[DEBATE] : (Fwd) Henning surveys new scramble for Africa

[Patrick Bond]

www.pambazuka.org

THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA’S RESOURCES

Henning Melber

Henning Melber presents a “state of the continent” report and comments 
on the “new African order” as designed by the global power structures of 
the World Economic Forum.


Almost 50,000 people from social movements all over this world gathered 
in Nairobi during the second half of January at the World Social Forum 
(WSF). Originally initiated in the Brazilian city of Porto Allegre a few 
years ago, it is organised as a counter meeting to the annual World 
Economic Forum (WEF) during this time of the year in the Swiss town 
Davos. The WEF brings together those in command of politics and economy 
in this world and those “celebrities” who like to be close to them. They 
represent a world in which Africa remains at the receiving end of the 
global power structures and increasingly again the object of external 
interests. This article summarises and comments upon recent developments 
on the continent.

Old wine in new bottles

It is anything but new that the African continent’s human and other 
natural resources are the object of more or less systematic looting from 
the outside world. Who still believes that “globalisation” is a very 
recent phenomenon simply needs to look in an African perspective on the 
devastating impact of the slave trade to understand, “how Europe 
underdeveloped Africa” (so the title of a seminal book published by the 
late Walter Rodney during the early 1970s). Already Karl Marx had 
observed (though in a rather insensitive language) in his Critique of 
the Political Economy that the hunt for black skins signalled the dawn 
of capitalism.

Since the days of the Trans Atlantic human resource transfer various 
subsequent forms of brutal exploitation through colonialism and 
imperialism were ultimately by means of formal decolonisation processes 
at least modified. But the “winds of change” created sovereign African 
states, whose societies remain to a large extent characterised by the 
structural legacy of an externally oriented dependency. Beneficiaries of 
such limited socio-economic development are still mainly externally 
based, with the limited participation of – all too often parasitic – 
small local elites, who exploit their political control over national 
wealth for their own gains.

They collaborate with those operating from the outside offering them the 
most convenient (and unashamed) access to the small slice of the cake 
they are able to keep for themselves in such sell out deals. Seen in 
this light, some (if not most) of the recent critical accounts of the 
aggressive expansion of Chinese interests into African countries and 
societies and their collaboration with local autocratic elites and 
despots has a hypocritical taste or at least bears traces of amnesia. 
After all, the Chinese penetration only rears the ugly face of predatory 
capitalism, which for far too long has already abused the dependency of 
the majority on the continent. One therefore is tempted to wonder, if 
the concern expressed is actually not more about the Western interests 
than about the welfare of the African people, given that what we witness 
today is anything but new with regard to its forms and effects. While 
this critical observation does not exonerate the at times appallingly 
imperialist nature of the Chinese expansion into Africa, it does 
undermine the credibility of those critics, who find no similar words 
for the other forms of imperialism, which for far too long had (and 
continue to have) crucial responsibilities for contributing to the state 
of misery many of the African people are in.

Africa since the end of the bipolar world order

The collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of a more than forty year 
period of bloc confrontation was by no means “the end of history” (as 
suggested by Francis Fukuyama). It was the beginning of a new global 
order for hegemonic rule with far reaching consequences also for African 
governments. Gone were the days, where in midst of a Cold War some 
manoeuvring space for limited opportunistic bargaining existed, which 
allowed for a bit of strategic positioning. Not that this was 
necessarily to the best of the African people: all too often, this 
constellation encouraged and protected self-enrichment schemes for 
dictators and/or small local elites through forms of rent seeking or 
sinecure capitalism, as examples from A (like Angola) to Z (like Zaire) 
document. The bi-polar world order was in no ways a suitable breeding 
ground for development “from below”, but offered parasitic agents the 
opportunity to position themselves as satellites in return for their own 
gains within the East-West polarisation.

The consolidation of the US-American dominance during the 1990s and its 
impact on the global order resulted in several changes also for the 
African continent. A regionally inter-linked “appeasement” strategy 
(with the Russian retreat from Afghanistan and the Cuban withdrawal from 
Angola) secured in Southern Africa the final decolonisation of Namibia 
(1990) and paved the way for an end to Apartheid and democratic 
elections in South Africa (1994). During this period the economic 
paradigms represented by the international financial institutions (World 
Bank and IMF) resumed the only power of definition. The World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) emerged as the broker to regulate comprehensively 
binding the global exchange relations of goods. The most to say in these 
regulating processes with far reaching implications for not only 
“classical” trade relations but wider defined exchanges has the club of 
the G8 members, which defines the rather one-sided rules of “global 
governance”.

