[DEBATE] : Chomsky on America the Failed State

[MFleshman at aol.com]

Sort of endless, but hey, its Chomsky. 
 
Why it's over for America 

An inability to protect its citizens. The belief that it is  above the law. A 
lack of democracy. Three defining characteristics of the  'failed state'. And 
that, says Noam Chomsky, is exactly what the US is becoming.  In an exclusive 
extract from his devastating new book, America's leading thinker  explains 
how his country lost its way 

By Noam  Chomsky

05/30/06 "_The  Independent_ 
(http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article621899.ece) " -- -- The selection of issues that should rank high  on the 
agenda of concern for human welfare and rights is, naturally, a  subjective 
matter. But there are a few choices that seem unavoidable, because  they bear 
so directly on the prospects for decent survival. Among them are at  least 
these three: nuclear war, environmental disaster, and the fact that the  
government of the world's leading power is acting in ways that increase the  likelihood 
of these catastrophes. It is important to stress the government,  because the 
population, not surprisingly, does not agree. 

That brings up  a fourth issue that should deeply concern Americans, and the 
world: the sharp  divide between public opinion and public policy, one of the 
reasons for the  fear, which cannot casually be put aside, that, as Gar 
Alperowitz puts it in  America Beyond Capitalism, "the American 'system' as a whole 
is in real trouble  - that it is heading in a direction that spells the end of 
its historic values  [of] equality, liberty, and meaningful democracy".

The "system" is coming  to have some of the features of failed states, to 
adopt a currently fashionable  notion that is conventionally applied to states 
regarded as potential threats to  our security (like Iraq) or as needing our 
intervention to rescue the population  from severe internal threats (like Haiti). 
Though the concept is recognised to  be, according to the journal Foreign 
Affairs, "frustratingly imprecise", some of  the primary characteristics of 
failed states can be identified. One is their  inability or unwillingness to 
protect their citizens from violence and perhaps  even destruction. Another is their 
tendency to regard themselves as beyond the  reach of domestic or 
international law, and hence free to carry out aggression  and violence. And if they have 
democratic forms, they suffer from a serious  "democratic deficit" that 
deprives their formal democratic institutions of real  substance.

Among the hardest tasks that anyone can undertake, and one of  the most 
important, is to look honestly in the mirror. If we allow ourselves to  do so, we 
should have little difficulty in finding the characteristics of  "failed 
states" right at home. 

No one familiar with history should be  surprised that the growing democratic 
deficit in the United States is  accompanied by declaration of messianic 
missions to bring democracy to a  suffering world. Declarations of noble intent by 
systems of power are rarely  complete fabrication, and the same is true in 
this case. Under some conditions,  forms of democracy are indeed acceptable. 
Abroad, as the leading  scholar-advocate of "democracy promotion" concludes, we 
find a "strong line of  continuity": democracy is acceptable if and only if it 
is consistent with  strategic and economic interests (Thomas Carothers). In 
modified form, the  doctrine holds at home as well.

The basic dilemma facing policymakers is  sometimes candidly recognised at 
the dovish liberal extreme of the spectrum, for  example, by Robert Pastor, 
President Carter's national security adviser for  Latin America. He explained why 
the administration had to support the murderous  and corrupt Somoza regime in 
Nicaragua, and, when that proved impossible, to try  at least to maintain the 
US-trained National Guard even as it was massacring the  population "with a 
brutality a nation usually reserves for its enemy", killing  some 40,000 people. 
The reason was the familiar one: "The United States did not  want to control 
Nicaragua or the other nations of the region, but it also did  not want 
developments to get out of control. It wanted Nicaraguans to act  independently, 
except when doing so would affect US interests  adversely."

