[DEBATE] : Re: (Fwd) N.Korea analysis by Marty Hart-Landsberg

[Peter Waterman]

Marty:

Thanks for this additional information. I will watch with interest any 
development of South-North relationships at the level of civil society.

I would be particularly interested to know more about the union contacts you 
mention. Given, however, the nature of the North Korean regime, one has to 
wonder whatever kind of relationship there could possibly be between the 
South Korean unions (moderate or militant, but anyway autonomous of capital 
and state, democratic, operating within a more or less liberal democracy) 
and those of North Korea (transmission belts for the party-state, possibly 
carrying out some welfare function, on the old Soviet model).

Best,

Peter W

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Martin Hart-Landsberg" <marty at lclark.edu>
To: "debate: SA discussion list" <debate at lists.kabissa.org>
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 9:58 PM
Subject: [DEBATE] : Re: (Fwd) N.Korea analysis by Marty Hart-Landsberg


| Please excuse one more comment on the situation in Korea:
|
| Interestingly there is more happening across the Korean border than is
| commonly known.  Over the last many years there have been meetings
| between North and South Korean trade unionists (including soccer games),
| scholars, environmentalists, teachers, and members of different women's
| organizations.   Some of these have been held in Northeastern China
| rather than on one side or the other of the Korean border.
|
| About a decade ago I spent ten days in North Korea as a consultant for a
| US based NGO (American Friends Service Committee) and my work was
| followed by the stationing of a full time regional coordinator in East
| Asia which produced many more visits to the North and conversations with
| officials and researchers and connection points for people in the South
| as well.  These in turn led to visits and speaking tours by North Korean
| scholars and officials in the U.S.  While these are all small steps they
| do have an impact.
|
| Sadly and not surprisingly when tensions between the North and the US
| escalate there are negative political consequences for cross border
| attempts at communication and engagement and for the broader political
| environment in the South itself.
|
| And finally, when the US found that it was not successful in using the
| six party talks on nuclear issues to isolate the North it began this
| September/October with renewed charges that the county was a rouge state
| for its involvement in the drug trade and counterfeiting of dollars.  In
| fact, there is little hard evidence in support of either charge.  In the
| case of the former, the main evidence cited was the 2003 seizure of a
| North Korean cargo ship and arrest of its crew by Australian officials
| when the ship was found to have heroin.  The US charged that this proved
| that the North was officially involved in drug running.  Well last March
| Australian courts found the captain and officers and crew innocent and
| released them.  Apparently the drugs had been put on the ship by a
| Chinese gang in a close container with no knowledge by the crew.
|
| And as for the counterfeiting charges, the only proof is a statement
| made by someone who fled the north.  Most experts that have seen the
| evidence doubt that the North has the technology to print such high
| quality forgeries.
|
| Again, none of this is to say that things are good in the North.  And I
| agree with Peter's comment (below) about the North's anti-labor efforts
| to attract foreign direct investment.  However, what I think is the most
| important thing to focus on right now is that the potential for positive
| change on the peninsula does exist and that US policy is largely
| motivated by a desire to isolate the North and undermine the possibility
| of a progressive process of reunification that might well reduce US
| influence on the peninsula.  The result is an ever more dangerous cycle
| of escalation that could very well lead to a new war on the Korean
| peninsula.
|
|
| Marty
|
| Peter Waterman wrote:
| > Thanks, Marty, for your clarification. Though quite how the kind of 
dialogue
| > you favour might develop, given the nature of the North Korean regime
| > boggles the mind.
| >
| > The limitations on such contacts might be suggested by the website of 
the
| > Korean Friendship Association, which declares that it has the 
'recognition
| > and total support' of the state (i.e. it is an organ of that state and
| > controlled by it). Prominently displayed are, first, portraits of the 
Father
| > and the Son, and only afterwards, 'country'.  For those who are prepared 
to
| > either laugh or weep, this is at http://www.korea-dpr.com/.
| >
| > Amongst the bombast and lies one can find a frightening admission or 
boast -
| > that this state offers (investors) the cheapest labour in the region.
| > Cheaper than China, Myanmar, Cambodia? Wow!
| >
| > The problem is that you, I, the world peace and anti-nuclear movements, 
have
| > zero access to the KDPR and are thus similarly limited in any possible
| > intervention. In the case of India, covered by the item on today's List, 
one
| > could at least relate to the peace movement in that country.
| >
| > In this case, there seems little one can do other than expose and 
attempt to
| > pressurise the US and allied Western states.
| >
| > Best,
| >
| > Peter W
| >
| >
| > ----- Original Message ----- 
| > From: "Martin Hart-Landsberg" <marty at lclark.edu>
| > To: "debate: SA discussion list" <debate at lists.kabissa.org>
| > Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 10:12 PM
| > Subject: [DEBATE] : Re: (Fwd) N.Korea analysis by Marty Hart-Landsberg
| >
| >
| > | Dear Peter,
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | Thanks for taking the time to respond.  The issue at hand is the 
growing
| > | tension on the Korean peninsula as highlighted by charges that North
| > | Korea is developing nuclear weapons.  I was not attempting to do an
| > | analysis of North Korean society or state.  Just to clarify—I do not
| > | find North Korea to be a democracy or engaged in building socialism. 
