[DEBATE] : Re: (Fwd) N.Korea analysis by Marty Hart-Landsberg

[Peter Waterman]

Thanks, Marty, for your clarification. Though quite how the kind of dialogue 
you favour might develop, given the nature of the North Korean regime 
boggles the mind.

The limitations on such contacts might be suggested by the website of the 
Korean Friendship Association, which declares that it has the 'recognition 
and total support' of the state (i.e. it is an organ of that state and 
controlled by it). Prominently displayed are, first, portraits of the Father 
and the Son, and only afterwards, 'country'.  For those who are prepared to 
either laugh or weep, this is at http://www.korea-dpr.com/.

Amongst the bombast and lies one can find a frightening admission or boast - 
that this state offers (investors) the cheapest labour in the region. 
Cheaper than China, Myanmar, Cambodia? Wow!

The problem is that you, I, the world peace and anti-nuclear movements, have 
zero access to the KDPR and are thus similarly limited in any possible 
intervention. In the case of India, covered by the item on today's List, one 
could at least relate to the peace movement in that country.

In this case, there seems little one can do other than expose and attempt to 
pressurise the US and allied Western states.

Best,

Peter W


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Martin Hart-Landsberg" <marty at lclark.edu>
To: "debate: SA discussion list" <debate at lists.kabissa.org>
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 10:12 PM
Subject: [DEBATE] : Re: (Fwd) N.Korea analysis by Marty Hart-Landsberg


| Dear Peter,
|
|
|
| Thanks for taking the time to respond.  The issue at hand is the growing
| tension on the Korean peninsula as highlighted by charges that North
| Korea is developing nuclear weapons.  I was not attempting to do an
| analysis of North Korean society or state.  Just to clarify—I do not
| find North Korea to be a democracy or engaged in building socialism.  I
| am critical of the regime.  I would like to see the regime change.  My
| own view is that change in Korea will come about most productively and
| progressively when independent South Korean movements have the ability
| to engage in dialogue with North Koreans.  For the time being those
| North Koreans will not be tied to independent North Korean social
| movements because there are not any.  However, North Koreans are not
| robots.  The more meetings between North and South teachers around
| issues of what a national curriculum might look like, or North and South
| environmentalists around issues of what a sustainable Korea might look
| like, the more change is likely to take place in ways that can yield
| real and meaningful change in both halves of Korea.
|
|
|
| Now, the main factor blocking this from happening is US policy towards
| North Korea and secondarily South Korea.  If North Korea was saying it
| was hell bent on developing a bomb, that it did not want to sign a peace
| agreement ending the Korean War, that it did not want to normalize
| relations with the US or Japan, etc., then that would be one thing.  But
| the reality is that the North is saying that it wants to sign a peace
| treaty, that it wants to normalize relations, and that it is willing to
| abandon its nuclear weapons program and missile programs in the context
| of a complete and comprehensive set of negotiations with the US.  Under
| those conditions it is hard not to see the tensions that are developing
| in the peninsula as largely caused by U.S. policy.
|
|
|
| The US has deliberately attempted to weaken South Korean efforts to
| improve relations with the North and has continued to attempt to isolate
| the North, for example, by continuing an economic embargo on them and
| vetoing their applications to join the Asian Development Bank and the
| World Bank, etc.  They continue to refuse to engage in any direct
| meetings with the North.  Remember that the North is not even demanding
| that the US disarm or reductions in South Korean military forces.  And
| remember that even according to the US CIA, the South has outspent the
| North on military spending each and every year since 1976.  At present
| the North spends around $1.7 billion a year and the South over $14
| billion dollars (and this does not count the US spending related to the
| South) on their respective militaries.
|
|
|
| Thus, as far as I see it the greatest danger here is US policy and the
| North Korean nuclear test, if that is what it is, can best be understood
| as a response to a determined US policy that repeatedly rejects any
| possibilities of reducing tensions between the two countries.
|
|
|
| Marty
|
|
|
| Peter Waterman wrote:
| > Am I the only reader who might find something missing in the 'North 
Korea'
| > analysis by Martin Hart-Landsberg ?
| >
| > In so far as he also publishes in the Trotskyist(?) magazine, Against 
the
| > Current, I have to assume Martin is a socialist, possibly also a 
Marxist.