Similar dilemmas faced Bush administration planners after  their invasion of 
Iraq. They want Iraqis "to act independently, except when  doing so would 
affect US interests adversely". Iraq must therefore be sovereign  and democratic, 
but within limits. It must somehow be constructed as an obedient  client 
state, much in the manner of the traditional order in Central America. At  a 
general level, the pattern is familiar, reaching to the opposite extreme of  
institutional structures. The Kremlin was able to maintain satellites that were  run 
by domestic political and military forces, with the iron fist poised.  Germany 
was able to do much the same in occupied Europe even while it was at  war, as 
did fascist Japan in Man-churia (its Manchukuo). Fascist Italy achieved  
similar results in North Africa while carrying out virtual genocide that in no  
way harmed its favourable image in the West and possibly inspired Hitler.  
Traditional imperial and neocolonial systems illustrate many variations on  similar 
themes.

To achieve the traditional goals in Iraq has proven to be  surprisingly 
difficult, despite unusually favourable circumstances. The dilemma  of combining a 
measure of independence with firm control arose in a stark form  not long 
after the invasion, as mass non-violent resistance compelled the  invaders to 
accept far more Iraqi initiative than they had anticipated. The  outcome even 
evoked the nightmarish prospect of a more or less democratic and  sovereign Iraq 
taking its place in a loose Shiite alliance comprising Iran,  Shiite Iraq, and 
possibly the nearby Shiite-dominated regions of Saudi Arabia,  controlling 
most of the world's oil and independent of Washington.

The  situation could get worse. Iran might give up on hopes that Europe could 
become  independent of the United States, and turn eastward. Highly relevant 
background  is discussed by Selig Harrison, a leading specialist on these 
topics. "The  nuclear negotiations between Iran and the European Union were based 
on a bargain  that the EU, held back by the US, has failed to honour," 
Harrison  observes.

"The bargain was that Iran would suspend uranium enrichment,  and the EU 
would undertake security guarantees. The language of the joint  declaration was 
"unambiguous. 'A mutually acceptable agreement,' it said, would  not only 
provide 'objective guarantees' that Iran's nuclear programme is  'exclusively for 
peaceful purposes' but would 'equally provide firm commitments  on security 
issues.'"

The phrase "security issues" is a thinly veiled  reference to the threats by 
the United States and Israel to bomb Iran, and  preparations to do so. The 
model regularly adduced is Israel's bombing of Iraq's  Osirak reactor in 1981, 
which appears to have initiated Saddam's nuclear weapons  programs, another 
demonstration that violence tends to elicit violence. Any  attempt to execute 
similar plans against Iran could lead to immediate violence,  as is surely 
understood in Washington. During a visit to Tehran, the influential  Shiite cleric 
Muqtada al-Sadr warned that his militia would defend Iran in the  case of any 
attack, "one of the strongest signs yet", the Washington Post  reported, "that 
Iraq could become a battleground in any Western conflict with  Iran, raising 
the spectre of Iraqi Shiite militias - or perhaps even the  US-trained 
Shiite-dominated military - taking on American troops here in  sympathy with Iran." The 
Sadrist bloc, which registered substantial gains in the  December 2005 
elections, may soon become the most powerful single political  force in Iraq. It is 
consciously pursuing the model of other successful Islamist  groups, such as 
Hamas in Palestine, combining strong resistance to military  occupation with 
grassroots social organising and service to the  poor.

Washington's unwillingness to allow regional security issues to be  
considered is nothing new. It has also arisen repeatedly in the confrontation  with 
Iraq. In the background is the matter of Israeli nuclear weapons, a topic  that 
Washington bars from international consideration. Beyond that lurks what  
Harrison rightly describes as "the central problem facing the global  
non-proliferation regime": the failure of the nuclear states to live up to their  nuclear 
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligation "to phase out their own  nuclear 
weapons" - and, in Washington's case, formal rejection of the  obligation.