I
| > | am critical of the regime.  I would like to see the regime change.  My
| > | own view is that change in Korea will come about most productively and
| > | progressively when independent South Korean movements have the ability
| > | to engage in dialogue with North Koreans.  For the time being those
| > | North Koreans will not be tied to independent North Korean social
| > | movements because there are not any.  However, North Koreans are not
| > | robots.  The more meetings between North and South teachers around
| > | issues of what a national curriculum might look like, or North and 
South
| > | environmentalists around issues of what a sustainable Korea might look
| > | like, the more change is likely to take place in ways that can yield
| > | real and meaningful change in both halves of Korea.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | Now, the main factor blocking this from happening is US policy towards
| > | North Korea and secondarily South Korea.  If North Korea was saying it
| > | was hell bent on developing a bomb, that it did not want to sign a 
peace
| > | agreement ending the Korean War, that it did not want to normalize
| > | relations with the US or Japan, etc., then that would be one thing. 
But
| > | the reality is that the North is saying that it wants to sign a peace
| > | treaty, that it wants to normalize relations, and that it is willing 
to
| > | abandon its nuclear weapons program and missile programs in the 
context
| > | of a complete and comprehensive set of negotiations with the US. 
Under
| > | those conditions it is hard not to see the tensions that are 
developing
| > | in the peninsula as largely caused by U.S. policy.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | The US has deliberately attempted to weaken South Korean efforts to
| > | improve relations with the North and has continued to attempt to 
isolate
| > | the North, for example, by continuing an economic embargo on them and
| > | vetoing their applications to join the Asian Development Bank and the
| > | World Bank, etc.  They continue to refuse to engage in any direct
| > | meetings with the North.  Remember that the North is not even 
demanding
| > | that the US disarm or reductions in South Korean military forces.  And
| > | remember that even according to the US CIA, the South has outspent the
| > | North on military spending each and every year since 1976.  At present
| > | the North spends around $1.7 billion a year and the South over $14
| > | billion dollars (and this does not count the US spending related to 
the
| > | South) on their respective militaries.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | Thus, as far as I see it the greatest danger here is US policy and the
| > | North Korean nuclear test, if that is what it is, can best be 
understood
| > | as a response to a determined US policy that repeatedly rejects any
| > | possibilities of reducing tensions between the two countries.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | Marty
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | Peter Waterman wrote:
| > | > Am I the only reader who might find something missing in the 'North
| > Korea'
| > | > analysis by Martin Hart-Landsberg ?
| > | >
| > | > In so far as he also publishes in the Trotskyist(?) magazine, 
Against
| > the
| > | > Current, I have to assume Martin is a socialist, possibly also a
| > Marxist.
| > | >
| > | > Yet his analysis is devoid of any consideration of the social, 
economic,
| > | > political nature of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - to 
give
| > its
| > | > official name.
| > | >
| > | > In the absence of such what we get is something cast in terms of
| > domination
| > | > theory in which the hegemon is presented as the guilty party, the
| > | > subordinate as innocent. Is this sufficient?
| > | >
| > | > I have no single doubt about the prime responsibility of the US in 
war
| > and
| > | > tensions in the Korean peninsular since World War Two. At the time 
of
| > the
| > | > Korean War, the world Communist movement and its peace movement saw 
this
| > as
| > | > a clash between US imperialism and a peaceloving, democratic 
socialist
| > | > state.
| > | >
| > | > I can only assume that Martin has felt obliged to abandon such a
| > framework.
| > | > But this has been at the cost of concealing - at least in the two 
pieces
| > | > here - the obscene and archaic nature of the Democratic People's
| > Republic of
| > | > Korea - of which the only reasonable descriptor is the last one, 
Korea.
| > | >
| > | > This Dynastic Militarist Totalitarian State has just continued its
| > largely
| > | > self-imposed isolation (from almost every other country in the 
world) in
| > the
| > | > most counter-productive possible way, that is by imitating the 
behaviour
| > of
| > | > its imperialist militarist nuclear enemy.
| > | >
| > | > The immediate effect of the breach of the UN non-proliferation 
treaty it
| > | > earlier signed has been to unite against it both its enemies and its
| > | > erstwhile friend, China!
| > | >
| > | > Not only this,.but it has probably united the peoples of these 
otherwise
| > | > diverse states with their increasingly discredited governments!
| > | >
| > | > Not only this, but it is making it possible for the nuclear powers 
to
| > | > presents themselves as civilised and responsible holders of nuclear
| > weapons!