| >
| > Yet his analysis is devoid of any consideration of the social, economic,
| > political nature of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - to give 
its
| > official name.
| >
| > In the absence of such what we get is something cast in terms of 
domination
| > theory in which the hegemon is presented as the guilty party, the
| > subordinate as innocent. Is this sufficient?
| >
| > I have no single doubt about the prime responsibility of the US in war 
and
| > tensions in the Korean peninsular since World War Two. At the time of 
the
| > Korean War, the world Communist movement and its peace movement saw this 
as
| > a clash between US imperialism and a peaceloving, democratic socialist
| > state.
| >
| > I can only assume that Martin has felt obliged to abandon such a 
framework.
| > But this has been at the cost of concealing - at least in the two pieces
| > here - the obscene and archaic nature of the Democratic People's 
Republic of
| > Korea - of which the only reasonable descriptor is the last one, Korea.
| >
| > This Dynastic Militarist Totalitarian State has just continued its 
largely
| > self-imposed isolation (from almost every other country in the world) in 
the
| > most counter-productive possible way, that is by imitating the behaviour 
of
| > its imperialist militarist nuclear enemy.
| >
| > The immediate effect of the breach of the UN non-proliferation treaty it
| > earlier signed has been to unite against it both its enemies and its
| > erstwhile friend, China!
| >
| > Not only this,.but it has probably united the peoples of these otherwise
| > diverse states with their increasingly discredited governments!
| >
| > Not only this, but it is making it possible for the nuclear powers to
| > presents themselves as civilised and responsible holders of nuclear 
weapons!
| >
| > I leave aside the question of the extent to which the militarism of the
| > dictatorship has been responsible for the starvation of its population -
| > also presented in strangely neutral terms by Martin. Apparently the DPRK 
is
| > innocent not only in its international relations but also in its 
internal
| > ones.
| >
| > I do not think an appropriate alternative global social movement 
response
| > can be constructed on such a problematic analysis.
| >
| > Response welcome, from Martin or whoever.
| >
| > Peter W.
| >
| >
| >
| >
| > ---- Original Message ----- 
| > From: "Patrick Bond" <pbond at mail.ngo.za>
| > To: "debate: SA discussion list" <debate at lists.kabissa.org>
| > Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 7:39 PM
| > Subject: [DEBATE] : (Fwd) N.Korea analysis by Marty Hart-Landsberg
| >
| >
| > | The North Korean situation.
| > |
| > |
| > | Well the long and short of it as I see it is that the North, ever 
since
| > | the end of the Soviet Union and the shift of Russia and central and
| > | eastern European countries to capitalism, has been desperately trying 
to
| > | normalize relations with the US and Japan. Its leadership has
| > | repeatedly said that it needs to do that to help revitalize the
| > | country’s economy. Without the Soviet block it has no established
| > | trading relations and thus no way to earn foreign exchange to pay for
| > | needed imports of fuel and resources. The US government (especially 
the
| > | military) for its own reasons has been happy to see the tensions 
remain
| > | on the Korean peninsula and the North suffer ever greater economic
| > | problems. These reasons include wanting to justify military budgets,
| > | retain troops in Japan, influence South Korean developments, and 
remain
| > | a key player in East Asia. There are those in the US establishment who
| > | would even welcome war against the North now that the Soviet Union no
| > | longer stands as a counter threat.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | So, faced with the need for normalization but an unwillingness on the
| > | part of the US government, the North decided that it would pursue the
| > | only strategy that appeared to get the attention of the US—the threat 
of
| > | a nuclear armed North Korea. As it turned out, the US was happy to 
take
| > | that threat and use it for reinforcing its own geopolitical agenda. 