Towards a new African order: NEPAD and AU

Significant inner-African dynamics complemented at the beginning of this 
century the global re-arrangements. With the democratically elected and 
legitimised new governments in South Africa and Nigeria the two economic 
powerhouses on the continent South of the Sahara left behind their 
pariah status. Based on internal and international acceptance, they 
resumed leadership roles in international policy arenas. At the turn of 
the millennium presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo emerged 
(with active support by Senegal, Algeria and Egypt) as new figureheads 
representing the collective interests of the South and in particular 
Africa vis-à-vis the industrialised Western countries. Originally tasked 
to negotiate debt cancellation arrangements in direct communication with 
them they moved on to seek new forms of interaction under the premises 
of the acknowledged socio-economic premises as defined by the WTO. As 
kind of junior partners in the global market they became the architects 
of what was finally termed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD).

After some incubation period and assumingly intensive political 
negotiations behind closed doors this blue print was upgraded to the 
status of an official economic programme and institution of the African 
Union (AU). The AU itself was a parallel transformation of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In the course of its change it 
undertook some significant corrections to the hitherto established 
continental policy pillars. Most importantly it moved away from the 
erstwhile almost holy principle of non-intervention into internal 
affairs of member states.

With a lot of confidence and trust and substantive political support 
offered by the G8 since its 2001 summit in Genoa the NEPAD-architects 
could bring back home the reassuring message that the industrial West is 
on board and willing to support the initiative. This contributed to the 
acceptance both in Africa as well as by the United Nations system, which 
in a General Assembly resolution officially recognised NEPAD as the 
economic programme for Africa. While this looks like a success story, 
the critical policy issues were to some extent at the same time aborted 
or at best watered down. The good governance discourse in line with the 
new uni-polar world system and to some extent imposed by the 
Western-capitalist hegemony was after all not only cosmetic rhetoric, 
but in some parts indeed a meaningful deviation from past practices of 
unquestioned autocratic rule by African despots and oligarchies.

The AU Constitution was adopted at the same summit in Durban when NEPAD 
was incorporated. It introduced a collective responsibility so far 
absent, justifying joint intervention for specified reasons. This has in 
the meantime provided several results, as cases like Darfur, the DRC, 
the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Togo have among others shown in different 
ways (and varying degrees of success), all seeking to contribute to 
conflict reduction or enhanced legitimacy of the political systems. In 
contrast to this new responsibility, the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM), conceptualised by NEPAD as a cornerstone for enhancing the 
notion of good governance, did not meet the expectations. The 
disappointment over non-delivery was maybe biggest when it came to the 
absence of any determined policy action by the NEPAD initiators in the 
case of Zimbabwe (where the South African president preferred his 
so-called silent diplomacy to any meaningful political intervention). 
Nonetheless, the demand for democracy, human rights and respect for 
constitutional principles articulated by the NEPAD blue print as a 
prerequisite for sustainable socio-economic development might have been 
a contributing factor to the new phenomenon of an increasing number of 
African heads of state more or less voluntarily (and peacefully) 
vacating their offices (which does not mean that the rotten apples have 
been eliminated, as Museveni, and even – though less successfully - 
Obasanjo as well as some others have shown in their recent efforts to 
extend their stay in office beyond the originally stipulated period of 
time).

New multi-polar tendencies and the competition for securing African 
resources

Systematic new efforts to access African markets and tap into the local 
resources became visible with the adoption of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) by the out-going Clinton administration. Through 
this initiative the USA openly underlined the relevance of the African 
dimension for its external trade relations (Africa ranks higher than 
Eastern Europe in the US trade balance). The break down of the AGOA 
trade volume, however, also discloses that with the exception of a few 
smaller niches (e.g. the temporary opportunities created for a locally 
based – though not owned – African textile industry with preferential 
access to the US market) the trade volume is mainly composed by 
exporting US-manufactured high tech goods and machinery and importing 
oil, strategic minerals and other natural resources for meeting demands 
of US-based industries.

Soon after AGOA was enacted, the trade department of the EU headquarters 
in Brussels initiated negotiations for a re-arrangement of its relations 
with the ACP countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific through 
so-called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The declared aim was 
to enter a post-Cotonou agreement phase meeting the demands for WTO 
compatibility. The EPA negotiations have since then entered critical 
stages meeting the resistance of many among the ACP countries. They are 
afraid of losing out on trade preferences and feel that Brussels seeks 
to impose a one-sided trade regime in its own interests, which also 
denies the declared partners the right to autonomous negotiations by 
re-drawing the map of regional configurations in Africa to comply with 
EU expectations.

Both initiatives, AGOA and the EPA negotiations, seem to reflect less so 
the genuine desire in fairer trade than securing access to relevant 
markets not least in the own interest of the USA and the EU. The 
competition for preferential trade agreements with South Africa 
(successfully negotiated by the EU during the late 1990s and currently 
facing an impasse with regard to the USA) are illustrating at the same 
time the point, that the industrialised states are anything but sharing 
the same interest when it comes to securing their individual links with 
other countries.