| > | >
| > | > I leave aside the question of the extent to which the militarism of 
the
| > | > dictatorship has been responsible for the starvation of its 
population -
| > | > also presented in strangely neutral terms by Martin. Apparently the 
DPRK
| > is
| > | > innocent not only in its international relations but also in its
| > internal
| > | > ones.
| > | >
| > | > I do not think an appropriate alternative global social movement
| > response
| > | > can be constructed on such a problematic analysis.
| > | >
| > | > Response welcome, from Martin or whoever.
| > | >
| > | > Peter W.
| > | >
| > | >
| > | >
| > | >
| > | > ---- Original Message ----- 
| > | > From: "Patrick Bond" <pbond at mail.ngo.za>
| > | > To: "debate: SA discussion list" <debate at lists.kabissa.org>
| > | > Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 7:39 PM
| > | > Subject: [DEBATE] : (Fwd) N.Korea analysis by Marty Hart-Landsberg
| > | >
| > | >
| > | > | The North Korean situation.
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > | Well the long and short of it as I see it is that the North, ever
| > since
| > | > | the end of the Soviet Union and the shift of Russia and central 
and
| > | > | eastern European countries to capitalism, has been desperately 
trying
| > to
| > | > | normalize relations with the US and Japan. Its leadership has
| > | > | repeatedly said that it needs to do that to help revitalize the
| > | > | country’s economy. Without the Soviet block it has no established
| > | > | trading relations and thus no way to earn foreign exchange to pay 
for
| > | > | needed imports of fuel and resources. The US government 
(especially
| > the
| > | > | military) for its own reasons has been happy to see the tensions
| > remain
| > | > | on the Korean peninsula and the North suffer ever greater economic
| > | > | problems. These reasons include wanting to justify military 
budgets,
| > | > | retain troops in Japan, influence South Korean developments, and
| > remain
| > | > | a key player in East Asia. There are those in the US establishment 
who
| > | > | would even welcome war against the North now that the Soviet Union 
no
| > | > | longer stands as a counter threat.
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > | So, faced with the need for normalization but an unwillingness on 
the
| > | > | part of the US government, the North decided that it would pursue 
the
| > | > | only strategy that appeared to get the attention of the US—the 
threat
| > of
| > | > | a nuclear armed North Korea. As it turned out, the US was happy to
| > take
| > | > | that threat and use it for reinforcing its own geopolitical 
agenda.
| > The
| > | > | result has been an ever more dangerous game of chicken.
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > | The North has repeatedly called for direct talks with the US and 
has
| > | > | said that all issues, including nuclear and missiles, can be dealt
| > | > | with. All they appear to want is to normalize relations with the 
US,
| > | > | and then with Japan, so as to stabilize their economy. The US 
refuses.
| > | > | Apparently, although we do not know for sure what has actually 
taken
| > | > | place, the government of North Korea is once again upping the ante 
in
| > | > | the hopes of forcing the US to the bargaining table. We shall see
| > where
| > | > | this will all end.
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > | However our demand should clearly be to support direct 
negotiations
| > | > | between the US and North Korea, this is a demand that has the 
strong
| > | > | support of China, South Korea, and Russia.
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > | For more background see the following piece I wrote for Against 
the
| > | > | Current a few years back at:
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > | http://www.lclark.edu/~marty/korea.htm
| > | > |
| > | > | Korea: Crisis and Opportunity
| > | > | (Published in Against the Current, Volume 103, March/April 2003)
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > | By Martin Hart-Landsberg
| > | > |
| > | > | Few know it, but the people of the United States owe South Korean
| > | > | activists a big debt of gratitude. The movement they helped build
| > | > | appears, at least temporarily, to have headed off a new war on the
| > | > | Korean peninsula. While Koreans, north and south, would have 
suffered
| > | > | the most, Americans would not have escaped its devastating
| > consequences.
| > | > |
| > | > | The direct impetus for the movement came from the November 2002
| > | > | acquittal by a U.S. military court in South Korea of two U.S.
| > soldiers.
| > | > | They were the commander and driver of the 50 ton armored vehicle 
that
| > | > | crushed two South Korean girls to death in June, on a narrow road
| > north
| > | > | of Seoul. Activists immediately organized demonstrations outside 
Camp
| > | > | Casey in South Korea, the scene of the trial, and then in early
| > | > | December, in Washington D.C., outside the Pentagon and the White
| > House.
| > | > |
| > | > | Tens of thousands of South Koreans eventually participated in 
marches,
| > | > | candlelight vigils, and demonstrations whose initial demands were 
for
| > a
| > | > | new trial of the soldiers by Korean authorities and revision of 
the
| > | > | U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement. Then, as U.S. threats 
to
| > | > | wage war against North Korea for its alleged production of nuclear
| > | > | weapons intensified, they became increasingly directed against 
U.S.