Unlike Europe, China refuses to be intimidated by Washington,  a primary 
reason for the growing fear of China on the part of US planners. Much  of Iran's 
oil already goes to China, and China is providing Iran with weapons,  
presumably considered a deterrent to US threats. Still more uncomfortable for  
Washington is the fact that, according to the Financial Times, "the Sino-Saudi  
relationship has developed dramatically", including Chinese military aid to  Saudi 
Arabia and gas exploration rights for China. By 2005, Saudi Arabia  provided 
about 17 per cent of China's oil imports. Chinese and Saudi oil  companies have 
signed deals for drilling and construction of a huge refinery  (with Exxon 
Mobil as a partner). A January 2006 visit by Saudi king Abdullah to  Beijing was 
expected to lead to a Sino-Saudi memorandum of understanding calling  for 
"increased cooperation and investment between the two countries in oil,  natural 
gas, and minerals".

Indian analyst Aijaz Ahmad observes that Iran  could "emerge as the virtual 
linchpin in the making, over the next decade or so,  of what China and Russia 
have come to regard as an absolutely indispensable  Asian Energy Security Grid, 
for breaking Western control of the world's energy  supplies and securing the 
great industrial revolution of Asia". South Korea and  southeast Asian 
countries are likely to join, possibly Japan as well. A crucial  question is how 
India will react. It rejected US pressures to withdraw from an  oil pipeline deal 
with Iran. On the other hand, India joined the United States  and the EU in 
voting for an anti-Iranian resolution at the IAEA, joining also in  their 
hypocrisy, since India rejects the NPT regime to which Iran, so far,  appears to be 
largely conforming. Ahmad reports that India may have secretly  reversed its 
stand under Iranian threats to terminate a $20bn gas deal.  Washington later 
warned India that its "nuclear deal with the US could be  ditched" if India did 
not go along with US demands, eliciting a sharp rejoinder  from the Indian 
foreign ministry and an evasive tempering of the warning by the  US embassy.

The prospect that Europe and Asia might move toward greater  independence has 
seriously troubled US planners since World War II, and concerns  have 
significantly increased as the tripolar order has continued to evolve,  along with 
new south-south interactions and rapidly growing EU engagement with  China.

US intelligence has projected that the United States, while  controlling 
Middle East oil for the traditional reasons, will itself rely mainly  on more 
stable Atlantic Basin resources (West Africa, western hemisphere).  Control of 
Middle East oil is now far from a sure thing, and these expectations  are also 
threatened by developments in the western hemisphere, accelerated by  Bush 
administration policies that have left the United States remarkably  isolated in 
the global arena. The Bush administration has even succeeded in  alienating 
Canada, an impressive feat.

Canada's minister of natural  resources said that within a few years one 
quarter of the oil that Canada now  sends to the United States may go to China 
instead. In a further blow to  Washington's energy policies, the leading oil 
exporter in the hemisphere,  Venezuela, has forged probably the closest relations 
with China of any Latin  American country, and is planning to sell increasing 
amounts of oil to China as  part of its effort to reduce dependence on the 
openly hostile US government.  Latin America as a whole is increasing trade and 
other relations with China,  with some setbacks, but likely expansion, in 
particular for raw materials  exporters like Brazil and Chile.

Meanwhile, Cuba-Venezuela relations are  becoming very close, each relying on 
its comparative advantage. Venezuela is  providing low-cost oil while in 
return Cuba organises literacy and health  programs, sending thousands of highly 
skilled professionals, teachers, and  doctors, who work in the poorest and most 
neglected areas, as they do elsewhere  in the Third World. Cuba-Venezuela 
projects are extending to the Caribbean  countries, where Cuban doctors are 
providing healthcare to thousands of people  with Venezuelan funding. Operation 
Miracle, as it is called, is described by  Jamaica's ambassador to Cuba as "an 
example of integration and south-south  cooperation", and is generating great 
enthusiasm among the poor majority. Cuban  medical assistance is also being 
welcomed elsewhere. One of the most horrendous  tragedies of recent years was the 
October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. In  addition to the huge toll, unknown 
numbers of survivors have to face brutal  winter weather with little shelter, 
food, or medical assistance. One has to turn  to the South Asian press to read 
that "Cuba has provided the largest contingent  of doctors and paramedics to 
Pakistan", paying all the costs (perhaps with  Venezuelan funding), and that 
President Musharraf expressed his "deep gratitude"  for the "spirit and 
compassion" of the Cuban medical teams.


