
what had been rejected?, they questioned.

Dress Rehearsal Strikes

The anger of working class youths against the sudden surrender by 
national labour leadership is understandable. Weeks and months preceding 
the strike, there had been series of threats of strike and actual 
strikes, as dress rehearsals, preparatory to the nationwide strike. 
These included strikes by Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) 
workers, Electricity workers, Academic Staff Union of Universities 
(ASSU), and protests against the controversial 2007 general elections 
organized by the Labour and Civil Society Coalition (LASCO). There were 
also sabotage activities, bombings and kidnappings by militant groups 
and mass protests in the Niger Delta against exploitative oil companies 
as well as threats by self determination groups in the South Eastern 
part of Nigeria to disrupt the hand over program to a new President if 
key self determination leaders were not released from detention.

What the foregoing shows is that the working class, in several sectors, 
had been infuriated and imbued with a fighting spirit to protect jobs 
and improve their overall living standards. That opportunity to express 
their anger and reverse the privatization process has temporarily been 
botched by the shocking compromise and sudden strike call off. But it 
would be a temporary set back. On the basis of a system of exporting 
crude oil and importing refined products, we do not need a soothsayer to 
predict that crises lie ahead.


Gains

Regardless of the weaknesses of the strike, the working class has shown 
that based on a united force of organisations of the poor, it is a force 
to reckon with in the process of policy formulation and implementation. 
The strike represents a message to the ruling class that labour will not 
just slavishly accept attacks on its rights without a fight. No matter 
how marginal, the reductions in VAT and prices of petroleum products are 
gains that could not have been won without a fight. Also, contrary to 
the threat of applying the ‘no work no pay’ rule, one of the agreements 
in ending the strike was that no worker would be penalized for having 
participated in the strike.

Weaknesses

However, the basis of the united platform upon which the strike was 
called was not brought to bear on the strike sufficiently. Whereas the 
Federal Government made a concession to implement the 15 per cent 
increase in basic pay, similar commitment was not extracted from the 
state Governments. This resulted in the continuation of the strike by 
State organs of the unions in states like Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, etc - after 
the nationwide action had been called off (See for example Nigerian 
Tribune, 26 June 2007: 5). Similarly, ASUU, which had started its strike 
three months before the nationwide strike, had to continue its strike 
until 1 July because the agreements reached did not touch on their 
concerns. In the same vein, though workers in the Niger Delta 
participated in the strike, some militant groups in the sub region 
openly dissociated themselves from the nationwide strike on the ground 
that the plight of the Niger Delta people had never been the concern of 
organized labour.

Reactive or Proactive Struggles?

The 20 -23 June general strike was a defensive strike. Rather than being 
proactive, the leadership of the strike was reactive and predominantly 
economistic. The strike was not aimed at bringing about fundamental 
changes to the root cause of the problems. Instead of addressing the 
root cause, the strike was essentially about the effects of government 
policies.

The behaviour of the leadership of the strike fits into Marx description 
of non-forward looking trade union leadership:

Trade Unions work well as centres of resistance against the 
encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of 
their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerilla 
war against the effects of the existing system, instead of 
simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organised 
forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class. 
(Marx, 1958: 447, cited in Hyman, 1975: 98)

A more pro-active approach would require challenging the policy of 
reliance on private importation of petroleum products, insistence on 
investigation of corruption in the management of existing refineries, 
and advocating local refining through existing and new state-owned 
refineries.

Central to the fuel crisis in Nigeria is the government commitment to 
the neoliberal principle of disengaging from economic activity and 
promoting the private sector in the supply of critical goods. The idea 
of promoting the private sector, combined with stupendous financial 
corruption involving about US$550 million in the Turn Around Maintenance 
(TAMs) of the refineries, results in crippling the state owned 
refineries, in order to justify reliance on the private sector for 
importation of petroleum products and sale of the refineries under the 
guise of inefficiency of state enterprises.

Who Should Control Industries?

As the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, 2001: 7-9) has pointedly 
posited, the big question for today is: how is industry to be 
controlled? Given the subsisting capitalist economic structure, the 
challenge is to interrogate managerial control with a view to 
accommodating a role for workers who work in each industry, and in the 
cases of mineral producing areas, the communities, in managing the 
enterprises. This suggests that working class organizations must reflect 
and advocate comprehensive solutions to issues regarding production, 
pricing and distribution of goods in an equitable and ecologically 
sustainable manner through advocacy of involvement of the trade unions 
and communities in the running of industries.

Mode of Strike Action and Process of Strike Call Off

That the strike was called off without resorting to the members, organs, 
and groups that sustained the strike for the period it lasted raises the 
issue of industrial/trade union democracy. Working class organizations 
must provide efficient democratic structure and process for carrying on 
daily struggles for better conditions and pay. The organs that take the 
decision to embark on strike must also be the ones to decide to call it 
off. With that kind of perspective, the need for mass protests and 
rallies rather than a-stay-at-home strike action will be seen.

The stay-at-home strike action renders the rank and file passive 
participants in the strike process and deprives the strike of the inputs 
and influence of the members from below in determining the direction of 
the strike, leaving the decision to call off or continue strike actions 
to the whims and caprices of the few leaders. In this regard, the 
Nigerian labour movement has a lot to learn from its South African 
counterparts that subjected government offers of wage increases to 
discussions at mass meetings of individual affiliate unions, during a 
strike that was taking place simultaneously in the two countries.

Indefinite or Limited Strike Action?

The strike also revealed the weakness of ‘indefinite’ strike action. 
Indefinite strike action is applicable in a situation in which the 
objective and subjective conditions point to the possibility of the 
working class taking over political power. Without such a revolutionary 
situation in existence, the state cannot tolerate ‘indefinite’ action. 
The situation will have to be resolved one way or the other, in 
revolutionary change or restoration of political control by the 
capitalist ruling class. For a working class leadership that completely 
lacks the perspective of the working class taking power, ‘indefinite’ 
form of action is a recipe for sudden back down. Therefore, it would be 
better to base actions on defined, limited number of days or weeks, 
continuation or discontinuation of action being determined by the mood 
and preparedness of the working class and the other poor strata, 
expressed at mass meetings. In other words, an attempt should be made to 
distinguish the Gramscian moments of ‘war of movement’ (when the actual 
revolution is ongoing) from moments of ‘war of position’ (when slow but 
steady preparatory revolutionary work is taking place).

Conclusion

The importance of drawing out lessons of struggles is implicit in a 
statement by Marx: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it 
just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by 
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmitted by the past’ (Marx, 1958: 247). It is hoped the lessons 
discussed in this paper will benefit future struggles.

* Femi Aborisade is a lecturer at The Polytechnic, Ibadan. He is the 
coordinator of the Centre for Labour Studies (CLS) & an Associate of the 
Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa.

* Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at 
http://www.pambazuka.org

For references, see link below.
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/42507