| > | > | policy toward both South and North Korea, more broadly. This was 
no
| > | > | simple anti-American movement but rather, thanks to years of 
activist
| > | > | education and organizing, an expression of popular recognition 
that
| > the
| > | > | U.S. military was not in South Korea to defend Korean interests 
and
| > that
| > | > | U.S. policy towards North Korea was in fact contrary to those
| > interests.
| > | > |
| > | > | One critical accomplishment of this movement was the December 19, 
2002
| > | > | election of Roh Moo-Hyun over the more conservative, and 
pro-American,
| > | > | Lee Hoi-Chang. The campaign was very close and it appears that the 
US
| > | > | hoped that its charges against North Korea would encourage support 
for
| > | > | Lee. However, in the closing days of the campaign Roh courageously
| > added
| > | > | his voice to the growing popular movement, making clear that he 
shared
| > | > | their opposition to U.S. policy toward the North. It was this 
stand
| > that
| > | > | was largely responsible for his victory.
| > | > |
| > | > | There now seems little doubt that war was at stake in this 
election.
| > | > | Several weeks after the election, Roh explained that “At the time 
of
| > the
| > | > | elections, some U.S. officials, who held considerable 
responsibility
| > in
| > | > | the administration, talked about the possibility of attacking 
North
| > | > | Korea…. I felt so desperate. I couldn’t even say in public what 
would
| > | > | happen if the United States attacked North Korea because that 
would
| > make
| > | > | the people afraid.” [1] Significantly, a U.S. military official
| > reacting
| > | > | to the outcome of the election commented that “There is a real 
sense
| > of
| > | > | mourning here.” [2]
| > | > |
| > | > | Because of South Korean efforts, we in the United States have a 
window
| > | > | of opportunity to organize our own opposition to US foreign policy
| > | > | towards Korea and in the process build ties with South Korea’s 
peace
| > | > | movement and activist community. We should also take advantage of 
this
| > | > | opportunity to think carefully about the kind of peace movement we 
are
| > | > | building in the US.
| > | > |
| > | > | To this point it has been narrowly focused on stopping a U.S. 
attack
| > on
| > | > | Iraq. While important, this narrow focus, as the situation in 
Korea
| > | > | makes clear, has the potential to blind participants to the 
broader
| > | > | scope of US policy and the underlying dynamics that drive it.
| > Examining
| > | > | the process that brought us to the brink of war in Korea can help 
us
| > | > | better understand these dynamics and the importance of broadening 
and
| > | > | deepening our challenge to U.S. foreign policy.
| > | > |
| > | > | Historical Context
| > | > |
| > | > | The US claims that current tensions with the North arose because 
of
| > that
| > | > | country’s October 2002 admission to U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State
| > | > | James Kelly that it had violated the 1994 framework agreement 
(that
| > was
| > | > | designed to halt its development of nuclear weapons) by secretly
| > pursing
| > | > | a military oriented uranium enrichment program. The U.S. argued 
that
| > | > | this program made North Korea a threat to the peace of the region, 
not
| > | > | only because the country might use nuclear weapons to threaten 
South
| > | > | Korea or Japan, but also because it might sell them to terrorists.
| > Thus,
| > | > | rather than waging war against the North, the U.S. claims that its
| > only
| > | > | interest is in stopping that country’s weapons program so as to 
keep
| > the
| > | > | world safe from nuclear terror.
| > | > |
| > | > | For its part, the North has accused the U.S. of misrepresenting 
its
| > | > | comments to Kelly. It claims that it had looked forward to the
| > meeting,
| > | > | the first direct high-level contact with the U.S. government since
| > | > | Bush’s election, in hopes that it would lead to ongoing dialogue 
and
| > | > | normalization of relations. Instead, Kelly came to accuse the 
North of
| > | > | violating the terms of the framework agreement in a threatening
| > manner.
| > | > | In response, the North told Kelly that it was the U.S. that had
| > violated
| > | > | the framework agreement, and that if the U.S. continued to 
threaten
| > the
| > | > | North with nuclear attack, it had every right to have nuclear 
weapons
| > to
| > | > | defend itself. And, while it acknowledged having purchased uranium
| > | > | enrichment technology, it said this was not a violation of the
| > | > | agreement. Moreover, it had not yet used it. Significantly, and in
| > | > | contrast to U.S. statements, the North claims it never said it had
| > | > | nuclear weapons or was seeking to develop them. [3]
| > | > |
| > | > | A historical perspective on U.S. foreign policy towards Korea 
offers
| > the
| > | > | best way to see through this thicket of competing claims and make
| > sense
| > | > | of the quickly escalating tensions that have followed this 
meeting. In
| > | > | broad brush, from the end of the Korean War until the present, the
| > U.S.
