[DEBATE] : (Fwd) Habib on SA civ.soc.&democracy
Patrick Bond
pbond at mail.ngo.za
Wed Dec 5 09:23:09 GMT 2007
www.sangonet.org.za
Civil Society and Democracy in South Africa
By Prof Adam Habib
Regime change can have significant impacts on society. And, this is all
the more so if it occurs in an era of globalisation. Nowhere is this
more evident than in South Africa where democratisation and
globalisation have fundamentally transformed the society. In the
process, civil society has itself been remolded in significant ways, the
effects of which are only now becoming evident. Thirteen years after the
transition the most obvious outcome of the remolding process is the
evolution of civil society into three distinct blocs, each of which is a
product, to different degrees, of separate transitional processes.
The three different blocs within civil society - NGOs, survivalist
agencies, and social movements - that emerged in response to structural
factors such as the democratisation process and globalisation’s
neo-liberal manifestation in South Africa, have very distinct
relationships with the state. On the one end of the spectrum is a
powerful set of formal service-related NGOs, which as a result of the
more enabling environment created by the democratic regime, have entered
partnerships with and/or sub-contracted to the state. These
organisations have more engaged and collegiate relations with the state.
On the other end of the spectrum, there is a group of community-based
structures, which actively challenge and oppose what they perceive as
the implementation of neo-liberalism. These organisations, whose
activists covet the status of social movements, also have an explicit
relationship with the state. This relationship, depending on the
organisation and the issue area, hovers somewhere between adversarialism
and engagement, and sometimes involves both. But even when engaging the
state, this is of a qualitatively different kind to that of the formal
NGOs. The latter has a relationship with the state that is largely
defined by its sub-contractual role, whereas the former is on a
relatively more even footing, engaging the state in an attempt to
persuade it through lobbying, court action, and even outright resistance.
In between these two sets of organisations is a third, more survivalist
and informal, mainly in marginalised communities, who have no
relationship with the state. These organisations are preoccupied with
assisting people to survive the ravages of neo-liberalism. They receive
neither resource, nor do they covet recognition, from the state. They
are preoccupied with the task of simply surviving the effects of the
state’s policies. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the majority of these
associations even recognise that the plight of the communities they
located in is largely a result of the policy choices of political elites.
Of course, these distinctions within civil society are not as stark and
rigid as they are depicted here. In the real world, there are many
organisations that straddle the divide and blur the boundaries between
one and more of these blocs. Some organisations, like the TAC, display
adversarial relations with the state on one issue and more collegiate
relations on another. Other organisations, like the Homeless Peoples
Federation (HPF), challenge and oppose some state institutions but have
established partnerships with others. What is important to remember of
the contemporary era is that democratisation and globalisation have
facilitated the reassertion of the plural character of civil society and
undermined the homogenous effects that the anti-apartheid struggle had
on this sector.
Most activists, politicians and government officials recognise this
plurality of civil society, at least at the rhetorical level. But in
most cases, its meaning has not been internalised for had it been, we
would not have the constant demands from these actors for a single
homogenous set of relations between civil society and the state. For
state officials, and the leadership and politicians of the ruling party,
the most appropriate relationship between civil society and the state is
one founded on collegiality. In this view, service-related NGOs which
contract with the state and community organisations which partner with
the ruling party, are behaving in a manner conducive to democracy.
Indeed, the ruling party has gone out of its way to reward such
behavior, mainly through providing access to corporatist institutions
and other public participation channels established by the state.
But sometimes the state has intervened more aggressively in manipulating
its resources to benefit some, and undermine other, civil society
institutions. The most notorious case of this is Eskom’s write-off of
electricity arrears in Soweto. In this case, the previous Minister of
Public Enterprises, Jeff Radebe, convinced the public parastatal to
write-off electricity arrears in the township in an effort to demobilise
the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) who had been gaining
ground by connecting poor residents who had been disconnected for
failure to pay their arrears. Eskom officially negotiated the write-off
with the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), the national
civic body officially aligned to the ANC, both to delegitimise the SECC
and publicly demonstrate the benefits of alignment with the ruling
party. This blatant abuse of public resources by the state to intervene
and influence the outcome of competition between two civic associations,
while rare, does graphically demonstrate what the ruling party perceives
as an appropriate state-civil society relationship, and the extent to
which it would go to advance its model of state-civic engagement.
But the state is not alone in wanting to advance a homogenous
state-civil society agenda. Radical activists within civil society also
advance a homogenous vision, except in their case; the relationship
should not be collegial, but rather adversarial. Of course this is not a
dominant view within civil society. Indeed, a majority of activists,
mainly located in COSATU, TAC and even SANCO, hold the view that the
strategic priority of the contemporary era is to struggle for the soul
of the ANC by remaining in partnership with it, while retaining the
independence and organisational capacity to take to the streets when
required. But others, both activists and scholars, argue that a
strategic partnership with the ruling party has the systemic effect of
consolidating existing power relations. These, they maintain, enable
state elites to be more responsive to the interests of black
entrepreneurs and foreign and domestic capital. The antidote to this
state of affairs is to break civil association’s partnership with the
ruling party, reintroduce political uncertainty into the political
system, and thereby make political representatives more responsive to
the interests of poor and marginalised citizens.
In any case, it needs to be noted that a single homogenous set of
state-civil society relations is not conducive to the consolidation of
democracy. Whether it is the state’s view of collegiate state-civil
society relationships, or the adversarial alternative of the radical
activists, neither on its own would facilitate the deepening of
democracy. Indeed, it is only the plurality of civil society, and its
consequent diversity of state-civil society engagements, that is
beneficial for democracy and governance in the country. The
informal-based CBOs enhance democracy at the simplest level because they
enable ordinary people to survive. The establishment of more formal
relations between them and the state would subvert their character and
thus compromise this role. The more formal NGOs’ collaborative
relationship with the state is largely a product of the services they
render for the state. And, in a society confronted with massive backlogs
and limited institutional capacity, this role can only be to the benefit
of democracy since it facilitates and enables service delivery to
ordinary citizens and residents. Finally, the adversarial and
conflictual role of new social movements and more formal CBOs enhances
democracy for it creates a fluidity of support at the base of society.
This can only be beneficial for it permits the reconfiguration of power
within society, forcing the state not to take its citizens for granted,
and effecting a systemic shift to the left which may create the
possibility for a more people-centered, Keynesian-oriented developmental
agenda.
These diverse roles and functions undertaken by different elements of
civil society, then, collectively create the adversarial and
collaborative relationships, the push and pull effects, which sometimes
assist and other times compel the state to meet its obligations and
responsibilities to its citizenry. The plurality of civil society and
the diverse sets of relations that it engenders with the state is thus
the best guarantee for the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.
- This article written by the University of Johannesburg Deputy
Vice-Chancellor: Research, Innovation and Advancement, University of
Johannesburg, Adam Habib, appeares in Prodder - NGOs and Development in
South Africa 2008.
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