The
| > | result has been an ever more dangerous game of chicken.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | The North has repeatedly called for direct talks with the US and has
| > | said that all issues, including nuclear and missiles, can be dealt
| > | with. All they appear to want is to normalize relations with the US,
| > | and then with Japan, so as to stabilize their economy. The US refuses.
| > | Apparently, although we do not know for sure what has actually taken
| > | place, the government of North Korea is once again upping the ante in
| > | the hopes of forcing the US to the bargaining table. We shall see 
where
| > | this will all end.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | However our demand should clearly be to support direct negotiations
| > | between the US and North Korea, this is a demand that has the strong
| > | support of China, South Korea, and Russia.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | For more background see the following piece I wrote for Against the
| > | Current a few years back at:
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | http://www.lclark.edu/~marty/korea.htm
| > |
| > | Korea: Crisis and Opportunity
| > | (Published in Against the Current, Volume 103, March/April 2003)
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > | By Martin Hart-Landsberg
| > |
| > | Few know it, but the people of the United States owe South Korean
| > | activists a big debt of gratitude. The movement they helped build
| > | appears, at least temporarily, to have headed off a new war on the
| > | Korean peninsula. While Koreans, north and south, would have suffered
| > | the most, Americans would not have escaped its devastating 
consequences.
| > |
| > | The direct impetus for the movement came from the November 2002
| > | acquittal by a U.S. military court in South Korea of two U.S. 
soldiers.
| > | They were the commander and driver of the 50 ton armored vehicle that
| > | crushed two South Korean girls to death in June, on a narrow road 
north
| > | of Seoul. Activists immediately organized demonstrations outside Camp
| > | Casey in South Korea, the scene of the trial, and then in early
| > | December, in Washington D.C., outside the Pentagon and the White 
House.
| > |
| > | Tens of thousands of South Koreans eventually participated in marches,
| > | candlelight vigils, and demonstrations whose initial demands were for 
a
| > | new trial of the soldiers by Korean authorities and revision of the
| > | U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement. Then, as U.S. threats to
| > | wage war against North Korea for its alleged production of nuclear
| > | weapons intensified, they became increasingly directed against U.S.
| > | policy toward both South and North Korea, more broadly. This was no
| > | simple anti-American movement but rather, thanks to years of activist
| > | education and organizing, an expression of popular recognition that 
the
| > | U.S. military was not in South Korea to defend Korean interests and 
that
| > | U.S. policy towards North Korea was in fact contrary to those 
interests.
| > |
| > | One critical accomplishment of this movement was the December 19, 2002
| > | election of Roh Moo-Hyun over the more conservative, and pro-American,
| > | Lee Hoi-Chang. The campaign was very close and it appears that the US
| > | hoped that its charges against North Korea would encourage support for
| > | Lee. However, in the closing days of the campaign Roh courageously 
added
| > | his voice to the growing popular movement, making clear that he shared
| > | their opposition to U.S. policy toward the North. It was this stand 
that
| > | was largely responsible for his victory.
| > |
| > | There now seems little doubt that war was at stake in this election.
| > | Several weeks after the election, Roh explained that “At the time of 
the
| > | elections, some U.S. officials, who held considerable responsibility 
in
| > | the administration, talked about the possibility of attacking North
| > | Korea…. I felt so desperate. I couldn’t even say in public what would
| > | happen if the United States attacked North Korea because that would 
make
| > | the people afraid.” [1] Significantly, a U.S. military official 
reacting
| > | to the outcome of the election commented that “There is a real sense 
of
| > | mourning here.” [2]
| > |
| > | Because of South Korean efforts, we in the United States have a window
| > | of opportunity to organize our own opposition to US foreign policy
| > | towards Korea and in the process build ties with South Korea’s peace
| > | movement and activist community. We should also take advantage of this
| > | opportunity to think carefully about the kind of peace movement we are
| > | building in the US.
| > |
| > | To this point it has been narrowly focused on stopping a U.S. attack 
on
| > | Iraq. While important, this narrow focus, as the situation in Korea
| > | makes clear, has the potential to blind participants to the broader
| > | scope of US policy and the underlying dynamics that drive it. 
Examining
| > | the process that brought us to the brink of war in Korea can help us
| > | better understand these dynamics and the importance of broadening and
| > | deepening our challenge to U.S. foreign policy.
| > |
| > | Historical Context
| > |
| > | The US claims that current tensions with the North arose because of 
that
| > | country’s October 2002 admission to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
| > | James Kelly that it had violated the 1994 framework agreement (that 
was
| > | designed to halt its development of nuclear weapons) by secretly 
pursing
| > | a military oriented uranium enrichment program. The U.S. argued that
| > | this program made North Korea a threat to the peace of the region, not
| > | only because the country might use nuclear weapons to threaten South
| > | Korea or Japan, but also because it might sell them to terrorists. 