| > | > | has sought to maintain a state of hostility with the North. [4]
| > | > |
| > | > | For example, an international conference was held April 1954 in
| > Geneva,
| > | > | as part of the Armistice agreement ending the Korean War fighting, 
to
| > | > | promote the peaceful reunification of Korea. The U.S. successfully
| > | > | worked to ensure its failure.
| > | > |
| > | > | The U.S. followed the collapse of the Geneva conference by 
steadily
| > | > | upgrading its military force on the peninsula, in violation of the
| > terms
| > | > | of the armistice. In 1957, it introduced nuclear artillery and
| > missiles
| > | > | into South Korea. Over the decade of the 1960s, it added atomic
| > | > | demolition munitions and Nike Hercules missiles with nuclear 
warheads,
| > | > | both of which were forward deployed near the DMZ.
| > | > |
| > | > | In the 1980s, the U.S. military adopted a new doctrine for North 
Korea
| > | > | called Airland Battle. As opposed to past years, when U.S. 
military
| > | > | strategy called for stopping a North Korean attack at the DMZ, 
U.S.
| > | > | plans now involved an immediate counterattack against the North, 
with
| > | > | special emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons.
| > | > |
| > | > | Given the continuing “state of war” between the U.S. and North 
Korea,
| > | > | U.S. policy towards North Korea gradually fell under the control 
of
| > the
| > | > | military and intelligence community. This community saw benefits 
in
| > | > | maintaining existing tensions because they legitimated the U.S.
| > military
| > | > | presence in South Korea and Japan. They also helped strengthen the
| > | > | position of the conservative military governments that ruled the
| > South.
| > | > |
| > | > | The military and intelligence community resisted all attempts to
| > either
| > | > | scale back the U.S. military presence in the South or improve
| > relations
| > | > | with the North. A case in point: when U.S. President Jimmy Carter
| > sought
| > | > | to withdraw all U.S. troops from South Korea before the end of his
| > term
| > | > | in office, it deliberately sabotaged his plan. It generated new 
and
| > far
| > | > | higher estimates of North Korean troop and weapons strength, which 
the
| > | > | army used to successfully challenge Carter’s proposed troop
| > withdrawal.
| > | > |
| > | > | The end of the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq brought a steady stream 
of
| > | > | articles in the U.S. press calling the DPRK the “next renegade 
state.”
| > | > | North Korea had a small nuclear power program dating back to the
| > | > | mid-1980s. The military and CIA declared their conviction, 
challenged
| > by
| > | > | the State Department, that this program was designed to produce
| > nuclear
| > | > | weapons, not power as the North claimed, and that the North was
| > already
| > | > | in possession of one or two nuclear bombs.
| > | > |
| > | > | The U.S. demanded IAEA inspections of all North Korea’s nuclear
| > | > | facilities; the North, denying it had a weapons program, refused. 
In
| > | > | March 1993 the U.S. began war games in the South directed against 
the
| > | > | North. The North responded by declaring its intention to withdraw 
from
| > | > | the nuclear non-proliferation treaty [NPT].
| > | > |
| > | > | While the North was portrayed as an outlaw state, it was actually
| > hoping
| > | > | that U.S. concern with its nuclear program would force it to 
normalize
| > | > | relations and end its economic blockade. With the end of the 
Soviet
| > | > | Union, the North needed to reorient its trade ties and attract new
| > | > | investment to generate foreign exchange. It therefore announced 
that
| > all
| > | > | security issues could be resolved to U.S. satisfaction if only it
| > would
| > | > | agree to direct negotiations.
| > | > |
| > | > | The U.S. agreed to talks in order to stop the North’s withdraw 
from
| > the
| > | > | NPT, out of fear that other countries might follow its example.
| > However,
| > | > | the talks quickly deadlocked and the U.S. resumed its efforts to 
force
| > | > | North Korean compliance. It sought to win UN support for 
international
| > | > | sanctions. At the same time, the U.S. military began planning for 
a
| > | > | strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities, with the expectation 
that
| > | > | this would likely lead to total war.
| > | > |
| > | > | At the risk of oversimplifying, the war drive was fueled in part 
by a
| > | > | new assertion of U.S. power in the wake of the collapse of the 
Soviet
| > | > | Union. Another critical factor was the U.S. military’s need to 
justify
| > | > | its cold war levels of spending in the post-Soviet era. It 
therefore
| > did
| > | > | what it could to puff up the North Korean threat, eagerly seizing 
on
| > the
| > | > | nuclear issue. And, the military industrial complex, which stood 
to
| > gain
| > | > | from the missile defense system proposed to counter the threat, 
gave
| > the
| > | > | military its full support.
| > | > |
| > | > | Talk of the threat fed upon itself, quickly leading to a crisis
| > | > | situation. According to then South Korean president Kim Young-Sam,
| > “The
| > | > | Clinton government was preparing a war.” Kim phoned Clinton and 
argued
| > | > | against a U.S. attack on the North. “Clinton tried to persuade me 
to
| > | > | change my mind, but I criticized the United States for planning to
| > stage
| > | > | a war with the North on our land.” [5]
| > | > |
| > | > | War on the Korean peninsula in 1994 was averted only because 
former
| > U.S.