Some  analysts have suggested that Cuba and Venezuela might even unite, a 
step towards  further integration of Latin America in a bloc that is more 
independent from the  United States. Venezuela has joined Mercosur, the South 
American customs union,  a move described by Argentine president Nestor Kirchner as 
"a milestone" in the  development of this trading bloc, and welcomed as opening 
"a new chapter in our  integration" by Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula 
da Silva. Independent  experts say that "adding Venezuela to the bloc furthers 
its geopolitical vision  of eventually spreading Mercosur to the rest of the 
region".

At a meeting  to mark Venezuela's entry into Mercosur, Venezuelan president 
Hugo Chavez said,  "We cannot allow this to be purely an economic project, one 
for the elites and  for the transnational companies," a not very oblique 
reference to the  US-sponsored "Free Trade Agreement for the Americas", which has 
aroused strong  public opposition. Venezuela also supplied Argentina with fuel 
oil to help stave  off an energy crisis, and bought almost a third of 
Argentine debt issued in  2005, one element of a region-wide effort to free the 
countries from the control  of the US-dominated IMF after two decades of disastrous 
effects of conformity to  its rules. The IMF has "acted towards our country as 
a promoter and a vehicle of  policies that caused poverty and pain among the 
Argentine people", President  Kirchner said in announcing his decision to pay 
almost $1 trillion to rid itself  of the IMF forever. Radically violating IMF 
rules, Argentina enjoyed a  substantial recovery from the disaster left by IMF 
policies.

Steps toward  independent regional integration advanced further with the 
election of Evo  Morales in Bolivia in December 2005, the first president from the 
indigenous  majority. Morales moved quickly to reach energy accords with  
Venezuela.

Though Central America was largely disciplined by Reaganite  violence and 
terror, the rest of the hemisphere is falling out of control,  particularly from 
Venezuela to Argentina, which was the poster child of the IMF  and the 
Treasury Department until its economy collapsed under the policies they  imposed. 
Much of the region has left-centre governments. The indigenous  populations have 
become much more active and influential, particularly in  Bolivia and Ecuador, 
both major energy producers, where they either want oil and  gas to be 
domestically controlled or, in some cases, oppose production  altogether. Many 
indigenous people apparently do not see any reason why their  lives, societies, and 
cultures should be disrupted or destroyed so that New  Yorkers can sit in 
SUVs in traffic gridlock. Some are even calling for an  "Indian nation" in South 
America. Meanwhile the economic integration that is  under way is reversing 
patterns that trace back to the Spanish conquests, with  Latin American elites 
and economies linked to the imperial powers but not to one  another. Along with 
growing south-south interaction on a broader scale, these  developments are 
strongly influenced by popular organisations that are coming  together in the 
unprecedented international global justice movements,  ludicrously called 
"anti-globalisation" because they favour globalisation that  privileges the 
interests of people, not investors and financial institutions.  For many reasons, the 
system of US global dominance is fragile, even apart from  the damage 
inflicted by Bush planners.