Thus,
| > | rather than waging war against the North, the U.S. claims that its 
only
| > | interest is in stopping that country’s weapons program so as to keep 
the
| > | world safe from nuclear terror.
| > |
| > | For its part, the North has accused the U.S. of misrepresenting its
| > | comments to Kelly. It claims that it had looked forward to the 
meeting,
| > | the first direct high-level contact with the U.S. government since
| > | Bush’s election, in hopes that it would lead to ongoing dialogue and
| > | normalization of relations. Instead, Kelly came to accuse the North of
| > | violating the terms of the framework agreement in a threatening 
manner.
| > | In response, the North told Kelly that it was the U.S. that had 
violated
| > | the framework agreement, and that if the U.S. continued to threaten 
the
| > | North with nuclear attack, it had every right to have nuclear weapons 
to
| > | defend itself. And, while it acknowledged having purchased uranium
| > | enrichment technology, it said this was not a violation of the
| > | agreement. Moreover, it had not yet used it. Significantly, and in
| > | contrast to U.S. statements, the North claims it never said it had
| > | nuclear weapons or was seeking to develop them. [3]
| > |
| > | A historical perspective on U.S. foreign policy towards Korea offers 
the
| > | best way to see through this thicket of competing claims and make 
sense
| > | of the quickly escalating tensions that have followed this meeting. In
| > | broad brush, from the end of the Korean War until the present, the 
U.S.
| > | has sought to maintain a state of hostility with the North. [4]
| > |
| > | For example, an international conference was held April 1954 in 
Geneva,
| > | as part of the Armistice agreement ending the Korean War fighting, to
| > | promote the peaceful reunification of Korea. The U.S. successfully
| > | worked to ensure its failure.
| > |
| > | The U.S. followed the collapse of the Geneva conference by steadily
| > | upgrading its military force on the peninsula, in violation of the 
terms
| > | of the armistice. In 1957, it introduced nuclear artillery and 
missiles
| > | into South Korea. Over the decade of the 1960s, it added atomic
| > | demolition munitions and Nike Hercules missiles with nuclear warheads,
| > | both of which were forward deployed near the DMZ.
| > |
| > | In the 1980s, the U.S. military adopted a new doctrine for North Korea
| > | called Airland Battle. As opposed to past years, when U.S. military
| > | strategy called for stopping a North Korean attack at the DMZ, U.S.
| > | plans now involved an immediate counterattack against the North, with
| > | special emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons.
| > |
| > | Given the continuing “state of war” between the U.S. and North Korea,
| > | U.S. policy towards North Korea gradually fell under the control of 
the
| > | military and intelligence community. This community saw benefits in
| > | maintaining existing tensions because they legitimated the U.S. 
military
| > | presence in South Korea and Japan. They also helped strengthen the
| > | position of the conservative military governments that ruled the 
South.
| > |
| > | The military and intelligence community resisted all attempts to 
either
| > | scale back the U.S. military presence in the South or improve 
relations
| > | with the North. A case in point: when U.S. President Jimmy Carter 
sought
| > | to withdraw all U.S. troops from South Korea before the end of his 
term
| > | in office, it deliberately sabotaged his plan. It generated new and 
far
| > | higher estimates of North Korean troop and weapons strength, which the
| > | army used to successfully challenge Carter’s proposed troop 
withdrawal.
| > |
| > | The end of the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq brought a steady stream of
| > | articles in the U.S. press calling the DPRK the “next renegade state.”
| > | North Korea had a small nuclear power program dating back to the
| > | mid-1980s. The military and CIA declared their conviction, challenged 
by
| > | the State Department, that this program was designed to produce 
nuclear
| > | weapons, not power as the North claimed, and that the North was 
already
| > | in possession of one or two nuclear bombs.
| > |
| > | The U.S. demanded IAEA inspections of all North Korea’s nuclear
| > | facilities; the North, denying it had a weapons program, refused. In
| > | March 1993 the U.S. began war games in the South directed against the
| > | North. The North responded by declaring its intention to withdraw from
| > | the nuclear non-proliferation treaty [NPT].
| > |
| > | While the North was portrayed as an outlaw state, it was actually 
hoping
| > | that U.S. concern with its nuclear program would force it to normalize
| > | relations and end its economic blockade. With the end of the Soviet
| > | Union, the North needed to reorient its trade ties and attract new
| > | investment to generate foreign exchange. It therefore announced that 
all
| > | security issues could be resolved to U.S. satisfaction if only it 
would
| > | agree to direct negotiations.
| > |
| > | The U.S. agreed to talks in order to stop the North’s withdraw from 
the
| > | NPT, out of fear that other countries might follow its example. 