| > | > | President Jimmy Carter accepted North Korean president Kim Il Sung’s
| > | > | invitation to come to Pyongyang and act as mediator. While the
| > military
| > | > | and most opinion makers in the U.S. criticized Carter’s visit, his
| > | > | action opened up an alternative to war. The result was the October
| > 1994
| > | > | framework agreement.
| > | > |
| > | > | The Framework Agreement
| > | > |
| > | > | Because the U.S. has singled out North Korean violations of the
| > | > | framework agreement to justify its current hostile stance towards 
the
| > | > | North, it is important to examine its terms and compliance status. 
The
| > | > | agreement required the North to freeze its one operating
| > | > | graphite-moderated reactor and halt construction of two bigger
| > reactors.
| > | > | It also required the North to store the spent fuel from its 
operating
| > | > | reactor under IAEA supervision.
| > | > |
| > | > | In exchange, the U.S was obligated to coordinate the building of 
two
| > new
| > | > | light water reactors (which were considered less militarily 
dangerous)
| > | > | that were to be finished by 2003. Once the reactors were 
completed,
| > but
| > | > | before they were fully operational, the North would have to allow 
full
| > | > | IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities. During the period 
of
| > | > | construction, the U.S. also agreed to provide the North with 
annual
| > | > | shipments of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.
| > | > |
| > | > | Perhaps most importantly, the agreement also called for the United
| > | > | States to “move toward full normalization of political and 
economic
| > | > | relations” with the North and “provide formal assurances to the 
DPRK
| > | > | against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United 
 States.”
| > | > |
| > | > | Tragically, the Clinton administration did not meet the terms of 
the
| > | > | agreement. Republicans swept into office in 1994 and repeatedly
| > | > | threatened to hold back needed funding for the promised oil 
deliveries
| > | > | to the North. One consequence was that they were not always made 
on
| > | > | schedule. Under pressure from the military and intelligence 
community
| > | > | (and its allies in Congress), Clinton also maintained economic
| > sanctions
| > | > | on the North. Moreover, the U.S. military continued to target and
| > | > | threaten the North with nuclear attack.
| > | > |
| > | > | In short, the North has every reason to fault U.S. compliance with 
the
| > | > | agreement. The reactors were supposed to be built by 2003. Yet, in
| > large
| > | > | measure because the U.S. hoped that North Korea would collapse 
from
| > | > | economic problems before that date, it did little to ensure a 
timely
| > | > | construction schedule. In fact the concrete foundation for the 
first
| > | > | reactor was not poured until August 2002.
| > | > |
| > | > | The U.S. has also taken no meaningful steps to normalize 
relations. As
| > a
| > | > | result, the heavy military pressure and economic embargo greatly 
add
| > to
| > | > | North Korea’s considerable economic difficulties. In fact, the 
failure
| > | > | of the U.S. to live up to its side of the agreement is highlighted 
by
| > | > | the fact that North Korea’s current demands are no different from 
what
| > | > | it was promised in 1994: normalization of relations and a 
guarantee
| > that
| > | > | it will not be threatened with military attack by the U.S.
| > | > |
| > | > | North Korea and the Axis of Evil
| > | > |
| > | > | The Bush administration has worked hard to maintain the North as 
an
| > | > | enemy because it serves U.S. policy interests to do so. One of 
Bush’s
| > | > | earliest and most important policy objectives was the creation of 
a
| > | > | national missile defense system, an objective strongly endorsed by 
the
| > | > | military industrial complex. He justified the building of this
| > expensive
| > | > | system largely with reference to the existence of a North Korean
| > threat.
| > | > |
| > | > | Immediately upon coming to office, Bush made it clear that he 
viewed
| > | > | North Korea as a terrorist state and felt no obligation to comply 
with
| > | > | the terms of the framework agreement. He also strongly rebuked 
South
| > | > | Korean president Kim Dae Jung for his reconciliation efforts, 
which
| > had
| > | > | produced an historic June 2000 summit meeting in Pyongyang with 
Kim
| > Jong
| > | > | Il, the leader of North Korea.
| > | > |
| > | > | While a national missile defense program was an important 
objective in
| > | > | the early days of his administration, Bush’s agenda changed
| > dramatically
| > | > | after September 11, 2001. The terrorist attack on the U.S. gave 
Bush
| > the
| > | > | opportunity to promote a much broader program on behalf of 
capitalist
| > | > | interests. He therefore launched what he called “a war on 
terrorism”
| > | > | that was in fact designed to reassert U.S. international 
dominance,
| > | > | promote new free trade agreements, and support a domestic agenda 
that
| > | > | included new tax breaks for corporations and the wealthy, greater
| > | > | spending for the military and security agencies, and new 
legislation
| > for
| > | > | repressing opponents of his agenda.