The new offensive pursued by China, which expands aggressively into 
African markets and seeks access to the fossil energy resources and 
other minerals and metals it urgently needs to fuel its own further 
rapid industrialisation process, adds to the rivalry and conflicting 
interests. In a matter of time, India, Brazil and Russia (as well as a 
number of other actors such as Malaysia and Mexico) are likely to add 
further pressure on the scramble for limited markets and resources. This 
new stage of competing forces on the continent has resulted in a 
plethora of recent analyses dealing mainly if not exclusively with the 
Chinese impact and practices. Interestingly enough, the EU and 
US-policies and practices seem to almost fade away from the picture. The 
current type of Cassandra-prophecies presents at times a rather 
one-sided story. Such selected narrative tends to downplay if not ignore 
the damaging external effects, which the existing socio-economic 
imbalances and power structures have created and consolidated. It 
appears at times, that the criticism raised towards China is more so an 
indicator of an increasing fear for losing own interests than for being 
motivated by a genuine concern for the African people.

Into more dependency or towards enhanced manoeuvring space?

The global initiatives for liberalisation under the WTO regime pose the 
question, if the markets and producers in the so-called developing 
countries are able to meet the challenges of a relatively free 
competition with the industrialised world or instead would require 
continued protection. At a closer look, it becomes obvious that this is 
a question wrongly posed. It had been indeed the markets and producers 
of the industrialised OECD countries, which were one-sided beneficiaries 
of state protection and distorting subsidisation policies. This turned 
any form of proclaimed fairness in trade and market relations into an 
illusion and ideological humbug.

Those advocating a liberalisation of trade relations contribute to the 
misperception that such steps would be identical or at least similar to 
a de-regulation of exchange relations with goods. As a matter of fact, 
the trend is quite the opposite. The so-called liberal global trade 
structures and networks have never before been to such an extent 
contractually defined and put into clauses. Numerous additional rules, 
such as hygienic and sanitary specifications, regulate access to markets 
even more so at times than tariffs. They are open to abusive control 
resulting in undue pressure and could turn into a tool for sanctions in 
cases of disagreement.

The historically-structurally disadvantaged societies should however at 
least be enabled to gain socio-economic strength based on own 
initiatives. This requires a framework, which would as a matter of 
principle allow for a kind of protectionist policy as legitimate 
survival strategy to empower local producers and foster own markets. 
This could create preconditions, from which in subsequent exchange 
relations the people in both the industrial as well as the African 
societies could benefit (but maybe at the expenses of unhindered profit 
maximisation for those who earn most).

With new rivals such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and a series of 
further countries at the threshold to meaningful own industrial 
production the competition for entering favourable relations with 
African countries might increase. This is in itself not negative to the 
interests of the African people. But it requires that the tiny elites 
benefiting from the currently existing unequal structures put their own 
interest in trans-nationally linked self-enrichment schemes behind the 
public interest to create investment and exchange patterns, which 
provide in the first place benefits for the majority of the people.

Selected Further Reading

Alden Christopher/Daniel Large/Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds) (2007), 
China Returns to Africa: The Politics of Contemporary Relations. London: 
Hurst
Broadman, Harry G. et. al. (2007), Africa’s Silk Road. China and India’s 
New Economic Frontier. Washington: World Bank
Brüntrup, Michael/Henning Melber/Ian Taylor (2006), Africa, Regional 
Cooperation and the World Market. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute 
(NAI Discussion Paper; 31) (accessible for download at http://www.nai.uu.se)
China in Africa. South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 
13, no. 1, 2006
Fombad, Charles Manga/Zein Kebonang (2006), AU, NEPAD and the APRM. 
Democratisation Efforts Explored. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute 
(Current African Issues; 32) (accessible for download at 
http://www.nai.uu.se)
Manji, Firoze/Stephen Marks (eds) (2007), African Perspectives on China 
in Africa. Nairobi & Oxford: Fahamu
Melber, Henning (2002), The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) – Old Wine in New Bottles? In: Forum for Development Studies, 
29(1), S. 186-209
Melber, Henning (2004), The G8 and NePAD – more than an elite pact? 
University of Leipzig Papers on African Politics and Economics (ULPA), 
no. 74
Melber, Henning (ed.) (2005), Trade, Development, Cooperation. What 
Future for Africa? Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute (Current African 
Issues; 29) (accessible for download at http://www.nai.uu.se)
Melber, Henning (ed.) (2007), China in Africa. Uppsala: The Nordic 
Africa Institute (forthcoming)
Southall, Roger/Henning Melber (eds) (2006), The Legacies of Power. 
Leadership Transition and the Role of Former Presidents in African 
Politics. Cape Town: HSRC Press & Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute
Taylor, Ian (2005), NEPAD. Towards Africa’s Development or Another False 
Start? Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner
Taylor, Ian (2006), China and Africa. Engagement and compromise. London 
& New York: Routledge
Tull, Denis M. (2006), China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance 
and consequences. In: Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3), pp. 459-479

* Dr. Henning Melber is Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld 
Foundation in Uppsala/Sweden. He has been Research Director of The 
Nordic Africa Institute (2000-2006) and Director of the Namibian 
Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) in Windhoek (1992-2000).deba