However,
| > | the talks quickly deadlocked and the U.S. resumed its efforts to force
| > | North Korean compliance. It sought to win UN support for international
| > | sanctions. At the same time, the U.S. military began planning for a
| > | strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities, with the expectation that
| > | this would likely lead to total war.
| > |
| > | At the risk of oversimplifying, the war drive was fueled in part by a
| > | new assertion of U.S. power in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
| > | Union. Another critical factor was the U.S. military’s need to justify
| > | its cold war levels of spending in the post-Soviet era. It therefore 
did
| > | what it could to puff up the North Korean threat, eagerly seizing on 
the
| > | nuclear issue. And, the military industrial complex, which stood to 
gain
| > | from the missile defense system proposed to counter the threat, gave 
the
| > | military its full support.
| > |
| > | Talk of the threat fed upon itself, quickly leading to a crisis
| > | situation. According to then South Korean president Kim Young-Sam, 
“The
| > | Clinton government was preparing a war.” Kim phoned Clinton and argued
| > | against a U.S. attack on the North. “Clinton tried to persuade me to
| > | change my mind, but I criticized the United States for planning to 
stage
| > | a war with the North on our land.” [5]
| > |
| > | War on the Korean peninsula in 1994 was averted only because former 
U.S.
| > | President Jimmy Carter accepted North Korean president Kim Il Sung’s
| > | invitation to come to Pyongyang and act as mediator. While the 
military
| > | and most opinion makers in the U.S. criticized Carter’s visit, his
| > | action opened up an alternative to war. The result was the October 
1994
| > | framework agreement.
| > |
| > | The Framework Agreement
| > |
| > | Because the U.S. has singled out North Korean violations of the
| > | framework agreement to justify its current hostile stance towards the
| > | North, it is important to examine its terms and compliance status. The
| > | agreement required the North to freeze its one operating
| > | graphite-moderated reactor and halt construction of two bigger 
reactors.
| > | It also required the North to store the spent fuel from its operating
| > | reactor under IAEA supervision.
| > |
| > | In exchange, the U.S was obligated to coordinate the building of two 
new
| > | light water reactors (which were considered less militarily dangerous)
| > | that were to be finished by 2003. Once the reactors were completed, 
but
| > | before they were fully operational, the North would have to allow full
| > | IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities. During the period of
| > | construction, the U.S. also agreed to provide the North with annual
| > | shipments of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.
| > |
| > | Perhaps most importantly, the agreement also called for the United
| > | States to “move toward full normalization of political and economic
| > | relations” with the North and “provide formal assurances to the DPRK
| > | against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States.”
| > |
| > | Tragically, the Clinton administration did not meet the terms of the
| > | agreement. Republicans swept into office in 1994 and repeatedly
| > | threatened to hold back needed funding for the promised oil deliveries
| > | to the North. One consequence was that they were not always made on
| > | schedule. Under pressure from the military and intelligence community
| > | (and its allies in Congress), Clinton also maintained economic 
sanctions
| > | on the North. Moreover, the U.S. military continued to target and
| > | threaten the North with nuclear attack.
| > |
| > | In short, the North has every reason to fault U.S. compliance with the
| > | agreement. The reactors were supposed to be built by 2003. Yet, in 
large
| > | measure because the U.S. hoped that North Korea would collapse from
| > | economic problems before that date, it did little to ensure a timely
| > | construction schedule. In fact the concrete foundation for the first
| > | reactor was not poured until August 2002.
| > |
| > | The U.S. has also taken no meaningful steps to normalize relations. As 
a
| > | result, the heavy military pressure and economic embargo greatly add 
to
| > | North Korea’s considerable economic difficulties. In fact, the failure
| > | of the U.S. to live up to its side of the agreement is highlighted by
| > | the fact that North Korea’s current demands are no different from what
| > | it was promised in 1994: normalization of relations and a guarantee 
that
| > | it will not be threatened with military attack by the U.S.