| > | > |
| > | > | The war on terrorism needed opponents and to support such a 
sweeping
| > | > | political agenda the enemy could not be limited to al Qaeda or 
even
| > | > | Afghanistan. Thus, in his January 2002 State of the Union speech, 
Bush
| > | > | raised the specter of the “axis of evil.” According to David Frum,
| > | > | Bush’s speechwriter, his original assignment was “to provide
| > | > | justification for a war, specifically a war with Iraq.” He came up
| > with
| > | > | the phrase “axis of hatred.” Higher ups changed it to the axis of
| > evil,
| > | > | and added Iran. Then, according to Frum, at the last minute, North
| > Korea
| > | > | was added. [6]
| > | > |
| > | > | This incident captures perfectly the spirit of U.S. policy towards
| > North
| > | > | Korea. The U.S. elite continues to find the North Korean threat an
| > | > | excellent vehicle for promoting their aims regardless of the cost 
to
| > the
| > | > | Korean people, or the American people for that matter. James Kelly’s
| > | > | visit to the North and the tensions that followed can only be
| > understood
| > | > | in this context.
| > | > |
| > | > | What lies ahead?
| > | > |
| > | > | Following the October meeting discussed above, the United States
| > | > | government announced that the framework agreement was dead. In
| > | > | mid-November, it cancelled its scheduled December shipment of 
heavy
| > fuel
| > | > | oil to North Korea.
| > | > |
| > | > | In December, it ordered a Spanish navel vessel to stop and seize a
| > North
| > | > | Korean ship carrying missiles. It later authorized its release 
when
| > | > | Yemen declared that it had legally purchased them. The U.S. issued 
no
| > | > | apology to North Korea. Soon afterwards, the U.S. released a new
| > | > | military doctrine calling for preemptive military strikes and 
covert
| > | > | actions against nations possessing nuclear, biological, and 
chemical
| > | > | weapons. The doctrine also allowed for the use of nuclear weapons 
as
| > an
| > | > | option in any conflict. North Korea was listed as one of the 
targeted
| > | > | nations.
| > | > |
| > | > | The North Korean government has, in turn, taken steps to restart 
its
| > | > | nuclear power operations and once again declared its intension to
| > | > | withdraw from the NPT. At the same time, it continues to seek 
direct
| > | > | negotiations with the United States in an effort to end its 
isolation
| > | > | and attract needed investment.
| > | > |
| > | > | Does the North have a nuclear weapons program? No one knows for 
sure.
| > | > | Many Russian, Chinese and South Korean defense analysts argue that 
the
| > | > | country has no weapons and is far from developing them even if was
| > | > | committed to doing so. They also acknowledge that it appears that 
the
| > | > | North has sought to keep the U.S. in the dark concerning its 
military
| > | > | capabilities because this uncertainty is their best bargaining 
chip to
| > | > | encourage negotiations. This is the diplomatic equivalent of high
| > stakes
| > | > | poker.
| > | > |
| > | > | Despite three consecutive years of growth, the North Korean 
economy
| > | > | remains in bad shape. A severe shortage of energy, largely caused 
by
| > the
| > | > | end of barter trade with the Soviet Union and a series of natural
| > | > | disasters, has crippled the country’s transportation system,
| > industrial
| > | > | production, and agriculture. North Korea’s GDP declined by half 
over
| > the
| > | > | decade of the 1990s; millions of people are without employment,
| > adequate
| > | > | food and public services. [7]
| > | > |
| > | > | The North Korean government has redoubled its efforts to establish
| > ties
| > | > | with the capitalist world in order to obtain the foreign exchange 
it
| > | > | needs to reinvigorate its economy. On the political front, it has
| > | > | normalized relations with most western European countries and
| > Australia.
| > | > | In September 2002, Kim Jong Il met with the Japanese prime 
minister
| > and
| > | > | acknowledged past wrong-doings, including the kidnapping of 
Japanese
| > | > | citizens; he also renounced compensation claims for Japanese
| > colonialism.
| > | > |
| > | > | On the economic front, the North has dispatched officials to other
| > | > | countries to study their economic experiences and tried to 
establish a
| > | > | special capitalist zone in Sinujiu, near the Chinese border. In 
July
| > | > | 2002, it introduced a package of major economic reforms that 
include
| > an
| > | > | end to rationing, charges for housing and utilities, and a 
devaluation
| > | > | of the currency. It is also working with the South to establish a
| > | > | special economic zone in Kaesong, and repair railway lines linking 
the
| > | > | South and North. However, it is doubtful that any of these efforts
| > will
| > | > | produce significant results as long as the state of hostilities
| > remains
| > | > | between North Korea and the U.S.