One consequence is that the Bush  administration's pursuit of the traditional 
policies of deterring democracy  faces new obstacles. It is no longer as easy 
as before to resort to military  coups and international terrorism to 
overthrow democratically elected  governments, as Bush planners learnt ruefully in 
2002 in Venezuela. The "strong  line of continuity" must be pursued in other 
ways, for the most part. In Iraq,  as we have seen, mass nonviolent resistance 
compelled Washington and London to  permit the elections they had sought to 
evade. The subsequent effort to subvert  the elections by providing substantial 
advantages to the administration's  favourite candidate, and expelling the 
independent media, also failed.  Washington faces further problems. The Iraqi labor 
movement is making  considerable progress despite the opposition of the 
occupation authorities. The  situation is rather like Europe and Japan after World 
War II, when a primary  goal of the United States and United Kingdom was to 
undermine independent labour  movements - as at home, for similar reasons: 
organised labour contributes in  essential ways to functioning democracy with 
popular engagement. Many of the  measures adopted at that time - withholding food, 
supporting fascist police -  are no longer available. Nor is it possible today 
to rely on the labour  bureaucracy of the American Institute for Free Labor 
Development to help  undermine unions. Today, some American unions are 
supporting Iraqi workers, just  as they do in Colombia, where more union activists are 
murdered than anywhere in  the world. At least the unions now receive support 
from the United Steelworkers  of America and others, while Washington 
continues to provide enormous funding  for the government, which bears a large part 
of the responsibility.

The  problem of elections arose in Palestine much in the way it did in Iraq. 
As  already discussed, the Bush administration refused to permit elections 
until the  death of Yasser Arafat, aware that the wrong man would win. After his 
death, the  administration agreed to permit elections, expecting the victory 
of its favoured  Palestinian Authority candidates. To promote this outcome, 
Washington resorted  to much the same modes of subversion as in Iraq, and often 
before. Washington  used the US Agency for International Development as an 
"invisible conduit" in an  effort to "increase the popularity of the Palestinian 
Authority on the eve of  crucial elections in which the governing party faces a 
serious challenge from  the radical Islamic group Hamas" (Washington Post), 
spending almost $2m "on  dozens of quick projects before elections this week to 
bolster the governing  Fatah faction's image with voters" (New York Times). 
In the United States, or  any Western country, even a hint of such foreign 
interference would destroy a  candidate, but deeply rooted imperial mentality 
legitimates such routine  measures elsewhere. However, the attempt to subvert the 
elections again  resoundingly failed.

The US and Israeli governments now have to adjust to  dealing somehow with a 
radical Islamic party that approaches their traditional  rejectionist stance, 
though not entirely, at least if Hamas really does mean to  agree to an 
indefinite truce on the international border as its leaders state.  The US and 
Israel, in contrast, insist that Israel must take over substantial  parts of the 
West Bank (and the forgotten Golan Heights). Hamas's refusal to  accept Israel's 
"right to exist" mirrors the refusal of Washington and Jerusalem  to accept 
Palestine's "right to exist" - a concept unknown in international  affairs; 
Mexico accepts the existence of the United States but not its abstract  "right to 
exist" on almost half of Mexico, acquired by conquest. Hamas's formal  
commitment to "destroy Israel" places it on a par with the United States and  
Israel, which vowed formally that there could be no "additional Palestinian  state" 
(in addition to Jordan) until they relaxed their extreme rejectionist  stand 
partially in the past few years, in the manner already reviewed. Although  
Hamas has not said so, it would come as no great surprise if Hamas were to agree  
that Jews may remain in scattered areas in the present Israel, while Palestine 
 constructs huge settlement and infrastructure projects to take over the 
valuable  land and resources, effectively breaking Israel up into unviable 
cantons,  virtually separated from one another and from some small part of Jerusalem 
where  Jews would also be allowed to remain. And they might agree to call the 
fragments  "a state". If such proposals were made, we would - rightly - regard 
them as  virtually a reversion to Nazism, a fact that might elicit some 
thoughts. If such  proposals were made, Hamas's position would be essentially like 
that of the  United States and Israel for the past five years, after they came 
to tolerate  some impoverished form of "statehood". It is fair to describe 
Hamas as radical,  extremist, and violent, and as a serious threat to peace and 
a just political  settlement. But the organisation is hardly alone in this  
stance.