| > |
| > | North Korea and the Axis of Evil
| > |
| > | The Bush administration has worked hard to maintain the North as an
| > | enemy because it serves U.S. policy interests to do so. One of Bush’s
| > | earliest and most important policy objectives was the creation of a
| > | national missile defense system, an objective strongly endorsed by the
| > | military industrial complex. He justified the building of this 
expensive
| > | system largely with reference to the existence of a North Korean 
threat.
| > |
| > | Immediately upon coming to office, Bush made it clear that he viewed
| > | North Korea as a terrorist state and felt no obligation to comply with
| > | the terms of the framework agreement. He also strongly rebuked South
| > | Korean president Kim Dae Jung for his reconciliation efforts, which 
had
| > | produced an historic June 2000 summit meeting in Pyongyang with Kim 
Jong
| > | Il, the leader of North Korea.
| > |
| > | While a national missile defense program was an important objective in
| > | the early days of his administration, Bush’s agenda changed 
dramatically
| > | after September 11, 2001. The terrorist attack on the U.S. gave Bush 
the
| > | opportunity to promote a much broader program on behalf of capitalist
| > | interests. He therefore launched what he called “a war on terrorism”
| > | that was in fact designed to reassert U.S. international dominance,
| > | promote new free trade agreements, and support a domestic agenda that
| > | included new tax breaks for corporations and the wealthy, greater
| > | spending for the military and security agencies, and new legislation 
for
| > | repressing opponents of his agenda.
| > |
| > | The war on terrorism needed opponents and to support such a sweeping
| > | political agenda the enemy could not be limited to al Qaeda or even
| > | Afghanistan. Thus, in his January 2002 State of the Union speech, Bush
| > | raised the specter of the “axis of evil.” According to David Frum,
| > | Bush’s speechwriter, his original assignment was “to provide
| > | justification for a war, specifically a war with Iraq.” He came up 
with
| > | the phrase “axis of hatred.” Higher ups changed it to the axis of 
evil,
| > | and added Iran. Then, according to Frum, at the last minute, North 
Korea
| > | was added. [6]
| > |
| > | This incident captures perfectly the spirit of U.S. policy towards 
North
| > | Korea. The U.S. elite continues to find the North Korean threat an
| > | excellent vehicle for promoting their aims regardless of the cost to 
the
| > | Korean people, or the American people for that matter. James Kelly’s
| > | visit to the North and the tensions that followed can only be 
understood
| > | in this context.
| > |
| > | What lies ahead?
| > |
| > | Following the October meeting discussed above, the United States
| > | government announced that the framework agreement was dead. In
| > | mid-November, it cancelled its scheduled December shipment of heavy 
fuel
| > | oil to North Korea.
| > |
| > | In December, it ordered a Spanish navel vessel to stop and seize a 
North
| > | Korean ship carrying missiles. It later authorized its release when
| > | Yemen declared that it had legally purchased them. The U.S. issued no
| > | apology to North Korea. Soon afterwards, the U.S. released a new
| > | military doctrine calling for preemptive military strikes and covert
| > | actions against nations possessing nuclear, biological, and chemical
| > | weapons. The doctrine also allowed for the use of nuclear weapons as 
an
| > | option in any conflict. North Korea was listed as one of the targeted
| > | nations.
| > |
| > | The North Korean government has, in turn, taken steps to restart its
| > | nuclear power operations and once again declared its intension to
| > | withdraw from the NPT. At the same time, it continues to seek direct
| > | negotiations with the United States in an effort to end its isolation
| > | and attract needed investment.
| > |
| > | Does the North have a nuclear weapons program? No one knows for sure.
| > | Many Russian, Chinese and South Korean defense analysts argue that the
| > | country has no weapons and is far from developing them even if was
| > | committed to doing so. They also acknowledge that it appears that the
| > | North has sought to keep the U.S. in the dark concerning its military
| > | capabilities because this uncertainty is their best bargaining chip to
| > | encourage negotiations. This is the diplomatic equivalent of high 
stakes
| > | poker.