| > | > |
| > | > | The South Korean people, who have also paid a high cost for the
| > division
| > | > | of their country and the resulting tensions, want to improve 
relations
| > | > | with the North. In this context, activists face many challenges,
| > | > | including promotion of a reunification strategy that encourages 
direct
| > | > | contacts between working people in the North and South and the
| > creation
| > | > | of new social visions.
| > | > |
| > | > | We in this country have a responsibility to help create space for
| > their
| > | > | efforts by demanding a change in US foreign policy. And, given 
that
| > the
| > | > | U.S. government’s demonization of North Korea helps to legitimate 
the
| > | > | war on terrorism with its enormous domestic social costs – costs 
that
| > | > | would rise rapidly in the case of a new Korean war – such an 
effort
| > | > | represents an act of solidarity in the truest sense.
| > | > |
| > | > | In focusing on Korea, and the dangers of war on the Korean 
peninsula,
| > I
| > | > | do not mean to suggest that the peace movement in the United 
States
| > | > | should make Korea a higher priority than Iraq. Given the current
| > | > | emphasis of the Bush administration, war in Iraq remains the more
| > likely
| > | > | outcome. However, the situation in Korea highlights the fact that 
the
| > | > | U.S. government’s stance towards Iraq is not an aberration. 
Rather,
| > the
| > | > | drive to war, whether in the Middle East or Korea, reflects and is 
a
| > | > | consequence of state efforts to advance a political agenda that is
| > | > | responsive to capitalist rather than popular needs. Therefore, if 
we
| > are
| > | > | to build an effective peace movement, our organizing efforts must
| > | > | encourage people to see the connections between what appear to be
| > | > | distinct crises as well as their root cause.
| > | > |
| > | > | Notes
| > | > |
| > | > | 1. Doug Struck, “S. Korean Says U.S. Considered Attack on North,”
| > | > | Washington Post, January 19, 2003, on-line.
| > | > |
| > | > | 2. Howard W. French, “Bush and the New Korean Leader to Take up 
Thorny
| > | > | Issues,” New York Times, December 21, 2002, on-line.
| > | > |
| > | > | 3. For more on the exchange see Gregory Elich, “Targeting North
| >  Korea,”
| > | > | Center for Research on Globalization 
(http://www.globalresearch.ca),
| > | > | December 31, 2002.
| > | > |
| > | > | 4. A more detailed discussion of the following history can be 
found in
| > | > | Martin Hart-Landsberg, Korea: Division, Reunification, and U.S.
| > Foreign
| > | > | Policy, Monthly Review Press, 1998, especially Chapter 6.
| > | > |
| > | > | 5. Agence France Presse, “South Korea Stopped US Strike on North
| > Korea:
| > | > | Former President,” Seoul, May 24, 2000.
| > | > |
| > | > | 6. Hendrik Hertzberg, “The Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker, 
January
| > | > | 13, 2003, on line.
| > | > |
| > | > | 7. North Korea’s economic situation and political options are
| > discussed
| > | > | in Gavan McCormack, North Korea in the Vice,” New Left Review, 18,
| > | > | November-December 2002; and Elich, “Targeting North Korea,” op. 
cit.
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | > |
| > | >
| > | >
| > |
| > 
 > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| > | >
| > | >
| > | > _______________________________________________
| > | > DEBATE mailing list
| > | > DEBATE at lists.kabissa.org
| > | > http://lists.kabissa.org/mailman/listinfo/debate
| > | >
| > | >
| > |
| > 
 > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| > | > I am using the free version of SPAMfighter for private users.
| > | > It has removed 182 spam emails to date.
| > | > Paying users do not have this message in their emails.
| > | > Try SPAMfighter for free now!
| > | >
| > | >
| > | 
 > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
| > | >
| > | > _______________________________________________
| > | > DEBATE mailing list
| > | > DEBATE at lists.kabissa.org
| > | > http://lists.kabissa.org/mailman/listinfo/debate
| > | >
| > |
| >
| >
| 
 > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| >
| >
| > _______________________________________________
| > DEBATE mailing list
| > DEBATE at lists.kabissa.org
| > http://lists.kabissa.org/mailman/listinfo/debate
| >
| >
| 
 > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| > I am using the free version of SPAMfighter for private users.
| > It has removed 184 spam emails to date.
| > Paying users do not have this message in their emails.
| > Try SPAMfighter for free now!
| >
| >
| > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
| >
| > _______________________________________________
| > DEBATE mailing list
| > DEBATE at lists.kabissa.org
| > http://lists.kabissa.org/mailman/listinfo/debate
| >
|


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


_______________________________________________
DEBATE mailing list
DEBATE at lists.kabissa.org
http://lists.kabissa.org/mailman/listinfo/debate


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am using the free version of SPAMfighter for private users.
It has removed 185 spam emails to date.
Paying users do not have this message in their emails.
Try SPAMfighter for free now!