Elsewhere traditional means of undermining democracy have  succeeded. In 
Haiti, the Bush administration's favourite "democracy-building  group, the 
International Republican Institute", worked assiduously to promote  the opposition to 
President Aristide, helped by the withholding of desperately  needed aid on 
grounds that were dubious at best. When it seemed that Aristide  would probably 
win any genuine election, Washington and the opposition chose to  withdraw, a 
standard device to discredit elections that are going to come out  the wrong 
way: Nicaragua in 1984 and Venezuela in December 2005 are examples  that 
should be familiar. Then followed a military coup, expulsion of the  president, and 
a reign of terror and violence vastly exceeding anything under  the elected 
government.

The persistence of the strong line of continuity  to the present again 
reveals that the United States is very much like other  powerful states. It pursues 
the strategic and economic interests of dominant  sectors of the domestic 
population, to the accompaniment of rhetorical  flourishes about its dedication to 
the highest values. That is practically a  historical universal, and the 
reason why sensible people pay scant attention to  declarations of noble intent by 
leaders, or accolades by their  followers.

One commonly hears that carping critics complain about what is  wrong, but do 
not present solutions. There is an accurate translation for that  charge: 
"They present solutions, but I don't like them." In addition to the  proposals 
that should be familiar about dealing with the crises that reach to  the level 
of survival, a few simple suggestions for the United States have  already been 
mentioned: 1) accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal  Court and 
the World Court; 2) sign and carry forward the Kyoto protocols; 3) let  the 
UN take the lead in international crises; 4) rely on diplomatic and economic  
measures rather than military ones in confronting terror; 5) keep to the  
traditional interpretation of the UN Charter; 6) give up the Security Council  veto 
and have "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind," as the Declaration  
of Independence advises, even if power centres disagree; 7) cut back sharply on 
 military spending and sharply increase social spending. For people who 
believe  in democracy, these are very conservative suggestions: they appear to be 
the  opinions of the majority of the US population, in most cases the 
overwhelming  majority. They are in radical opposition to public policy. To be sure, we 
cannot  be very confident about the state of public opinion on such matters 
because of  another feature of the democratic deficit: the topics scarcely 
enter into public  discussion and the basic facts are little known. In a highly 
atomised society,  the public is therefore largely deprived of the opportunity 
to form considered  opinions.

Another conservative suggestion is that facts, logic, and  elementary moral 
principles should matter. Those who take the trouble to adhere  to that 
suggestion will soon be led to abandon a good part of familiar doctrine,  though it 
is surely much easier to repeat self-serving mantras. Such simple  truths carry 
us some distance toward developing more specific and detailed  answers. More 
important, they open the way to implement them, opportun- ities  that are 
readily within our grasp if we can free ourselves from the shackles of  doctrine 
and imposed illusion.

Though it is natural for doctrinal systems  to seek to induce pessimism, 
hopelessness, and despair, reality is different.  There has been substantial 
progress in the unending quest for justice and  freedom in recent years, leaving a 
legacy that can be carried forward from a  higher plane than before. 
Opportunities for education and organising abound. As  in the past, rights are not 
likely to be granted by benevolent authorities, or  won by intermittent actions - 
attending a few demonstrations or pushing a lever  in the personalised 
quadrennial extravaganzas that are depicted as "democratic  politics". As always in 
the past, the tasks require dedicated day-by-day  engagement to create - in 
part recreate - the basis for a functioning democratic  culture in which the 
public plays some role in determining policies, not only in  the political arena, 
from which it is largely excluded, but also in the crucial  economic arena, 
from which it is excluded in principle. There are many ways to  promote 
democracy at home, carrying it to new dimensions. Opportunities are  ample, and 
failure to grasp them is likely to have ominous repercussions: for  the country, for 
the world, and for future generations.

This is an edited  extract from _Failed  States_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/redirect?link_code=ur2&tag=informati06f8-20&camp=1789&creative=9325&path
=external-search?search-type=ss&index=blended&keyword=Failed%20States)   by No
am Chomsky (Hamish Hamilton)

© 2006  Independent News and Media Limited