| > |
| > | Despite three consecutive years of growth, the North Korean economy
| > | remains in bad shape. A severe shortage of energy, largely caused by 
the
| > | end of barter trade with the Soviet Union and a series of natural
| > | disasters, has crippled the country’s transportation system, 
industrial
| > | production, and agriculture. North Korea’s GDP declined by half over 
the
| > | decade of the 1990s; millions of people are without employment, 
adequate
| > | food and public services. [7]
| > |
| > | The North Korean government has redoubled its efforts to establish 
ties
| > | with the capitalist world in order to obtain the foreign exchange it
| > | needs to reinvigorate its economy. On the political front, it has
| > | normalized relations with most western European countries and 
Australia.
| > | In September 2002, Kim Jong Il met with the Japanese prime minister 
and
| > | acknowledged past wrong-doings, including the kidnapping of Japanese
| > | citizens; he also renounced compensation claims for Japanese 
colonialism.
| > |
| > | On the economic front, the North has dispatched officials to other
| > | countries to study their economic experiences and tried to establish a
| > | special capitalist zone in Sinujiu, near the Chinese border. In July
| > | 2002, it introduced a package of major economic reforms that include 
an
| > | end to rationing, charges for housing and utilities, and a devaluation
| > | of the currency. It is also working with the South to establish a
| > | special economic zone in Kaesong, and repair railway lines linking the
| > | South and North. However, it is doubtful that any of these efforts 
will
| > | produce significant results as long as the state of hostilities 
remains
| > | between North Korea and the U.S.
| > |
| > | The South Korean people, who have also paid a high cost for the 
division
| > | of their country and the resulting tensions, want to improve relations
| > | with the North. In this context, activists face many challenges,
| > | including promotion of a reunification strategy that encourages direct
| > | contacts between working people in the North and South and the 
creation
| > | of new social visions.
| > |
| > | We in this country have a responsibility to help create space for 
their
| > | efforts by demanding a change in US foreign policy. And, given that 
the
| > | U.S. government’s demonization of North Korea helps to legitimate the
| > | war on terrorism with its enormous domestic social costs – costs that
| > | would rise rapidly in the case of a new Korean war – such an effort
| > | represents an act of solidarity in the truest sense.
| > |
| > | In focusing on Korea, and the dangers of war on the Korean peninsula, 
I
| > | do not mean to suggest that the peace movement in the United States
| > | should make Korea a higher priority than Iraq. Given the current
| > | emphasis of the Bush administration, war in Iraq remains the more 
likely
| > | outcome. However, the situation in Korea highlights the fact that the
| > | U.S. government’s stance towards Iraq is not an aberration. Rather, 
the
| > | drive to war, whether in the Middle East or Korea, reflects and is a
| > | consequence of state efforts to advance a political agenda that is
| > | responsive to capitalist rather than popular needs. Therefore, if we 
are
| > | to build an effective peace movement, our organizing efforts must
| > | encourage people to see the connections between what appear to be
| > | distinct crises as well as their root cause.
| > |
| > | Notes
| > |
| > | 1. Doug Struck, “S. Korean Says U.S. Considered Attack on North,”
| > | Washington Post, January 19, 2003, on-line.
| > |
| > | 2. Howard W. French, “Bush and the New Korean Leader to Take up Thorny
| > | Issues,” New York Times, December 21, 2002, on-line.
| > |
| > | 3. For more on the exchange see Gregory Elich, “Targeting North 
 Korea,”
| > | Center for Research on Globalization (http://www.globalresearch.ca),
| > | December 31, 2002.
| > |
| > | 4. A more detailed discussion of the following history can be found in
| > | Martin Hart-Landsberg, Korea: Division, Reunification, and U.S. 
Foreign
| > | Policy, Monthly Review Press, 1998, especially Chapter 6.
| > |
| > | 5. Agence France Presse, “South Korea Stopped US Strike on North 
Korea:
| > | Former President,” Seoul, May 24, 2000.
| > |
| > | 6. Hendrik Hertzberg, “The Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker, January
| > | 13, 2003, on line.
| > |
| > | 7. North Korea’s economic situation and political options are 
discussed
| > | in Gavan McCormack, North Korea in the Vice,” New Left Review, 18,
| > | November-December 2002; and Elich, “Targeting North Korea,” op. cit.
| > |
| > |
| > |
| > |
| >
| >
| 
 > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| >
| >
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